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The influence of individual differences and decision domain 
on the consistency of risk preferences 
Emma Soane 
Thesis summary 
The research presented in this thesis considers the question of whether individual-level 
risk preferences are consistent or inconsistent across decision domains. For example, do 
people make the same decisions with respect to work, health and finance? Some 
previous authors have suggested that risk preferences are inconsistent, e. g. Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979), while others have put forward the idea that people have generalised 
tendencies to take or avoid risks, e. g. Sitkin and Pablo (1992). 
The work of Sitkin and Pablo was drawn upon to develop hypotheses concerning the 
conceptualisation and construction of risk propensity. Risk propensity was 
operationalised as the degree of consistency of cross-domain risk preferences. It was 
proposed that a propensity to take or avoid risks is associated with whether individuals 
have consistent tendencies across different decision domains, that personality will be a 
key predictor of risk propensity, and that inconsistent cross-domain risk preferences will 
be associated with risk domain-specific cognitive and emotional aspects of decision 
making. 
A survey measure was developed to assess risk and decision preferences both across 
and within the domains of work, health and finance. Biographical and personality 
factors were also measured. The sample comprised 360 participants drawn from five 
sample groups chosen to capture a range of risk preferences. 
The results showed that risk propensity can be conceptualised and measured in terms of 
the consistency of cross-domain risk preferences. People who were consistent in their 
risk preferences were characterised by the personality traits of emotional stability, low 
extroversion, low openness and high agreeableness. Additionally, consistent risk 
preferences were associated with relative consistency of attention to situational 
information and perceived risk. The majority of participants, however, had different risk 
preferences in different domains, and showed variability in their decision preferences. 
The implications of the research for understanding risk propensity and risk management 
are discussed. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Chapter abstract 
This thesis explores the factors that influence whether people are consistent or 
inconsistent in their risk preferences across decision domains. 
The first section of the chapter discusses the context within which individual risk taking 
takes places. Two key elements of the risk problem that influenced the development of 
this research are presented. These elements are the need for further theoretical work into 
the concept of risk preferences and the factors that motivate individuals to take risk, and 
the need for an understanding of individual-level risk preferences that could assist the 
risk management process. The next section of the chapter discusses three different 
approaches to risk that have shaped much of the theoretical and empirical work in the 
risk field. The approaches are utility theory, prospect theory and the more psychological 
approach. The next section of the chapter discusses the key concepts used in this 
research. The chapter concludes with a summary of each of the following chapters. 
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1.2 The risk context 
The research described in this thesis was developed in response to two aspects of the risk 
that are the focus of discussion. The first aspect is a theoretical issue. It has been 
suggested that there is a considerable volume of work that needs to be carried out in 
order to understand people's perceptions and responses to risk (Rosa, 1998). A key 
question that has been raised by a number of researchers is why some people are 
consistent in their preferences for taking or avoiding risk, and why some people are 
inconsistent. In many aspects of life an individual can make a choice about whether to 
avoid a risk or whether to accept a risk. If the individual makes the latter choice, to bear 
a risk, it could be because the person wishes to attain goals that can only be achieved by 
taking a risk. For example, City traders working in emerging markets know that they 
must take risks in order to gain rewards. The choices that people make about risk can be 
dependent upon many factors. It is frequently likely that situational variables have 
important influences on behaviour. However, theoretical and empirical research carried 
out in the psychological tradition have shown that there are important individual-level 
differences that affect people's choices about risk. Some people are more consistently 
willing to take risks than others. Some people are consistently unwilling to engage in 
risky activities. Some people choose to accept some risks, but not other risks. The 
research described in this thesis considers the relationship between individual difference 
characteristics, decision domain and risk preferences to assess why some people have 
consistent approaches to risk and some people do not. 
One important concept that applies to the consistency of risk-related decision making 
and risk taking is risk propensity. Theoretical and empirical work into the concept of risk 
propensity is reviewed in the next chapter. It is concluded that while there are several 
theoretical models of risk behaviour that include the notion of risk propensity, and a 
number of studies that operationalise the construct, there are opportunities for further 
exploration and theoretical development of the concept. The research presented in this 
thesis seeks to contribute to the debate about the nature of risk preferences, key 
components of risk propensity (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992), and whether preferences are 
consistent and inconsistent across decision domains. The issue of consistency over time 
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is not measured in this research, although the implications of the results are discussed in 
relation to temporal consistency in Chapter 9. '0 
A second issue that influenced the development of this work is the increased importance 
of risk management in organisations. High profile events over the last few years, such as 
the collapse of Barings bank, the illegal copper market trading in Daiwa bank and several 
railway disasters, have raised the issue of risk to the forefront of management practice. It 
could be that the key to effective risk management lies in the understanding of individual- 
level risk-related decision processes to complement the development of appropriate 
information, control and incentive systems. It is argued in this thesis that there are 
individual differences in risk preferences that influence whether people choose to take 
risks or avoid risks. These differences could have important implications of the 
management of individuals in high risk, safety-critical industries. 
1.3 The nature of risk 
The concept of risk has already been referred to a number of times in this chapter. This 
section discusses the approaches to individual-level risk that have been used in the risk 
literature and presents the approach to risk that has been used in this research. 
1.3.1 Risk and utility 
The concept of utility is a key component of several theories of risk. These theories 
propose that when people make decisions they seek to maximise utility, or output, by 
choosing the optimal combination of probability and the size of the potential gain. Hence 
the use of the term expected utility theory. 
One of the most historically significant theories of risk was developed by Daniel 
Bernoulli. Bernoulli examined people's risk-related choices and published a paper on 
expected utility theory in 1738. This paper was to form one of the key tenets in classical 
finance theory, that investors are risk averse (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 1996). Bernoulli 
3 
proposed that, when making choices, people seek to maximise expected utility rather 
than maximise expected returns. He suggested that behaviour could be characterised by a 
utility function that assigns a utility to any level of personal wealth. Bernoulli 
hypothesised that the utility function could be represented as a convex curve with utility 
on the vertical axis and wealth on the horizontal axis. The change in utility from any 
increase or decrease in wealth therefore depends on the existing wealth prior to the gain 
or loss. The shape of the utility curve means that the disutility from losing wealth is 
greater than the utility of gaining wealth. That is, people will be risk averse. Bernoulli 
proposed that risk aversion can be subject to individual differences, although he did not 
go into details about these differences, and can be calculated by asking an individual how 
much greater the winnings need to be than the stake in a fifty-fifty gamble. Individual risk 
behaviour is hypothesised to be determined by the asymmetry of the utility curve above 
and below an individual's current wealth. 
There are two important corollaries of Bernoulli's work that are critical factors in 
modern finance. First, there is an assumption that people will require compensation to 
place their wealth in an investment that associates risk with return. This implies that the 
expected return on risk could be an important factor that motivates individual choice. 
Second, the aggregation of individual-level risk functions is a key factor in the operation 
of financial markets. 
The development of Bernoulli's work has been of great importance in the finance field. 
Expected utility theory in this form has not been applied in the psychological field, 
although it has been developed to encompass subjective perceptions of risk. The 
subjective expected utility approach to risk was based upon the work of Savage (1954). 
Savage showed that the expected utility model could be generalised to include subjective 
measures of probability. The subjective expected utility model acknowledges that both 
probabilities and utilities are defined subjectively and individually. 
The expected utility and subjective expected utility models of decision making have a 
significant place in the risk literature. The models have been particularly important in the 
risk and finance literature. These approaches have been a part of the debate about the 
rationality of decision making, and whether people should, or do, make decisions in the 
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way that these models predict (Neumann & Politser, 1992). The models also have 
relevance to the psychological literature. Expected utility models do not expand the 
debate about the psychological nature of risk and the individual factors that could 
influence decisions about risk. However, the expected utility approach does acknowledge 
that there is a subjective component of risk perception. The subjective nature of risk has 
been a key foundation to the development of psychological approaches to understanding 
risk (Broadbent, 1984). A model that has been a bridge between the more objective 
models of risk and the more subjective psychological models of risk is prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
1.3.2 Prospect theory 
Prospect theory was developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to describe 
observations about decision making and risk taking that did not conform to expected 
utility models of decision making. The authors suggested that there were systematic 
inconsistencies between actual behaviour and the rational behaviour predicted by 
expected utility models. An example of observed decision behaviour was the under- 
weighting of probable outcomes compared with certain outcomes. Decision preferences 
were shown to be non-linear. That is, the authors suggested that people do not think in 
terms of objective probabilities. Rather, they use subjectively determined decision 
weights that deviate most from objective probabilities when the probability is either very 
high or very low. That is, very low probabilities tend to be over-weighted, very high 
probabilities tend to be under-weighted and certainty at either pole is weighted very 
highly. In addition, Kahneman and Tversky observed that people do not weigh equally 
shared aspects of different alternatives. Hence they are susceptible to the influences of 
framing, for example whether an outcome is framed as a loss or a gain. Prospect theory 
was developed to account for these observations. 
The authors proposed that there is a relationship between objective and subjective losses 
and gains that can be described in terms of two curves, shaped like a tilted `S' about a 
reference point which separates the domain of loss from the domain of gain. The curve is 
concave for losses and convex for gains. The curve is steeper in the domain of losses, 
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indicating that losses are more significant to an individual than the equivalent gains. The 
theory predicts that behaviour will be risk averse in the domain of gains, because people 
focus on what they have that they could lose, and risk seeking in the domain of losses 
because, once people have already experienced loss, the value of subsequent losses is 
deemed to have decreased relative to the value of removing loss altogether. Prospect 
theory is an important part of the risk literature for several reasons. First, an implication 
of the theory is that risk behaviour varies on a situational basis. Second, the theory 
proposes that perceptions of loss and gain are key determinants of behaviour. Third, 
there has been a considerable volume of empirical work that has been founded upon the 
principles of prospect theory. Prospect theory is referred to at several points throughout 
this thesis, due to its prominence in the risk literature, and is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
The research that has been founded on prospect theory has tended to use an experimental 
research method. This method enables the examination of whether framing choices as 
losses or gains affects decision making, for example by presenting one sample group with 
a positively framed choice and another group with a negatively framed choice. The 
effects of other factors, such as environment, that might influence choice can be 
controlled. The measures used in this type of research have tended to be standardised 
scenarios. One of the scenarios used by Kahneman and Tversky in their research, and 
cited frequently by other authors, is shown and discussed in Chapter 3. The approach to 
risk used in the research presented in this thesis has been influenced by prospect theory 
and its predictions of the influence of loss and gain on risk taking. The second key 
influence on the research discussed in this thesis is the psychological approach to risk. 
1.3.3 Psychological models of risk 
The prospect theory approach to risk and the more psychologically-oriented approaches 
to risk are presented in separate sections due to the degree of importance attributed to 
individual difference and psychological characteristics. Prospect theory presents a 
method for describing risk seeking and risk aversion in relation to the domains of loss 
and gain. The more psychologically focused approaches to risk give greater attention to 
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variation in individual level factors that could influence risk preferences, for example 
personality characteristics. 
Within the psychological field, however, there is a range of different ways of 
understanding risk. One issue concerns the definition of risk. The approaches to risk 
outlined in the sections above have a shared, key assumption about risk at their core: that 
risk is associated with loss. A summary of the components of risk by Yates and Stone 
(1992) proposed that the three essential, subjective, interactive elements of risk are 
losses, the significance of losses and uncertainty associated with losses, that is, 
uncertainty about the nature and scope of losses. These authors suggested that losses can 
take a number of forms including financial loss, performance loss, physical loss, 
psychological loss and time loss. Yates and Stone hypothesised that loss is compared 
with an internal reference point. This notion of the ý reference point is somewhat more 
complex than the reference point in Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory (1979) 
that divided the domains of loss-and gain. Yates' reference points include personal 
average references, that are related to the past history of outcomes; social expectation 
references, concerned with expectations of social contexts; target references, that is the 
situation that a person aspires to be within. In sum, Yates and Stone suggested that when 
making decisions about risk, people consider what they think they will lose and in which 
areas of their life they would be worse off. 
An alternative perspective of risk, and one that is adopted in this research, is the notion 
that risk involves gain. The relationship between risk and gain is at least implicit in a 
number of models of risk. For example, although the expected utility approach to risk 
focused on loss and loss aversion, this approach did acknowledge that a key component 
of risk, and a reason why people will engage in risky investments, is the association of 
risk with return. In the financial markets environment, and many other environments 
alike, it can be that the biggest risks yield the biggest rewards. The notion of gain is also 
included in the work of Sitkin and Pablo (1992). Their approach encompasses a number 
of features of risk including the possibility of gain and the importance of goal-directed 
behaviour. That is, risk might be taken in order to meet certain expectations or to 
achieve particular goals. This approach provides a piece of information about why people 
engage in risky behaviour, and why some people might be inconsistent in whether they 
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prefer to take or avoid risks than others that is important in this research: people are 
motivated to achieve their goals and are willing to take risk, or accept risk, to attain 
desired outcomes. An important issue raised by this statement concerns the nature of 
goals. The risk literature suggests that there can be two types of goals of risk behaviour. 
The first type of goal concerns the relationship between risk and rewards. In some 
contexts, such as financial markets, there is a positive relationship between risk and 
reward. People willing to take risk are likely to benefit financially, as discussed above in 
relation to expected utility theory. The second type of goal concerns the more intrinsic 
reward that is the sensation that could be associated with risk taking. The work of 
Zuckerman into the concept of sensation seeking began with a paper by Zuckerman, 
Kolin, Price and Zoob (1964). Zuckerman has shown in numerous empirical and 
theoretical papers that sensation seeking involves the pursuit and enjoyment of novel, 
varied, complex and intense experiences. An important element of sensation seeking 
behaviour is that sensation itself is a goal of behaviour (Zuckerman, 1969). Hence, 
people might engage in risk behaviours because of the pleasure in doing so. 
In sum, there is some evidence that risk behaviour can be motivated because of the 
rewards that might be associated with risk, or with the sensations of risk taking itself. 
The two goals of risk behaviour have important implications for the way that risk 
behaviour and risk preferences are understood. Behaviour directed at the first type of 
goal could, as Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Sitkin and Pablo (1992) suggested, be 
influenced by perceptions of loss and gain, reference points, risk preferences and 
evaluations of potential outcomes. The second type of goal behaviour is influenced by 
personality since sensation seeking has been shown to be a component of the 
extroversion dimension of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1985). It might be that, for 
many people, behaviour is motivated by a mixture of both reward seeking and sensation 
seeking. The combination of factors could vary on an individual-level basis and be 
determined by the strength of personality characteristics and psychological decision 
preference variables. This raises interesting questions about the consistency of risk 
preferences and risk behaviour which have been little addressed in the psychological 
literature and which are the focus of this thesis. These issues are discussed at length in 
Chapters 2 and 3. In short, it could be proposed that, if risk preferences are shaped by 
personality, they are more likely to lead to approaches to risk that are consistent across 
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different decision domains. If risk preferences are shaped by decision characteristics, 
such as position of loss and gain in relation to a reference point, then risk behaviour is 
more likely to be situationally variable and inconsistent. These propositions lead to the 
development of three key aims of this research. 
1.4 Summary of the research aims 
The research had three aims. These aims were developed from the risk literature, and 
shaped the research method and hypotheses. 
" To examine whether risk preferences are consistent across different decision 
domains. 
" To assess the influence of biographical variables, personality factors, and cognitive 
and emotional decision preference variables on both the consistency of cross-domain 
risk preferences, and on domain-specific risk preferences. 
" To consider the implications for the relationship between cross-domain and within- 
domain risk preferences. 
1.5 Summary of key concepts discussed in this thesis 
This section presents a review of the five key concepts that are discussed in this research. 
Risk 
The term risk has been defined and used in numerous ways. A key element of risk is the 
notion of probability. One approach to risk was summarised by Knight (1921,1965). 
Knight proposed that risk could be defined as events that can be represented 
meaningfully by numerical probabilities. Risk was considered by Knight to be distinct 
from uncertainty, where events have no specific, rational probability distribution. The 
emphasis on the relationship between risk and probability of outcomes is commonly the 
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core of approaches to economic theories of risk. Psychological approaches to risk have 
tended to take a different approach. Psychologists have suggested that people do not 
commonly think in terms of probabilities, and indeed are often not able to, given the 
difficulty in calculating probabilities in most decisions. This is particularly true when the 
possible range of outcomes is not known. The psychological approach to risk has tended 
to use the term risk while acknowledging that risk includes uncertainty. This is the 
approach taken in this thesis. 
Risk propensity 
Sitkin and Pablo (1992) suggested that risk propensity is a tendency or take or avoid 
risks. A number of other authors have used similar definitions. Theoretical and empirical 
work into the concept is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. There has been some variance, 
however, with respect to the operationalisation of the concept. Some empirical studies 
have measured risk preferences, or risk taking, in finance or business contexts and have 
suggested that they have assessed an individual's risk propensity. Several studies are 
reviewed in Chapter 2. It is argued in this thesis that, if there is such as construct as risk 
propensity, it should be associated with consistent preferences for taking or avoiding 
risks across several aspects of decision making. In addition, if the construct of risk 
propensity can be conceptualised and measured effectively, it could provide important 
insights into understanding individual-level risk behaviour, for example why people take 
more risks than others and why some take risks in one area of their life but not other 
areas. Furthermore, this understanding could lead to the development of effective risk 
management strategies in organisations. 
Risk preferences and risk taking 
The terms risk preferences and risk taking are used frequently in the risk literature. Risk 
preference is generally considered to be a psychological construct, whereas risk taking is 
usually defined and measured in terms of actual behaviour. In this thesis, risk preferences 
are considered to be psychological constructions that influence whether people take or 
avoid risks. Preferences rather than behaviour are assessed for three reasons. First, the 
aim of this research is to examine psychological tendencies to take or avoid risk in 
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several types of decision. Hence a psychological concept seemed to be the most relevant 
operationalisation of this aim. Second, this thesis concerns the nature of risk taking in 
uncontrolled settings, i. e. not in the lab. A point of interest in this research concerned 
decisions that people make in their day to day life rather than considering standardised, 
hypothetical choices. Third, in some situations it is not possible to act in accordance with 
preferences. For example, in a highly controlled work environment risk taking might be 
bounded by clear regulations. These could prevent a person from taking a risk, however, 
there could still be a psychological motivation to take risks, such as the associated 
sensation of excitement, which are another issue relevant to the concept of risk 
propensity. In sum, the measurement of a psychological preference for taking or avoiding 
risks seemed to be an appropriate way to assess the relationships between personality, 
decision making and the consistency of risk preferences in different decision domains. 
Risk perception 
Risk perception is a concept that features in a number of theories of risk taking, including 
the work of Sitkin and Pablo (1992) that has influenced significantly the development of 
this research. Risk perception has been characterised in several ways. For example Sitkin 
and Pablo suggest that it is a broad term that represents the degree of risk perceived in 
any given situation. There are a number of other approaches to risk perception. As 
Slovic notes in his book `The Perception of Risk' (2000), risk perception is highly 
subjective. Slovic and his colleagues have suggested that risk perception is associated 
systematically with two key hazard features - whether a hazard is believed to be 
controllable or not, and whether a hazard is perceived to have dread, or catastrophic, risk 
(Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1980). 
In this thesis, risk perception is conceptualised similarly to the work of Sitkin and Pablo. 
First, their general definition is used. It is acknowledged that a range of individual 
difference and situation-related variables is likely to influence risk perception. These 
variables are not measured, however, two assumptions following the work of Sitkin and 
Pablo are, first, that the level of perceived risk in a situation is a summary of the range of 
input factors. Second, that risk perception is considered to be an important variable that 
could be related to risk propensity. 
11 
Domains 
Two types of domains are discussed in this thesis. One use of the term domain relates to 
the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). These authors proposed that two key 
influences on risk behaviour are the domains of loss and gain. For example, if people 
have had a positive experience, such as an unexpected financial bonus, they are 
suggested to be in the domain of gain. Conversely, if someone has spent more money 
than they had budgeted for having their car fixed, they are in the domain of loss. This 
conceptualisation has had a significant impact on the development of many theoretical 
and empirical works concerning the nature of risk and the factors that shape risk taking. 
The work of Kahneman and Tversky has been outlined in this chapter and is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 3. 
The second type of domain discussed in this thesis is the concept of decision domain. 
Here, a domain is taken to be an area of decision making, such as work-related decisions, 
or finance-related decisions. The notion that there are different decision domains, and 
that different domains could have particular characteristics that shape choices about risk, 
is a central part of the discussion around the nature of risk propensity. 
1.6 Chapter summaries 
This section presents an overview of each of the subsequent chapters. 
1.6.1 Overview of Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 discusses in detail the Sitkin and Pablo (1992) model of risk taking which 
includes the concept of risk propensity. This model is used to form the basis of the 
research that is described in this thesis and was chosen because it is the best developed 
and most tested model involving risk propensity. Published empirical work that has cited 
the work of Sitkin and Pablo is discussed. It is concluded that, while the Sitkin and Pablo 
(1992) model of risk propensity is a useful conceptualisation and has led to some 
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interesting empirical work, there are opportunities for the further development of the 
understanding of risk propensity. The research in this thesis aims to contribute to that 
development. 
1.6.2 Overview of Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature concerning individual-level influences on risk-related 
decision making. Previous theoretical and empirical work has shown that there are three 
key individual difference factors that affect choice: personality; perceptions of loss and 
gain; emotions. It is suggested that people can be categorised in terms of those who are 
largely consistent in their risk-related decision making and those who are generally 
inconsistent in their risk-related decision making. The former group is more likely to 
have strong disposition-based approaches to their risk-related decision making. The latter 
group, characterised by a different type of personality profile, is likely to be more 
susceptible to the influence of situational characteristics such as perception of loss and 
gain. 
1.6.3 Overview of Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 discusses the research design and the method. The research design was 
developed to enable between-participants comparisons with respect to risk preferences 
both within-domain and across-domain. A survey method was used to gather 
standardised, equivalent data in three different decision domains, work, health and 
finance. Biographical and personality data were also measured. The sampling strategy 
was developed to try to capture a range of orientations to risk, and to ensure that there 
was variance on all items. 
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1.6.4 Overview of Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 discusses the data screening and describes the data in terms of the distributions 
of variables, both within sample groups and across the whole sample. The sampling 
strategy was found to have achieved its goal of variance in terms of risk preferences and 
decision processes. The individual-level data were found to vary both within and across 
sample groups. 
1.6.5 Overview of Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 considers the relationships between the variables measured in the 
questionnaire using correlation analyses. Patterns of relationships were considered 
between the variables within each decision domain, across the domains, and between the 
decision preference variables, biographical factors and personality factors. 
1.6.6 Overview of Chapter 7 
Chapter 7 considers the consistency of cross-domain risk preferences, and the factors 
that influence whether people have consistent or inconsistent risk preferences. T-test and 
regression analyses are used to examine the factors that are associated with consistent 
and inconsistent cross-domain risk preferences. Within-domain risk preferences are also 
examined. It was found that some people had consistent cross-domain risk preferences, 
while the majority had domain-specific risk preferences. The hypotheses were confirmed. 
1.6.7 Overview of Chapter 8 
Chapter 8 presents and discusses qualitative data. Analysis of comments revealed that 
there are a number of important differences associated with risks in different domains. 
The combination of these differences with individual choices about risk bearing and the 
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attainment of goals that entail risk is likely to be an important factor that influences 
domain-specific risk preferences. 
1.6.8 Overview of Chapter 9 
The final chapter discusses the conclusions and implications of the research. It is 
suggested that the consideration of individual-level cross-domain and domain-specific 
risk preferences provides useful insights into both risk behaviour and risk management. 
The limitations of this research are discussed. Directions for future work into the 
conceptualisation and construction of within-domain and across-domain risk preferences 
are suggested. 
1.7 Chapter summary 
This research aims to examine the concept of risk propensity, and to consider the factors 
that lead to consistent or inconsistent individual-level approaches to risk. The first part of 
this chapter presented the main ideas that influenced the development of this thesis. The 
first issue is a theoretical debate about the nature of risk propensity. The second issue 
concerns the management of risk in business. The second section of this chapter 
reviewed the main ideas in the current risk literature to show both how this research 
coheres with other psychological studies of risk, and to demonstrate that there are 
opportunities for research in this field. It was suggested that the construct of risk 
propensity has important implications for the understanding of risk behaviour. A 
summary of the key concepts that formed the basis of the research is presented. The final 
section gives an overview of the chapters that follow. 
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Chapter 2 
Risk propensity theory and research 
2.1 Chapter abstract 
This chapter reviews theory and empirical research concerning the concept of risk 
propensity. The key theme of the discussion of the relevant theoretical and empirical 
work is whether cross-domain risk behaviour is consistent or variable. 
The first section of this chapter presents and critiques the Sitkin and Pablo (1992) risk 
propensity framework. The second section reviews empirical work into risk preferences 
and risk propensity. Theoretical work and research evidence suggest that a proportion of 
the population can be characterised as having consistent risk preferences in different 
decision domains. Risk preferences can be consistent in either direction, i. e. risk seeking 
or risk averse. Consistent preferences have been found to be associated with particular 
dispositional traits. The remainder of the population is likely to have inconsistent risk 
preferences, and will take risks in some decision domains and avoid risks in other 
domains. 
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2.2 The Sitkin and Pablo approach to risk propensity and risk taking 
The key theme in this thesis is why some people are consistent in their risk-related 
decision making and other people show variance in their risky decision making. This 
thesis was influenced primarily by the model of Sitkin and Pablo (1992). The Sitkin and 
Pablo model was a significant factor in the development of this research because it is the 
most complete synthesis of the psychological and situational antecedents of risk and has 
been the basis of several published empirical studies. This section discusses the model in 
detail. 
Sitkin and Pablo's 1992 paper, "Reconceptualising the Determinants of Risk Behaviour", 
discussed theoretical and empirical work concerning the conceptualisation of individual- 
level risk-related behaviour. The paper developed a series of propositions that are 
derived from previous theory and research. The authors constructed a model that brings 
together contrasting approaches to risk taking in organisations. This model was chosen 
as the basis for this research for several reasons. First, the model focused on individual 
differences in risk preferences and risk behaviour. These factors relate to the aims of the 
research, namely to examine whether there are differences between people who have 
consistent approaches to risk and people who are inconsistent in their approaches to risk. 
Second, the Sitkin and Pablo approach acknowledged that risk is associated with loss 
and gain. This approach is different from some theoretical conceptualisations of risk that 
focus on the association between risk and loss. The difference between the focus on both 
loss and gain compared with loss alone has important implications for the understanding 
of the factors that motivate people to take risks, as noted in Chapter 1. Third, there is 
increasing empirical evidence that the Sitkin and Pablo approach to risk preferences and 
risk propensity represents an important method of conceptualising and understanding risk 
preferences, and why preferences might vary on an individual basis. Relevant empirical 
studies are reviewed after the discussion of theoretical work of Sitkin and Pablo. Fourth, 
although the Sitkin and Pablo approach to risk preferences and risk taking has been an 
important development in this risk literature, there are opportunities for the extension of 
their work. This research aims to contribute to the literature by demonstrating an 
alternative approach to the conceptualisation and measurement of risk propensity 
through risk preferences. 
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Sitkin and Pablo defined risk as defined "the extent to which there is uncertainty about 
whether potentially significant and/or disappointing outcomes of decisions will be 
realised" (p10). Risk behaviour was defined as the "degree of risk associated with the 
decisions made" (p11). Risk is related to outcomes. Sitkin and Pablo suggested that 
there are three characteristics of outcomes that influence the riskiness of decisions. First 
is outcome uncertainty. This is usually considered in terms of the variability of outcomes 
(Libby & Fishburn, 1977). High variability is generally considered to be more risky than 
low variability. For high variability to be considered positively, there need to be 
significantly higher returns associated with it (e. g. Bowman, 1980; MacCrimmon & 
Wehrung, 1986). Outcome uncertainty can also be associated with lack of knowledge of 
the distribution of potential outcomes, either in terms of what the outcomes actually are 
or what their relative likelihoods are (March, 1978) and the uncontrollability of outcome 
attainment (Vlek & Stallen, 1980). The more uncontrollable an outcome is, the more 
risky it is considered to be. 
Second are outcome expectations. These concern the range of positive and negative 
outcomes of the risk. Sitkin and Pablo drew on the work of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) to suggest that there can be subjectivity concerning whether an outcome is 
positive or negative. The risk in a choice might not be in the decision or the outcome per 
se, but in the relationship between the outcome and the decision maker's expectations. 
For example, if there is a possibility that an outcome will fall well below expectation, 
then the decision can be considered to be more risky than if the discrepancy between 
expectations and potential outcomes is smaller. 
Third is outcome potential. This is concerned with extreme outcomes; the best and worst 
case scenarios. Sitkin and Pablo cited evidence that people tend to overweight very 
unlikely outcomes, for example the likelihood of winning a lottery (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). The perceived probability of outcomes is thus a non-linear function. 
Sitkin and Pablo proposed that outcomes might not perceived to be on a continuum, 
rather, there might be a threshold, or step function which separates one range of 
outcomes from another, as other researchers have proposed (e. g. Dutton & Jackson, 
1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Mintzberg, Raisinghani & Theoret, 1976). 
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Overall, Sitkin and Pablo proposed that decisions can be considered to be riskier when 
their expected outcomes are more uncertain, decision goals are more difficult to achieve, 
or the potential outcome set includes some extreme consequences than when there is less 
uncertainty, difficulty and extremity of outcomes. Within this framework, risk propensity 
is one the key factors influencing choice behaviour. 
Risk propensity is defined as "the tendency of the decision maker to either take or avoid 
risks" (p12). Sitkin and Pablo proposed that risk propensity influences how a decision- 
maker evaluates risk and decides what risks are acceptable. Risk propensity is reflected 
in either an individual's range of risk related activities within and across decision arenas, 
or their expressed preferences for risk seeking or risk avoidance, or both. Sitkin and 
Pablo suggested that their definition of risk propensity enables the determination of an 
overall likelihood that a person will take or avoid risks, but does not enable specific 
predictions of risk behaviours. The authors have noted that situational factors might 
influence risk behaviour, and they suggested that risk behaviour can show some cross- 
situational variability. Sitkin and Pablo proposed that risk preferences that underlie risk 
propensity are relatively stable over time. 
The second key concept that Sitkin and Pablo proposed shapes risk behaviour is risk 
perception, defined as "the perceived risk inherent in a situation" (p 12). The approach to 
risk perception is concerned with the individual and their internal representations of, and 
responses to, risk situations. The risk environment is not discussed in detail, but the 
interaction between internal representations and the external world is central to the 
model. This is reflected in the authors' discussion of the nature of risk propensity, in 
which it is suggested that risk propensity is not an innate predisposition nor is it 
completely stable and constant. Risk propensity is proposed to develop slowly over time, 
in part as a result of experience. It is suggested that risk-related behaviour can adapt, 
developing with the assimilation of outcomes and experiences over time, but tends to 
form a robust approach to risk, either risk seeking or risk aversion, which is largely 
consistent across different risk domains. 
The model was largely derived from dissatisfaction with previous theories, in particular, 
theories which have proposed that behaviour is dependent purely upon situational 
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variables. Sitkin and Pablo suggested that the key factor, missing in much previous 
research, is risk propensity. That is, an individual difference variable that interacts with 
the risk environment to shape behaviour. The authors present three sets of evidence in 
support of the proposition that risk behaviour across situations can be relatively 
consistent. First, Sitkin and Pablo draw upon the threat rigidity hypothesis of Staw, 
Sandelands and Dutton (1981) which suggested that people are consistently risk averse 
under conditions of threat. 
Second, Sitkin and Pablo claimed that results of empirical studies into risk preferences 
and risk taking have been shaped by research methods. Sampling is suggested to be a 
cause of observed inconsistencies in risk behaviour. The authors considered the context 
of previous research studies in terms of their risk propensity framework. They proposed 
that where low risk behaviour is studied, the contexts have tended to be bureaucratic, 
risk averse organisations and where high risk behaviour is studied, the settings tend to be 
more entrepreneurial. The risk propensities of the individuals involved could be expected 
to differ between settings because of selection processes that favour risk seeking or risk 
averse behaviour from employees. The authors proposed that their meta-framework 
highlights the importance of the absent variable of risk propensity. 
Third, Sitkin and Pablo proposed that previous studies have not only excluded risk 
propensity, which is important to the explanation of risk behaviour, but also that they 
have modelled risk behaviour incorrectly. Specifically, the authors noted that risk 
perception is hypothesised commonly to the key determinant of risk behaviour, however 
the relationship between psychological factors and risk perception is not discussed in the 
literature. Sitkin and Pablo attempted to develop a new model of risk behaviour that 
could take into account the effects of both dispositions and situations, be suitable for 
application in the work environment and fulfil the identified need for such a model 
(Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989). 
Sitkin and Pablo supported their framework by selecting previous theoretical and 
empirical work. They proposed the following categorisation (p27), shown on the next 
page. 
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Figure 2.3: Summary of theoretical and empirical work that contributed to the 
Sitkin and Pablo model of risk taking (1992) 
Situational characteristics (objective or perceived) 
Positive Negative 
Prospect theory - conservation Threat rigidity (Staw, 
of prior gains (Kahneman & Sandelands & Dutton, 1981) 
Tversky, 1979) Hypervigilance (Janis & Mann, 
Risk Loss prevention bias (Jackson 1977) 
averse & Dutton, 1988) 
Prediction: low risk behaviour Prediction: low risk behaviour 
Risk 
propensity Attention to opportunities Prospect theory - going for 
(March & Shapira, 1987) broke (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Singh, 1986) 
Risk 
seeking 
Prediction: high risk behaviour Prediction: high risk behaviour 
Sitkin and Pablo suggested that the use of two key factors, risk propensity and risk 
perception, as mediators between influences on risk behaviour and risk behaviour 
distinguishes their model from previous models and increases the model's effectiveness. 
The factors that shape risk propensity and risk perception are discussed below. The 
authors suggested that risk propensity is concerned with the characteristics of the 
individual decision maker and is composed of three factors. 
1. Risk propensity 
1a. Risk preferences 
Risk preferences are conceptualised as being a general, individual level attitude towards 
risk. Preferences influence whether people seek or avoid risk. Sitkin and Pablo base their 
propositions on the work of Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), Kogan and Wallach (1964), 
McClelland (1961) and Slovic (1972). Individual orientations to risk, derived from the 
interaction between psychological factors and the environment, are a critical element of 
the Sitkin and Pablo model. The notion that behaviour is directed purely by 
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organisational factors (e. g. Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) was 
not accepted. 
lb. Inertia 
The concept of inertia is related to the concept of risk preferences. Sitkin and Pablo 
suggested that once people have formed attitudes or preferences towards risk, for 
example whether risks are sought or avoided, these preferences tend to be relatively 
stable. (Kogan & Wallach, 1964; Rowe, 1977; Slovic, 1972). Sitkin and Pablo proposed 
that stability can be considered as a form of inertia and that inertia, or habit, can be a 
more important influence on risk behaviour that situational risk factors. 
1c. Outcome history 
Sitkin and Pablo suggested that theories that do not consider history of loss and gain, for 
example Kahneman & Tversky's prospect theory (1979), have omitted an important 
influence on behaviour. The authors cited research that has shown that people who have 
had positive outcomes from risk behaviour are likely to continue taking risks (Osborn & 
Jackson, 1988; Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Similarly, people who have had experiences of 
loss are risk averse in subsequent choices (Osborn & Jackson, 1988). Sitkin and Pablo 
proposed that people's preferences could become more extreme as a result of historical 
effects of loss and gain. People who prefer to take risks become more risk seeking and 
people who prefer to avoid risks become more risk averse. That is, people demonstrate 
escalating commitment to particular courses of action (Staw & Ross, 1987) with respect 
to risk behaviours as with other behaviours. Sitkin and Pablo proposed that people who 
seek to gain from risk taking, but are unsuccessful, are more likely to vary their 
approaches to risk in an attempt to find an optimal risk strategy. They suggested that this 
is the cause of variable risk behaviour. The authors likened this hypothesis to the 
observation that organisations that are successful tend to adhere to strategies that have 
been successful in the past, while organisations that are not successful tend to vary their 
strategies (Lave & March, 1975; March, 1988). 
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2. Risk perception 
Sitkin and Pablo proposed that risk perception is concerned with the situation within 
which the decision is being made, and is influenced by six factors. 
2a. Risk propensity 
The factors that shape risk propensity have been discussed above. Sitkin and Pablo 
proposed that risk propensity is a direct influence on risk perception. Someone who is 
risk averse is likely to perceive risks to be greater than someone who is risk seeking. 
2b. Problem framing 
Research by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and numerous subsequent authors, has 
demonstrated that risk behaviour can be influenced by whether a problem is presented in 
terms of associated gains or associated losses. Sitkin and Pablo suggested that 
perceptions and framing interact. They proposed that positively framed situations are 
perceived as entailing greater risk than is objectively appropriate because people in 
situations of gain have been shown to be risk averse (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The 
reverse holds for negatively framed situations, which are perceived to involve less risk 
than is appropriate. In addition, the positive framing of situations encourages a focus on 
the opportunities associated with risk taking rather than the costs (March & Shapira, 
1987). 
2c. Top management team homogeneity 
Research into the influence of groups on decision making has indicated that there are 
significant interactions between group properties and the nature of decisions. Groupthink 
(Janis, 1972) is considered by Sitkin and Pablo to be a salient issue. Groupthink is a 
process associated with homogeneous groups whereby group norms reduce the range of 
decision outcomes. Decisions tend to be more polarised in this type of group than would 
be observed among individuals. Sitkin and Pablo proposed that homogenous top 
management teams are associated with homogeneity of team member perceptions, and a 
greater likelihood of strong risk aversion or risk seeking. 
23 
2d. Social influence 
In the above discussion concerned with inertia it was noted that individual factors are 
important influences on behaviour and that organisational factors alone are insufficient to 
explain behaviour. Sitkin and Pablo do acknowledge, however, that the organisational 
social context is an important, " but not exclusive, influence on risk perception. The 
organisational context has been termed a `strong' situation (Mischel, 1977). That is, 
organisational culture, reward and control systems exert powerful constraints on 
behaviour (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989; Snyder & Ickes, 1985). People often have to 
behave in accordance with organisational expectations, explicit or implicit, rather than in 
accordance with their own preferences. Organisational cultures can be discriminated in 
terms of risk orientation (e. g. Deal & Kennedy, 1982). Sitkin and Pablo proposed that 
individual level perceptions would be consistent with managers' perceptions. In addition, 
people within organisations that have a moderate risk orientation will be more slow to 
perceive risks, but more accurate. 
2e. Problem domain familiarity 
Sitkin and Pablo suggested that the more familiar decision makers are with the decision 
domain, the more likely they are to apply their knowledge and experiences to new 
decision problems (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972; Dearborn & Simon, 1958). Their 
range of responses can thus become limited. In addition, the authors noted evidence that 
when responses are shaped by past experiences rather than current situations, people can 
be overconfident and underestimate risks (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; March & Shapira, 
1987). Lack of familiarity can also relate to sub-optimal risk judgements. Jemison and 
Sitkin (1986) found that people who are inexperienced in organisations could adhere to 
inappropriate, standard procedures or make sub-optimal judgements based on incomplete 
information. Sitkin and Pablo proposed that people with moderate domain familiarity 
would have more appropriate levels of confidence and accurate perceptions of risk than 
people with high or low familiarity. They also proposed that low levels of familiarity are 
associated with greater variance in perception. 
6. Organisational control systems 
Control systems can be important determinants of risk behaviour because of the rewards 
and punishments associated with behaviour. Sitkin and Pablo highlighted, in particular, 
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the work of Ouchi (1977) that categorised control systems into two groups. First, 
reward systems can focus on the decision making process. Second, reward systems can 
focus on decision outcomes. Sitkin and Pablo proposed that systems which focus on 
process issues decrease perceptions of risk, because there is less risk for the individual if 
the outcome is poor, and that systems which focus on outcome issues increase 
perceptions of risk. 
In sum, Sitkin and Pablo made several hypothesises based upon their approach to risk 
propensity and the work of previous authors. Their hypotheses included the following 
predictions that are concerned with risk propensity. 
" The nature of the relationship between risk propensity and risk perception changes 
according to the situation and becomes stronger when perceived risk is greater. Risk 
averse individuals perceiving greater risk will take increasingly fewer risks and risk 
seeking individuals perceiving less risk will take greater risks. 
9 The shift in the relationship -between 
perception, propensity and behaviour is 
dependent upon individual thresholds that are related to risk preferences, inertia, the 
barriers to overcoming inertia and the outcomes of past risk taking behaviour. Hence, 
individual level variations in risk behaviour are explained by the relationship between 
risk propensity, risk perception and behaviour. 
" Perceptions are moderated by propensity rather than being a direct influence on 
behaviour. Perceptions can be influenced by the risk environment and are thus subject 
to fluctuation. 
" Variance in behaviour is within the bounds of individual risk propensity. 
Sitkin and Pablo summarised three theoretical contributions of their research. First, 
drawing together previously unrelated research streams. Second, a critical reappraisal of 
the roles of risk perceptions and risk propensity. Third, the identification of determinants 
of risk behaviour not previously recognised in the literature. 
The Sitkin and Pablo model is illustrated on the next page. 
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Figure 2.4: The Sitkin and Pablo model (1992) illustrated 
Risk preferences 
Inertia 
Outcome history 
Problem framing 
Top management team 
homogeneity 
Social influence 
iI 
Problem domain 
familiarity 
Organisational 
control systems 
Risk propensity 
Risk behaviour 
Risk perception 
Sitkin and Pablo noted that, in addition to their theoretical contributions, there are also a 
number of empirical implications of their research, including the opening of the 
possibility of further work on organisational level factors and research into the 
interactions between the components of the model. 
Overall, the Sitkin and Pablo model is useful to this research for several reasons in 
addition to the reasons outlined prior to the full discussion of the model. First, the model 
suggests that there is likely to be a risk propensity factor that underpins behaviour and 
that can show individual level variation in the degree of consistency across decision 
domains. Second, the model is an attempt to bring together different approaches to risk 
propensity: those which suggest that risk propensity is a characteristic of the individual 
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and can be stable over time, and those which suggest that risk propensity is a product of 
environmental factors. Third, the Sitkin and Pablo model is the best developed and 
discussed model of risk propensity. Fourth, the key principles concerning the central role 
of risk propensity and the relationship between propensity, perception and behaviour can 
be applied to settings other than the workplace. 
However, there are a number of theoretical and empirical difficulties with the model. 
First, the conceptualisation of risk propensity as being a variable that is able to change 
over time yet tends to be relatively stable, is problematic. This presentation of risk 
propensity appears to be due to the desire to fit in with previous research. Sitkin and 
Pablo refer to risk propensity in terms of it being a disposition, yet make no mention of 
dispositions in terms of personality. This is a striking omission given the importance of 
personality in determining behaviour, including risk behaviour. Personality and its 
relationships with risk preferences and risk behaviour are discussed in the next chapter. 
A second issue is the choice of the three components of risk propensity (risk preferences, 
inertia, outcome history). The risk preference variable is most closely linked to a 
disposition approach to modelling the antecedents of risk behaviour, however the other 
two variables, inertia and outcome history, are both related to past behaviours and habits 
formed partly on the basis of past behaviours. This is problematic for two reasons. First, 
the distinction between inertia and preferences formed over time is not clear. Second, the 
outcomes of behaviours are subject to interpretation which is likely to be influenced by 
risk perception, within the perception/ propensity framework of the individual. These 
variables might not be independent of risk perception. 
The construction of risk perception is also problematic. The variables range from the 
very general, such as social influence, to the highly specific, such as top management 
team homogeneity. The effects of each of the variables on risk perception and risk 
behaviour are not explained. Nor is it explained why these variables are included, while 
other variables that have been also demonstrated to have effects on risk perception, such 
as emotions which are discussed in the next chapter, are excluded. 
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Third, there is some degree of tautology in the development of model and the 
development of predictions from the model. Sitkin and Pablo used the results of 
numerous different strands of research to make propositions about the influences on risk 
behaviour and nature of the relationships between indirect and direct influences on risk 
behaviour. The authors then applied the model to findings of previous research to 
demonstrate its fit. This seems to be an essentially circular approach that cannot prove 
independently the model's effectiveness. 
Fourth, there is some empirical support for the model. This is discussed in the next 
section of this chapter. However, the variables used in research have not always been 
operationalised as the Sitkin and Pablo model would suggest. All the studies have only 
tested parts of the model. A full test of the model has yet to be published. 
In sum, the Sitkin and Pablo model of risk taking and risk propensity, despite a number 
of conceptual and empirical problems, comprises an interesting synthesis of the literature 
worthy of further development. The research described in this thesis was, in part, based 
upon the work of Sitkin and Pablo and sought to examine some of the issues raised by 
the authors, in particular the issue of whether risk preferences are consistent across 
domains. The reasons why the Sitkin and Pablo framework was selected for use in this 
thesis have been outlined above. In addition, there are three further issues that make this 
framework relevant. First, there are interesting theoretical implications for the 
development of an understanding of risk propensity. Second, a consideration of the 
number of other models of risk propensity suggests that the Sitkin and Pablo model is the 
optimum basis for this research due to it being better developed and supported than the 
alternatives. Four published models of risk propensity are portfolio theory (Coombs, 
1969,1975; Coombs & Meyer, 1969; Coombs & Huang, 1970a); zero risk theory 
(Naatanen & Summala, 1974); risk homeostasis theory (Wilde, 1982); the risk 
thermostat model (Adams, 1985,1988). A fifth model is the threat-rigidity hypothesis 
(Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981). This model does not consider the concept of risk 
propensity, however, it does hypothesise that risk taking will be consistent in the 
direction of risk aversion when people are faced with threats. It has thus contributed to 
the debate about the consistency of risk preferences and risk behaviour. These models 
involving risk propensity show a considerable degree of variance in terms of their content 
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and structure. For example, the threat rigidity hypothesis focuses on psychological and 
physiological factors that lead to risk aversion in situations of threat. The Adams model 
proposes that the interaction between risk propensity, perceptions of societal risk, 
perceived danger, positive and negative outcomes influences risk behaviour such that 
people will adjust their behaviour to be more or less risky, as appropriate for their 
preferences and their situation. In general, there has been little published work that tests 
models either by the models' authors, or subsequent researchers. Hence, although these 
models are acknowledged as being components of the psychological risk literature, the 
models are not explored further in this thesis. Rather, the most significant influence on 
the research described in this thesis is the work of Sitkin and Pablo, discussed above. The 
third reason for using the Sitkin and Pablo model is that research based upon the model 
has shown some support for the ideas central to their framework of risk propensity. 
Empirical studies are reviewed below. 
2.3 Empirical work into the concept of risk propensity 
This section reviews empirical work concerned with the concept of risk propensity. The 
empirical work illustrates a number of approaches to the conceptualisation and 
measurement of risk propensity that were important influences on the development of the 
research described in this thesis. 
The first subsection discusses research based upon the work of Sitkin and Pablo. The 
second section discusses the correlation approach to the study of risk propensity. 
2.3.1 Research influenced by the Sitkin and Pablo model (1992) 
Several research studies have been carried out. The Sitkin and Pablo model was first 
tested 'by Sitkin and Weingart (1995). The Sitkin and Weingart studies focused on four 
variables and their relationship with risk behaviour. Specifically, the authors considered 
whether the effects of problem framing and outcome history on risk behaviour were 
mediated by risk propensity and risk perception, respectively. In accordance with the 
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Sitkin and Pablo model (1992), outcome history was proposed to be a determinant of 
risk propensity and problem framing was proposed to be a determinant of risk 
perception. Propensity and perception were suggested to influence risky decision making 
behaviour directly. Outcome history was chosen above the other factors comprising risk 
propensity because the authors argued that in previous research risk propensity either has 
not been considered, or the research method has confounded risk propensity and risk 
perception. Problem framing was included in the research because of previous research 
findings which have shown risk behaviour to be inconsistent and situationally variable 
depending upon the way a decision problem is framed, i. e. as positive or negative 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
The model that Sitkin and Weingart tested is shown below. 
Figure 2.5: Model of risk behaviour tested by Sitkin and Weingart (1995) 
Outcome history b Risk propensity 
Risky decision 
making behaviour 
Problem framing Risk perception 
The authors proposed four hypothesises concerning the relationships between the 
variables. 
" Outcome history is positively related to risk propensity. Positive experiences of risk 
lead to risk seeking, negative experiences of risk lead to risk aversion. 
" Risk propensity is positively related to risk behaviour. Propensity to seek risk leads 
to risk behaviour and the reverse for propensity to avoid risk. 
" Problem framing is positively related to risk perception. That is, a problem presented 
in a way that focuses on opportunities will lead to risk seeking, and threat-framed 
problems lead to risk aversion. 
" There is a negative relationship between risk propensity and risk perception, that is 
propensity to seek risks is related to perceptions of low risk and vice versa. The same 
holds for the relationship between risk perception and risk behaviour. 
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Sitkin and Weingart conducted two studies to test this model. In both studies 
participants were given a scenario concerning the decisions faced by a motor racing team 
manager and asked a series of questions about decisions and judgements. Participants 
were students. The measure of outcome history was the positive or negative outcome of 
the scenario. A manipulation check was used to ensure that participants' choices were 
influenced by the outcome history. Decision making behaviour and risk propensity were 
measured using a scale developed by the authors. The Cronbach's alpha of the decision 
making scale was . 72. The Cronbach's alpha of the risk propensity scale was . 86. Risk 
perception was measure using a scale adapted from MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1985, 
1986a, 1986b). The Cronbach's alpha of the risk perception scale was . 75. 
The first study examined the influence of outcome history on risk propensity, risk 
perception and risky decision making behaviour. In order to test for the effects of 
outcome history, two versions of the scenario were developed. The versions differed 
with respect to whether the outcome history was successful or not. T-tests and 
regression analyses were used to examine the data. Results showed that there were 
significant differences between ratings of risk decision making (t = -2.06, p< . 05), risk 
propensity (t = -2.15, p< . 05) and risk perception 
(t = 2.38, p< . 05) 
for the positive and 
negative outcome history conditions (df = 36). As hypothesised, risk perception was 
lower when risky decision making and risk propensity were greater. Second, hierarchical 
regression was used to test for mediation effects. Risk propensity was found to mediate 
the relationship between outcome history and risky decision making, and between 
outcome history and risk perception. Risk perception fully mediated between risk 
propensity and risky decision making. 
The second study examined the influence of problem framing on behaviour. Two 
versions of the racing scenario presented different problem frames, one negative and one 
positive. There were significant differences between risky decision making (t = 3.44, p< 
. 01) and risk perception 
(t = -2.99, p <. O1) for the positive and negative conditions (df 
= 61). The direction of relationships was as hypothesised. There were significant 
relationships between the framing of the problem and the perception of the problem. 
Risky decision making and risk perception were negatively related. Regression analysis 
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showed that risk perception partially mediated the relationship between problem framing 
and risky decision making. 
Sitkin and Weingart suggested that, although risk propensity did not influence behaviour 
directly, it was shown nevertheless to be an important factor in the decision making 
process. The revised model, below, takes these observations into account. 
Figure 2.6: Revised model of risk behaviour from the research of Sitkin and 
Weingart (1995) 
Outcome history 0 Risk propensity 
Problem framing -10 Risk perception i 
Risky decision-making 
behaviour 
The work of Sitkin and Weingart demonstrates some of the propositions made by Sitkin 
and Pablo (1992). There are, however, some problems with this piece of research. First, 
it is not clear that the research is a test of risk propensity. The measure of risk propensity 
seemed to be more concerned with the effects of scenario framing (positive or negative) 
than with risk propensity as defined by Sitkin and Pablo (1992). Sitkin and Pablo 
suggested framing to be an influence on risk perception. Yet, in the model that Sitkin and 
Weingart test, outcome history is purported to influence risk propensity. Hence the 
findings could be a result of the method. Second, it is only a partial test of the Sitkin and 
Pablo model. It is not fully clear why the other variables in the model are excluded from 
the research. There have been several studies by other authors that have based their work 
upon the Sitkin and Pablo model. These studies are reviewed below. 
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Smith and Friedland (1998) examined the influenced of education and personality on risk 
propensity of nurse managers. The authors noted that appropriate risk taking is an 
increasingly important aspect of the role of nurse managers. Previous research has shown 
that the risk propensity of nurses is related to both level of education and the risk 
situation (Grier & Schnitzler, 1979). Nurses with higher levels of education were 
prepared to take and accept more risk than those with lower educational attainment. 
However, research by Masters and Masters (1989) found that there were no differences 
in risk propensity that related to level of education. Smith and Friedland addressed these 
discrepancies using a framework based upon the work of Sitkin and Pablo (1992). Three 
components of the Sitkin and Pablo model were considered: risk preferences, outcome 
history and inertia, i. e. the factors that constitute risk propensity. Smith and Friedland 
operationalised risk preferences in terms of self-esteem and locus of causality. Higher self 
esteem was proposed to lead to greater risk taking due to increased confidence 
(Lancaster & Lancaster, 1981). Self esteem was measured using the Rosenberg self 
esteem scale (1965). Causality orientations have been defined as `general motivational 
frameworks that shape how individuals see the world' (p23). There are three types of 
orientation: autonomy (the self is in control), control (the environment is in control) and 
impersonal (behaviour is beyond the individual's intentional control) (Deci & Ryan, 
1985). Causality orientation was measured using the Causality Orientations at Work 
Scale (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Inertia was operationalised in terms of tenure, which was 
proposed to be a proxy for the development of habits over time. Outcome history was 
operationalised as level of education. It was suggested that nurses with less than a 
bachelors degree would have been taught to minimise risks. The authors hypothesised 
that high self esteem and higher levels of education (minimum bachelors degree) would 
be associated with high risk propensity. Control or impersonal causality orientations and 
longer tenure were proposed to be associated with low risk propensity. 
All the participants in the Smith and Friedland study were women. The mean level of 
experience was 20.17 years. Risk propensity was measured using four scenarios 
developed from the Kogan and Wallach choice dilemmas questionnaire (1964). The 
scenarios were adapted by experts to address decision making in nursing situations. 
Participants were asked to advise how much risk a nurse manager should take in each 
scenario. Participants were then asked to choose between a high risk and low risk option 
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and to note the probability of success that they would require to take a high risk 
decision. Multiple regression was used to assess the impact of the predictor variables on 
risk propensity. Results showed that strong autonomy orientations were found to be 
associated with higher risk propensity (p < . 05). Higher educational attainment was 
found to be associated with greater risk propensity (p < .0 1). Self esteem and tenure 
had 
no effect. 
Smith and Friedland's research is an interesting attempt to test part of the Sitkin and 
Pablo model. It was demonstrated that there were differences in the risks that nurses 
with different qualifications and experience would take. The results suggested that 
nurses' decision making is subjective. The implications for managing decision making 
and risk could be important. However, the research method does not seem to be a true 
test of Sitkin and Pablo for several reasons. First, Smith and Friedland note that risk 
preferences might be related to personality. Although this seems likely to be true, they 
have diverged from the approach of Sitkin and Pablo who do not discuss preferences in 
terms of personality. Second, Smith and Friedland's operationalisation of personality in 
terms of self esteem and locus of causality is problematic. It is not clear why these 
aspects of personality are chosen rather than a generic model of personality, such as the 
Five Factor model of personality. The Five Factor model of personality and its 
relationship with risk taking are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Third, Sitkin 
and Pablo's definition of outcome history indicates that some measurement of previous 
risks and their outcomes is required. Level of educational attainment does not seem to be 
a satisfactory proxy for history of risk taking. Rather, education might be more likely to 
relate to cognitions or perceptions related to risk. Fourth, the scenarios used to measure 
risk propensity were related only to four different risk scenarios, each focused on work. 
It is possible that risk preferences with respect to work were measured effectively. It is 
also possible that the assessed risk preferences apply only to the work context, and 
therefore should be considered as work-related risk preferences rather than a generalised 
assessment of risk propensity. 
A third piece of research that draws upon the work of Sitkin and Pablo was carried out 
by Williams and Narendran (1999). These authors examined the impact of a range of 
biographical factors, risk propensity and risk perception on risk behaviour. The aim of 
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the study was to test the extent to which risk preferences influence managerial risk 
propensity and the extent to which individual characteristics influence risk preferences. 
Participants were 196 Indian managers working in India and 89 Indian managers working 
in Singapore (total n= 285). Williams and Narendran proposed the following model of 
risk behaviour. 
Figure 2.7: Williams and Narendran model of risk behaviour (1999) 
Risk 
preferences 
Individual 
characteristics 
Risk l Risk 
propensity behaviour 
Risk 
perception 
Other factors 
Risk preference was measured using a single item developed from MacCrimmon and 
Wehrung (1986). Participants were asked to rate their willingness to take risks compared 
with their colleagues. These authors' operationalisation of risk propensity was a scale 
formed by responses to ten business scenarios. Each scenario was followed by a choice 
between a risky option of a safe option and an assessment of the riskiness of the choice 
made, ranging from very safe to very risky. A manipulation check was carried out to 
examine the relationship between choice of the safe versus risky option and perceived 
riskiness of choice. Perceptions of greater risk were associated with risky choice. This 
finding is contrary to the hypothesis of Sitkin and Pablo (1992) that perception and risk 
taking are associated negatively. A check on the pattern of responses showed that there 
were some participants who responded almost consistently with respect to risk seeking 
or risk aversion across the business scenarios. 92 respondents selected the risky option in 
at least 7 out of 10 scenarios. 75 participants chose the safer option in at least 7 out of 
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10 scenarios. These results support the notion that people can have risk preferences that 
are consistent across situations. 
Personality was measured in terms of the Achievement Motivation Scale results 
(Jackson, 1965), Rotter's Locus of Control measure (1971) and Type A behaviour 
measured using items from the Jenkins Activity Survey (Krantz, Glass & Snyder, 1974; 
Schaubroek & Williams, 1993). Cultural orientation was operationalised in terms of 
traditional versus modern perspectives. Items were derived from the work of Nedd and 
Marsh (Nedd and Marsh, 1979; Nedd, 1992). Data were also gathered concerning 
organisational characteristics and individual variables such as age, seniority and tenure. 
Analysis of variables influencing risk behaviour was carried out using stepwise 
regression. Variables were clustered in accordance with the authors' model of risk 
behaviour. A preference for taking risks was associated with lower age, being male, 
higher levels of education, a modern cultural perspective, working in India, increased 
length of employment, seniority, non-governmental control of organisation, need for 
achievement, internal locus of control, ambiguity intolerance and Type A personality. 
Results showed that willingness to take risks was unrelated to tendencies to take or 
avoid risks. Higher willingness to take risks was, however, associated with belief that the 
course of action selected was risky. That is, reported willingness to take risk was more 
strongly related to perceptions of risk than risky choice behaviour. The authors proposed 
that these results could be due the subconscious influence of preferences on propensity, 
or due to the influence of organisational factors on behaviour. There was a relationship 
between perceptions of organisational willingness to take risks and risk preferences. It 
could be that organisations influence risk preferences to some extent, or that there might 
be self-selection of individuals into organisations that match their risk preferences. The 
latter proposition could be a factor that accounts for the positive relationship between 
risk perception and risky choice. 
The Williams and Narendran study provided evidence that willingness to take risks is the 
sum of a number of psychological, biographical and organisational factors. It 
demonstrated that risk perception has a significant relationship with risk behaviour. The 
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operationalisation of risk propensity in terms of responses to business scenarios, 
however, suggests that the results might concern risk propensity at work and not a more 
generalised measure of risk propensity. In addition, the summing of responses to the risk 
propensity items does not allow for people to be distinguished on the basis of whether 
they are consistently risk averse or risk seeking, or inconsistent. Given that these groups 
were identified with respect to the manipulation check, further examination of these 
groups to test for differences, for example in terms of personality or risk preferences, 
might have revealed differences between people who were consistent in their risk 
preferences and people who were inconsistent. 
Another author to carry out research into risk propensity based upon the work Sitkin 
and Pablo was Kärhä (1998). Kärhä's research focused on the forestry industry in 
Finland. It assessed the key influences on risk preferences and considered whether 
attitudes to risk differed across individuals in the industry. 
Krhä developed a questionnaire was used to gather data. The variables were a range of 
personality characteristics, age, work experience, seniority, the size of the organisational 
unit, the influence of co-workers, questions about decision situations, success of 
previous decisions and decision support systems.. Kärha's method of measuring risk 
propensity was by asking participants to rate themselves on a scale of 1- 20 with two 
poles: I avoid risks and I seek risks. Each pole was described further to enable 
participants to improve their self-rating. The scale referred to daily decision making 
situations. Two control statements were used in addition to the self-rating: I don't enjoy 
taking risks and I take only manageable risks. Participants were 140 managers from four 
of the main timber organisations in Finland. 
Data from the risk propensity measure were used to categorise people into one of three 
groups: risk seekers (response range 16 - 20, n= 23), risk neutrals (response range 6- 
15, n= 89) and risk averters (n = 28, response range 1- 5). Although the largest group is 
the risk neutrals, the distribution of responses on the scale showed that few people rated 
themselves the midpoint of the scale. The modal response was 12. The results of the 
control statements verified the categorisation and between group scores were 
significantly different, although at the individual level some responses were not 
37 
consistent. There were no significant differences between the risk propensities of 
participants from different hierarchical levels. 
The risk preference groups were compared in terms of their personal characteristics. It 
was found that the risk seekers rated themselves as more outgoing, dominant, happy-go- 
lucky, expedient, adventurous, tough-minded, trusting, imaginative, self-confidence and 
unprejudiced than the other two groups. These results are similar to previous research 
(e. g. Keinan, Meir & Gome-Nemirovsky, 1984; Shapira, 1995). The results for the risk 
neutral people showed their self-ratings to fall between the scores for the risk seekers 
and risk averters. There were also differences between the groups with respect to 
decision making situations. The risk averters considered themselves to have more 
certainty in decision situations and to have fewer risky situations in their daily work than 
either of the other two groups. It was suggested that people who preferred to avoid risk 
structured their work to fit in with their preferences, as has been shown by other authors 
(Keinan, Meir & Gome-Nemirovsky, 1984; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986). 
In sum, Kärhä's research provides further evidence for the existence of individual-level 
risk preferences that can be used to categorise people. Differences in risk preference 
showed relationships with differences in a range of other individual difference factors, 
including personality. These results were clear even with a relatively simple measure of 
risk preference and a questionnaire that was not a well-established measure of 
personality. The study indicates that the inclusion of personality provides useful insight 
into the construction of risk preferences. 
Tabak and Barr published a similar type of study (1999). These authors examined the 
propensity on hospital managers to adopt radical technological innovations. Risk 
propensity was conceptualised in the way defined by Sitkin and Pablo (1992). It was 
proposed that personal characteristics (risk propensity, self-efficacy, cognitive 
complexity, education level, age, past experience) and the organisational context 
(perceived strategy, perceived information processing capacity, perceived resource 
availability, specialisation) would influence the intention to adopt innovations. 
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Participants in the research were 998 executives from American community hospitals. 
The three innovations that respondents considered were developed using a panel of 
health care experts. The likelihood of adoption of the innovation was operationalised as 
the intent to adopt. Participants rated their intent on a scale of 0% probability - 100% 
probability. Risk propensity was measured using a revised version (Sexton & Bowman, 
1985) of the risk sub-scale of the Jackson Personality Inventory (Jackson, 1976). The 
Jackson measure of risk taking assesses general tendencies to enjoy gambling, danger 
and adventure, and to choose to be in situations with uncertain outcomes. The other 
constructs were measured using survey-format items. Self-efficacy was measured using 
the Sherer et al scale (1982). Cognitive complexity was the degree to which respondents 
liked abstract versus concrete thinking (O'Conner, 1972). Strategy and information 
processing capacity were measured using Likert scales (Thomas & McDaniel, 1990). 
The scales were based on the work of Miles (1982) who suggested that organisational 
strategies can be assessed in terms of the type and extent of product or service, market 
competition, customer profiles and innovative services or products. The information 
processing capacity scale measured the range of formality, interaction and participation 
in decision making (from Thomas, Clark & Gioia, 1993). Availability of resources was 
measured using ratings concerning ten hospital-specific resources, e. g. labour (adapted 
from Miller & Freisen, 1982). 
Regression analysis was used to assess the influence of individual and organisational 
characteristics on the dependent variable, intention to adopt innovations. Three models 
were used. First, the individual-level variables only were put into the analysis. Self- 
efficacy (p < . 001), risk propensity 
(p < . 001) and past experience (p < . 01) were all 
shown to influence intentions significantly. The second analysis considered the 
organisational variables alone. Organisational strategy and perceived resource availability 
were all positively related to decision to adopt the innovation (p < . 001). Information 
processing capacity was related negatively to intent (p < . 01). 
A similar pattern of results 
emerged when all the variables were entered into the regression equation. Significance 
levels were at least p< . 01, with the exception of past experience, which ceased to have 
a significant impact. 
39 
The authors suggested that these results confirm that a range of factors impacted upon 
the decision processes influencing intention to adopt radical innovation. Although they 
noted that intention to adopt might not in all cases lead to adoption, they proposed that 
these results are significant nonetheless. As with the studies discussed above, risk 
propensity was found to be one of the key factors in the decision process. 
In sum, a number of studies have been carried out which have used the concept of risk 
propensity as Sitkin and Pablo have defined it. Although the operationalisation of the 
construct of risk propensity has varied across studies, research has demonstrated three 
important findings. First, risk propensity has been shown to be a significant influence on 
the decision making process. Second, risk propensity can be used as the basis for 
categorising individuals into groups according to differences in their risk preferences. 
Third, differences in risk propensity tend to be associated with a number of other 
individual-level characteristics and dispositions. These findings have influenced the 
development of the research discussed in this thesis. 
A study that has made a significant contribution to the development of the understanding 
of the concept of risk propensity was the work of Weber and Milliman (1997). This 
paper is reviewed in detail because it demonstrates important differences between 
methods for conceptualising and measuring risk preferences. Weber and Milliman's 
paper examined individual-level consistency of risk-related decision making from three 
different perspectives. The aim of the research was to assess whether different theoretical 
approaches to decision making, including a definition of risk preference that is similar to 
that of Sitkin and Pablo (1992), led to different results. It was concluded that different 
operationalisations of consistent and inconsistent decisions did indeed lead to differences 
in the revealed patterns of behaviour. 
Weber and Milliman reviewed the literature concerning decision making under conditions 
of loss and gain. They suggested that although people's choices might change under 
different domains, the change might be due to shifts in perception not changes in 
preference. They proposed that this distinction is of critical importance if risk behaviour 
is to be influenced by situations.; Further, if behaviour is driven by risk perceptions, then 
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cognitive processes need to be targeted by managers to effect change. Alternatively, if 
behaviour is driven by preferences, then emotional responses must be targeted. 
The authors defined risk preference in three ways. 
1. Traditional risk attitudes derived from people's choices, i. e. the utility framework 
approach. 
2. Relative risk attitudes based on the work of Dyer and Sarin (1982). This approach 
separates the marginal value for outcomes from attitudes towards uncertainty. The 
authors suggested that differences in choices under conditions of loss and gain as 
modelled in the expected utility framework might be the result of differences in 
marginal values in the domains. The relative risk attitude, however, might be stable 
and could be a personality trait. 
3. Perceived risk attitude concerned with reported tendency to be attracted or repelled 
by risk. This is similar to the conceptualisation of Sitkin and Pablo. 
The three concepts were compared in two experiments. Experiment 1 assessed 
hypothetical commuting choices of 54 University of Chicago participants. Items were 
presented in three sections of a questionnaire. First, participants were told to assume a 
certain journey time (60 minutes) for a fixed price ($3). They were asked how much they 
would pay for trains that were faster or slower by six fixed intervals. Second, 
participants' utility function was calculated by asking them to state the probability that 
would make them indifferent between an arrival time that was 40 minutes faster or 
slower than the original time of 60 minutes, and a connection that was 5,10,15,20 or 
30 minutes faster or slower with a probability of . 80. Third, perceived risk attitudes were 
assessed using two sets of pairwise comparisons with respect to risk. The first set of 
items assessed preferences. The second set of items concerned arrival times of trains that 
were faster or equal (gain domain) and slower or equal (loss domain) than the current 
time of 60 minutes with varying associated probabilities, operationalised in terms of the 
probability of catching a connection. 
Participants were classified into four groups: risk seeking, risk averse, neutral and mixed. 
The classification process was repeated three times, once for each conceptualisation of 
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risk-related decision making. Next, the number of people who showed consistency of 
group membership across the loss and gain domain was summed. The pattern of results 
is striking. The percentage of people who were consistent under the EU risk attitude 
categorisation was 22%. The percentage of people who were consistent under the 
relative risk attitude categorisation was 37%. Under the perceived risk attitude 
categorisation, 76% of people were consistent in their responses. 
The authors suggested that the differences in conceptualisation and operationalisation of 
risk-related decision making led to different results concerning consistency across the 
domains of loss and gain. Further analysis of perceived risk attitudes was carried out 
with respect to pairwise comparisons of trains. Participants were asked to make a choice 
between two trains presented together, one train being more risky than the other in terms 
of variance for both gain and loss domains. High variance was associated with high risk. 
If preference alone was considered, the results showed that in the loss domain 62% of 
participants chose the less risky train and in the gain domain 61% chose the more risky 
train (higher variance). However, when participants' perception of which train was the 
more risky (the higher variance or lower variance train), a different pattern emerged. In 
the loss domain the high variance train was considered to be riskier in 85% of 
judgements. In the gain domain, 34% responses rated the low variance train as the most 
risky. It seemed that, when in the domain of gain, the degree of variance of arrival time 
was not a key concern and the focus was on the potential for larger time savings. In the 
loss domain, greater variance was considered to be problematic. Perceived risk attitudes 
showed a different pattern of results. People were classified as risk averse if they 
preferred the choice in the pair that was judged to be less risky and risk seeking when 
they preferred the option that was judged to be more risky. Using this categorisation, 
57% of participants were risk averse in both loss and gain domains. When losses were 
considered people almost always perceived the low variance train to be less risky. In the 
gain domain choices were more divided between the high and low variance train with the 
biggest shift towards the high variance train. 
In sum, the majority preference in the loss domain was for the low risk, low variance 
choice. This result seems to be contrary to prospect theory. The authors suggest this 
could be due to differences between choices concerned with money and choices in the 
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time domain. Of greatest interest to Weber and Milliman was the observed change in 
perceptions. They proposed that people did not see themselves as making more or less 
risky choices in loss and gain domains, that is, their underlying preferences might have 
remained stable. Rather, perceptions of what was risky changed. For example, in the gain 
domain the train that had no chance of saving a lot of time (low variance) was perceived 
to be the more risky train. The high variance train was seen to be less risky. An expected 
utility perspective, in contrast, would have classified this choice as risk seeking. 
At the individual level the differences in operationalisation of the three conceptualisations 
of risk led to large differences. People were classified as risk seeking, risk averse or risk 
neutral according to their risk choices between 12 item pairs. The number of people 
classified as belonging to the same group for both gain and loss domains was 22% using 
the EU risk preference approach, 37% using the relative risk preference approach yet 
76% when the perceived risk attitude approach was used. The authors concluded from 
this study that it is theoretically possible for risk perceptions to change across situations 
while underlying risk preferences, that could be associated with personality, remain 
stable. 
The second study reported in Weber and Milliman's paper was concerned with repeated 
financial decisions. The choice to study repeated decisions was made to enable 
examination of the effects of prior losses and gains. The task involved a combination of 
skills and chance to increase the salience of previous success or failure. The measure was 
a computer-based investment task. Participants were 24 graduate students at the 
University of Chicago. The participants were asked to select one stock based upon a 
range of information in each of ten sessions, during which positive or negative feedback 
concerning the selected stock was given. The stocks varied in terms of the risks they 
represented. For example some stocks were similar to blue chip companies whereas 
others resembled small new organisations. Stock price varied across investment sessions 
so that each participant experienced loss and gain. There was an additional option to put 
money into endowment. 
Results showed that in the gain domain participants stayed with the same stock 55% of 
the time. In the loss domain, participants chose the same option only 30% of the time. At 
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the individual level the same pattern was observed. Each participant showed greater 
variance in the loss domain. The participants were categorised as risk seeking (n = 5) or 
risk averse (n = 15). These two groups differed significantly with respect to the amount 
of money that they chose to put into endowment rather than into stocks (p < . 01). The 
former group invested more in stocks. There was considerable individual level variation 
in perceptions of risk associated with each organisation's stock. When asked about 
changes in risk judgements over the investment period, participants tended to report that 
they had updated their information on the basis of the trends that were the result of the 
loss or gain outcome manipulation in the research design. 
Perceived risk attitudes were analysed using participants' risk judgements of a stock and 
whether or not the stock was chosen. Correlations were used to assess the relationship 
between judgement and choice for each individual over four points in time. Two methods 
of classification were used to categorise people as risk seeking or risk averse. The first 
method categorised people for whom the correlations were significant at the p< . 05 
level. The second method categorised people on the basis of a negative (risk averse) or 
positive (risk seeking) correlation. The number of people categorised as risk seeking, risk 
neutral (people who fell between the critical values for method 1) or risk averse for both 
loss and gain domains was summed. A total of 79% showed the same risk preference 
under method 1. A total of 83% showed unchanged preferences under method 2. 
Overall, the work of Weber and Milliman is important to the research discussed in this 
thesis, and to the general development of the understanding of risk preferences. Weber 
and Milliman proposed that there is support for the notion of a consistent, personality- 
based concept of risk preference. Factors such as loss or gain might change perceptions 
while leaving underlying risk preferences unchanged. They suggested that their data 
supported the work of Sitkin and Weingart (1995). The authors do not claim to have 
assessed causal relationships between key variables, nor do they claim that any of the 
three approaches to risk preference is superior. 
In sum, there have been a number of studies that have examined the concepts of risk 
propensity and risk preferences. Some of these studies have been inspired by the work of 
Sitkin and Pablo. There is, however, some degree of variance with respect to the 
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conceptualisation and measurement of risk propensity. While some authors have used 
considered risk propensity in terms of the degree of risk that people say they prefer to 
take or avoid, or have assessed choice behaviour, a common approach has been to assess 
risk preferences in one domain only. In particular, the work domain has been the focus of 
attention. Some authors have supported the notion of consistent risk preferences for at 
least a portion of the sample population. The work of Weber and Milliman showed that 
whether people can be shown to have consistent risk preferences or not depends upon 
the way that risk preferences are conceptualised and measured. These authors suggested 
that there are individual level risk preferences that are likely to be anchored in personality 
and consistent across situations. The work reviewed in this section has been an important 
component in the development of the research that is described in this thesis, and in the 
analytical strategy that is discussed in the chapters that follow. Another area of research 
that has informed this study is a part of the literature that has taken a different approach 
to the concept of risk propensity. The next section discusses the correlation-based 
method of study. 
2.3.2 The correlation-based approach to risk propensity 
The following discussion reviews some key research studies that are relevant to the 
conceptualisation and understanding of risk propensity. A research framework and 
method that has been adopted by several researchers, whose work is reviewed below, has 
examined the concept of risk propensity in terms of the number and strength of 
correlation-based relationships between a number of different measures of risk taking. 
The correlation method for research was an influence on the analysis of the data gathered 
in this research. Correlations between questionnaire items are discussed in Chapter 6. 
One study was carried out by Slovic (1962). Slovic considered relationships between 
different types of risk. Slovic's measures were: response set measures comprising 
speed/accuracy tasks, a test for tendency to include items in an ambiguous, stated 
category (the inclusion task) and a multiple choice test where wrong answers are 
penalised; the Torrance-Ziller Inventory that assesses preferences with respect to 
physical sensations, financial situations and life experiences; the job preference inventory 
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that associates preferences for jobs with independence, responsibility and high variance 
outcomes with risk taking; an assessment of betting behaviour; risk taking with respect 
to betting on vocabulary questions. In addition, participants were rated by fraternity 
colleagues on descriptive statements concerning risk taking. Correlations between the 
variables showed that there were few strong relationships between measures of risk 
taking. At the level of p <'. 01 there were three significant correlations. Taking chances 
on the games was significantly, positively associated with risk taking in the speed and 
accuracy task, i. e. sacrificing accuracy for the sake of speed. Risk taking on the inclusion 
task was related to scores on the Torrance Ziller measure (Torrance & Ziller, 1957). The 
Torrance Ziller measure was also associated with peer ratings of risk taking. There were 
six correlations significant at the p< . 05 
level: risk taking on the skill task with the 
inclusion task and gambling (negative relationship). Gambling was also associated 
negatively with peer risk ratings. One of the chance tasks was positively related to the 
Torrance Ziller measure. The other chance task was negatively related to job preference 
scores and associated positively with peer risk rating. 
Slovic concluded that risk taking is both subjective and multidimensional. He proposed 
that the pattern of correlations does seem to suggest that situational factors are more 
significant than individual factors in determining risk behaviour. However, it is not clear 
that the conceptualisation of what constitutes risk is equivalent across the measures. It 
would be interesting to see whether a different type of analysis could be carried out on 
data such as these. For example, it could be that the majority of people were 
inconsistent, but that there was a minority group of people who are more consistent 
across tasks. Categorisation of individuals, as carried out by authors such as Weber and 
Milliman, might have revealed that some people responded consistently to a range of 
different measures of risk. 
Kogan and Wallach (1964) carried out research using a similar method. These authors 
assessed participants on a range of measures: response set measures, as described in the 
above summary of Slovic's research; personality measures, such as impulsiveness; 
aptitude tests; the authors' Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (which has since been used in 
numerous research studies); measures of betting. As with the work of Slovic, 
correlations between the measures were in general low. Only 17 out of 196 correlations 
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were statistically significant. It was concluded that risk taking is situation-dependent and 
variable. However, individual level response patterns were found to vary. Participants 
who scored highly on defensiveness, measured using Crowne and Marlowe's (1960) 
scale of need for social approval, and anxiety, assessed using Alpert and Haber's (1960) 
scale, were relatively consistent in their approaches to risk. It can be hypothesised that 
their consistency was in part due to their disposition based orientations to risk. Women 
were found to be more consistent than men. The results suggested that there is some 
evidence for consistent preferences, at least for a subset of the sample. 
The work of Kogan and Wallach was used by Weinstein and Martin (1969) who 
considered correlations between scores on the Kogan and Wallach choice bets measure 
(1964). Participants were students. Their task was to choose between bets that varied 
with respect to size, stake and probability of winning. Responses were categorised in 
terms of five strategies: maximisation of gain; minimisation of loss; long shot; 
minimisation of deviation from a half (choice of the alternative with the probability of 
winning that is closer to half); maximisation of variance. Results showed that 6 out of 20 
correlations between scores were significant. Correlations tended to be stronger for men 
than women, although the overall pattern was the same. Relationships were strongest 
between maximisation of gain, minimisation of loss and maximisation of variance. 
Extroversion (Eysenck's 1964 measure) and Machiavellianism (Christie & Merton, 
1958) were associated with risk taking. The authors suggested that there is some 
evidence that material risk taking has some relationships with interpersonal risk taking. 
They proposed that interpersonal risk taking might, however, be strongly influenced by 
situational factors. The Weinstein and Martin study raises the issue that risk taking in one 
decision domain could be associated with risk taking in other domains, although they do 
not pursue this line of enquiry. 
Another correlation-based piece of research into risk propensity was published by 
Salminen and Heiskanen (1997). These authors examined correlations between reports of 
accidents in traffic, at work, at home, sports accidents and leisure time accidents. The 
research drew upon the concepts of accident proneness and risk compensation, both of 
which assume relationships between different types of accidents. Data were gathered 
using telephone interviews carried out by professional interviewers. There were three 
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data sets. The number of people in each data set that were interviewed was 9598 (1980), 
13762 (1988) and 4275 (1993). In each data, participants were asked to report all the 
accidents that they have been involved in over the previous 12 months. The results of the 
1980 study showed that there were strong correlations between home accidents and 
sport-related accidents and between home accidents and work accidents (both p< . 001). 
There were also significant relationships between traffic accidents with work accidents 
and home accidents (p < . 01). The 1988 study revealed three significant relationships. 
Sports accidents were associated with traffic accidents and occupational accidents (p < 
. 001). 
Occupational and traffic accidents were also correlated at the same level of 
significance. The large sample size enabled the authors to analyse data separately for 
men and women. When divided into categories by age, particular accidents were 
highlighted as being significant for different age categories. Risk taking was greatest 
among young males. The results -suggested a portion of the sample were relatively 
consistent in their risk taking. 
Salminen and Heiskanen acknowledged that the study has several drawbacks. First, they 
cited research that suggests that people forget up to 30% of their accidents in a year 
(Elander, West & French, 1993), yet noted that accident proneness could be revealed 
better over a five year period than a one year period. Second, the people that refused to 
participate in the study tended to be young, city dwelling men (Heiskanen, Aromaa, 
Niemi, Ruusinen & Siren 1991) who might have experienced many accidents compared 
with people with different demographic characteristics. Third, accident involvement was 
not distributed normally which might have influenced the correlation results. 
Nevertheless, there tended to be strong relationships between traffic accidents, accidents 
at work and sports injuries. It is likely that these relationships are due to the behaviour of 
young men that increases the probability of these types of accidents (Central 
Organisation for Traffic Safety in Finland, 1992; Ministry of Labour, 1993; Sandelin, 
1988). The research is interesting in that it identifies two key factors, youth and being 
male, that were associated with accident involvement that was consistent across 
domains, if not over time. However, further exploration of the psychological correlates 
of decisions about risk could have been interesting. 
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A piece of research that has been much cited subsequently was carried out by 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung in 1986. These authors examined the risk propensity of 
managers. Risk propensity was defined in terms of risk seeking or risk averse choice 
behaviour. A large volume of studies and analyses was produced. Selected, relevant 
results and their implications are discussed. 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung hypothesised that individual-level approaches to risk can be 
consistent, and proposed that people can be characterised as risk seekers or risk averters. 
These characteristics are operationalised in terms of preferences and behaviours, 
although the psychological variables influencing these characteristics are not discussed. 
This hypothesis was tested. The results showed that, when standardised choice situations 
were considered, there was a small group of people who were consistently more risk 
seeking than chance would predict. Similarly, there was a small group of people who 
were consistently risk averse. When the results of naturalistic decision measures were 
examined, the results showed that there was a consistently risk averse group, but not a 
consistently risk seeking group. 
Age was found to be strongly associated with risk aversion. Postgraduate level of 
education and higher income were associated with greater risk taking. CEOs were found 
to take greater risks than managers at lower levels within the organisation. However 
there were no significant differences between the risk seekers and the risk averters on the 
biographical characteristics. There were no clear relationships between biographical data 
and risk propensity. 
In sum, although risk seeking and risk aversion were influenced by situational 
characteristics, for example greater risk aversion was observed in decisions concerning 
the individual's money than when company money was involved, a proportion of the 
sample were found to be consistent in their approach to risk. The authors suggested that 
there are two key individual level approaches to risk: consistent risk seeking or 
consistent risk aversion and variable risk behaviour. Further, the authors suggested that 
when situations are not standardised, the differences between people who are risk 
seekers and risk averters are more strongly apparent than when standardised situations 
are used to assess risk preferences. 
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A different approach to risk propensity was taken by Smidts (1997). This author used the 
concept of intrinsic risk attitude, rather than risk propensity or risk preferences. He 
considered some of the individual difference variables that might influence orientations to 
risk. He defined intrinsic risk attitude is the relationship between risk attitude, measured 
in terms of a utility function, and strength of preference, measured by a value function. 
The participants in Smidts' research were farmers. Risk attitudes and strength of 
preference were measured over a two-year time period. Questionnaire and interview data 
were gathered. Strength of preference and risk attitude concerned with the price of 
potatoes were assessed during interviews using a lottery technique and a midvalue 
splitting technique respectively. 
Results showed that the average strength of risk preference was similar over the period 
of data collection. The test-retest Spearman correlation was . 45 
(p<. 001, n= 179). This 
result supports the notion of risk propensity, albeit in one decision domain. Risk attitudes 
were found to move towards greater risk aversion over time. The change in risk attitudes 
was likely to have been related to expectations of lower prices and lower yield of 
potatoes. Risk attitude and strength of preference were positively and significantly 
correlated (p < . 001, n= 203 
in year 1; p< . 05, n= 53 
in year 2). The pattern of 
relationship between the two variables was not linear. Smidts suggested that, although 
there is some relationship between the variables, they could be regarded as measuring 
different constructs. Overall, the majority of participants were intrinsically risk seeking. 
This is in contrast to MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) who found that in naturalistic 
decision situations there were no consistently risk seeking participants. Smidts 
recommended the use of multiple procedures to test constructs like intrinsic risk attitude 
and reported his agreement with von Winterfeld and Edwards (1986) in this matter. 
Smidts acknowledged, however, that the indirect nature of the measurement of intrinsic 
risk attitude increases the likelihood of error and instability caused by error. He 
concluded that further research needs to be carried out into the psychological factors that 
influence intrinsic risk attitude and on the methods of analysis used to assess risk 
propensity. 
The correlation-based method of research has led to two conclusions. The first 
conclusion is that there are no significant relationships between different measures of risk 
50 
taking (e. g. Slovic, 1962). Thus risk preferences are proposed to be inconsistent across 
situations. The second conclusion is that risk preferences and risk taking are likely to be 
consistent across situations for some people (e. g. MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986). As 
discussed in the previous section summary, the apparently conflicting results could be, in 
part, caused by the conceptualisation and measurement of risk preferences and by the 
sample groups. It could be that, as Weber and Milliman (1997) proposed, there are stable 
risk preferences but these preferences might not emerge as consistent measurable 
phenomena in standardised experimental settings. The results of some studies might also 
be influenced by sampling. If, as authors such as MacCrimmon and Wehrung have 
suggested, the number of people who are consistently risk seeking or risk averse is 
relatively small, it could be that sampling strategies have not captured enough variation 
to ensure that the groups of people with consistent responses are represented. 
2.4 Summary of risk propensity research 
There is empirical support for the concept of risk propensity defined in terms of 
consistent risk preferences or behaviours. The pattern of results that has emerged from a 
number of studies is that the population consists of two groups, with respect to risk 
preferences: people with consistent preferences (either risk seeking or risk averse) or 
inconsistent preferences. It could be expected that research sample groups vary in their 
composition in terms of consistent and inconsistent participants. Results concerning the 
consistency of risk behaviour have varied. Some researchers have supported the notion 
of consistent risk seeking and risk aversion for a part of the population. Where 
inconsistency has been observed it is possible that at least some of the results might be 
accounted for by the majority group, representing inconsistent individuals, masking the 
responses of a minority group of individuals with consistent approaches to risk. Overall, 
it is clear that the issue of decision domains is important to the concept of risk 
propensity. If people are not consistent across domains, they cannot be considered to 
have a particular propensity to take risks. Rather, they have domain-specific risk 
preferences that could be variable. 
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The research into risk propensity has also demonstrated that, in general, there is a lack of 
agreement among researchers concerning the definition of risk propensity. Different 
approaches to risk propensity have been adopted, and there is variance in the degree to 
which risk propensity has been ascribed to individual or situational factors. There is also 
variance in the research method. Some studies have considered risk propensity in terms 
of responses or behaviours across a number of different risk situations. Other researchers 
have measured responses to a small number of items in one decision domain and the 
response is deemed to be a measure of risk propensity. It seems that further development 
of the concept of risk propensity is required. The research discussed in this thesis aims to 
contribute to the clarification of the conceptualisation and construction of risk 
propensity. 
2.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has discussed theoretical and empirical work surrounding the concept of 
risk propensity. The aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate that risk propensity is a 
valid concept that can be considered in terms of risk preferences, but that further 
clarification of the concept could add to the understanding of whether risk preferences 
are generalisable, and thus can be considered to form a directional propensity to take or 
avoid risks, or whether risk, preferences are variable across situations and decision 
domains. 
One model of risk propensity, the Sitkin and Pablo model (1992), has been reviewed and 
critiqued. This model was chosen for discussion, and to form the basis of the research 
described in this thesis, because it is the best developed model of risk propensity. The 
Sitkin and Pablo model proposed that a combination of individual and organisational 
variables shape risk behaviour. It was hypothesised that propensity is relatively stable 
across situations and time. Any variance in behaviour is within the bounds of an 
individual's propensity to seek or avoid risks. 
Empirical work into the concept of risk propensity has shown varying degrees of support 
for the concept. A number of authors have found that subsections of their sample group 
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show consistent risk preferences, thus supporting the notion of consistent risk 
preferences. In contrast, a number of researchers have found little cross-situational 
consistency of risk behaviour, It could be that results are, to some extent, dependent on 
the research method. Analysis has not in each case been directed towards the 
identification of different groups of consistent or inconsistent individuals. Where there 
has been research into inconsistent decision making, the focus is not on individuals who 
might, in fact, be consistent. It could be that in many studies there are some people, 
perhaps in small numbers, who do not show changes across loss and gain domains. 
In sum, it is proposed that risk propensity can usefully be interpreted in terms of 
consistent and inconsistent decision preferences and choices. It seems likely that 
individuals can be categorised in two ways: people who are consistent in their 
approaches to risk and people who are inconsistent in their approaches to risk. Research, 
such as the work of Weber and Milliman (1997), has proposed that the consistency of 
the former group is likely to be associated with particular psychological and disposition- 
based characteristics. In contrast, it is possible that people who are inconsistent in their 
approaches to risk do not have the same psychological profiles. Inconsistent preferences 
could be due to a combination of situational variables and psychological variables. 
The next chapter considers the psychological and perceptual factors that might influence 
whether people are consistent in their approaches to risk-related decision making or 
whether people are inconsistent in their risk preferences. 
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Chapter 3 
Personality, framing, emotions and risk 
3.1 Chapter abstract 
This chapter builds upon the discussion in the previous chapter. The chapter presents 
further theoretical and empirical evidence for psychological antecedents of risk-related 
decision making and behaviour. It is argued that the consistency of risk preferences is 
likely to be related to personality-based dispositions, cognitive processes and emotions. 
The chapter comprises four sections. The first section reviews the literature concerning 
personality and risk preferences. The second section discusses the relationship between 
cognitive processes, risk perception and risk preferences. The third section introduces 
the concept of emotions and considers how emotions can influence risk behaviours. The 
fourth section presents the hypotheses that are tested in this research. 
It is concluded that the presence of directional personality traits can lead to consistent 
cross-domain risk preferences. That absence of this type of personality profile is 
proposed to be associated with cross-domain variance in risk preferences, whereby the 
decision maker is more likely to be influenced by their perceptions, cognitive decision 
processes and emotions than by their dispositions. 
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3.1 Risk and Personality 
This section discusses the conceptualisation and measurement of personality, and how 
dispositions can affect risk behaviour. 
Personality is important to the study of risk and risk propensity for two key reasons. 
First, there are important theoretical reasons why personality could lead to consistent 
cross-domain risk behaviours. Second, there is empirical evidence to suggest that 
personality is associated strongly with risk behaviour. 
3.1.1 Definition of personality 
Personality has been defined recently as being "that set of non-physical and non- 
intellectual psychological qualities which make a person distinct from other people. " 
(Adler, 1996, p419). This definition has been selected from a range of alternatives 
because it reflects the difficulty is summarising the numerous aspects of people's 
characteristics, habits, emotions, thoughts and behaviours with a few phrases. There have 
been a number of different approaches to the conceptualisation and measurement of 
personality over the last century. Over the last few years there has, however, been some 
convergence. One of the most important changes is the development of the concept of 
personality traits and the refinement of a cluster of five traits generalisable across 
individuals and nations. Traits are the "internal psychological structures or properties 
that relate to regularities in behaviour" (Adler, 1996, p420). There are different traits 
referring to different sets of cognitions, emotions or behaviour. Each trait is 
characterised by two poles situated at opposite ends of a continuum, for example 
introversion - extroversion. 
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3.1.2 The Five Factor model of personality 
One the most significant developments of the conceptualisation and measurement of 
personality is the Five Factor model. The development and applications of the Five 
Factor trait model of personality are important to this research for several reasons. First, 
the Five Factor model is an empirically based model grounded in a significant body of 
research. Second, the trait approach to personality focuses on individual differences 
(Reber, 1985) which are the focus of this study. Third, there is general agreement that 
the Five Factor model is the optimal current model of personality. It is a model that 
supports the notion of cross-situational consistency of preferences, and in some cases 
behaviour, because once formed personality traits remain relatively stable throughout 
adulthood (Costa & McCrae, 1988b). This issue is discussed in more detail below. 
Fourth, there is gathering evidence that supports relationships between risk taking and 
the Five Factor model of personality. Although it is acknowledged that there are other 
models of personality, alternative approaches are not discussed in this thesis. This is 
because the strongest empirical evidence for a relationship between risk taking and 
personality has been based upon the Five Factor model. 
The model is operationalised in several personality measures. One of the most widely 
used is based upon the NEO-PI which measures neuroticism, extroversion and openness 
to experience (McCrae and Costa, 1985,1987). The authors have been described as "the 
world's most prolific and most influential proponents of the five factor model. " 
(Goldberg, 1993 p30). This questionnaire was initially based on a three factor model 
supported by several other researchers (e. g. Eysenck, 1991; Peabody, 1968,1985). 
McCrae and Costa revised their approach in the light of the repeated emergence and 
replicability of five factors. Two factors were therefore added to their model: 
agreeableness and conscientiousness. The personality inventory was revised to include 
these factors (Costa & McCrae, 1991). The NEO-PI R comprises 240 Likert scale items 
that measure six facets in each of the five factors. The authors have written numerous 
papers concerning the Five Factor model of personality (e. g. Costa & McCrae 1982, 
1985,1987,1988a, 1988b, 1991,1992a, 1992b, 1994,1995a, 1995b, 2000; Herbst, 
Zonderman, McCrae & Costa, 2000; Kallasmaa, Allik, Realo & McCrae, 2000; McCrae 
& Costa 1982,1983,1984,1985,1987,1988a, 1988b, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1991a, 
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1991b, 1992,1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1997; Loehlin, McCrae, Costa & 
John, 1998; Yang, McCrae, Costa, Dai, Yao, Cai & Gao, 1999). 
The following table shows summaries of the five personality factors. (Costa and McCrae, 
1985). 
Figure 3.1: Summary of the Five Factor model of personality (Costa & McCrae, 
1985) 
Characteristics of the Trait scales Characteristics of the low 
high scorer scorer 
NEUROTICISM (N) 
Worrying, nervous, Assesses adjustment vs. emotional instability. Calm, relaxed, 
emotional, insecure, Identifies individuals prone to psychological unemotional, hardy, secure, 
inadequate, distress, unrealistic ideas, excessive cravings or self-satisfied 
hypochondriacal urges and maladaptive coping responses. 
EXTROVERSION (E) 
Sociable, active, talkative, Assesses quantity and intensity of interpersonal Reserved, sober, 
person-oriented, " interaction; activity level; need for stimulation unexuberant, aloof, task- 
optimistic, fun loving, and capacity for joy. oriented, retiring, quiet 
affectionate 
OPENNESS (0) 
Curious, broad, interests, Assesses proactive seeking and appreciation of Conventional, down-to- 
creative, original, experience for its own sake; toleration for and earth, narrow interests, 
imaginative, untraditional exploration of the unfamiliar. unartistic, unanalytical 
AGREEABLENESS (A) 
Soft hearted, good natured, Assesses the quality of one's interpersonal Cynical, rude, suspicious, 
trusting, helpful, orientation along a continuum from compassion uncooperative, vengeful, 
forgiving, gullible, straight to antagonism in thoughts, feelings and actions. ruthless, irritable, 
forward manipulative 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS (C) 
Organised, reliable, hard Assesses the individual's degree of organisation, Aimless, unreliable, lazy, 
working, self disciplined, persistence and motivation in goal-directed careless, lax, negligent, 
punctual, scrupulous, neat, behaviour. Contrasts dependable, fastidious weak-willed, hedonistic 
ambitious, persevering people with those who are lackadaisical and 
sloppy. 
The work of McCrae and Costa has changed the opinions of a number of researchers 
who previously had held alternative views. Notable among these is Oliver John, who had 
initially taken the lexical approach to personality assessment which is concerned with the 
encoding of aspects of personality in language. McCrae and John (1992) claimed that the 
convergence upon a five factor model marked a turning point for personality psychology. 
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John went on to develop the Big Five Inventory. This personality measure is a 44-item 
questionnaire developed for research purposes. The measure is used in this research, and 
is described in more detail in the method chapter. 
3.1.3 Critique of the Five Factor model 
There have been a number of criticisms of the Five Factor model of personality. First is 
the issue of the derivation of the model. Block (1995) claimed that the use of factor 
analysis is problematic. Different approaches to factor analysis can yield different 
numbers of factors. The results then require psychological interpretation before they are 
meaningful. This interpretation is often subjective and does rely upon objective statistical 
criteria. Different researchers have come to different conclusions about the results of 
factor analysis and have labelled the factors differently and placed some facets in the 
domain of different factors. However, work by Costa and McCrae has demonstrated the 
reliability of the five factor structure through its consistent emergence in empirical 
research (e. g. Costa & McCrae, 1988b; Costa, McCrae & Dye, 1991; McCrae & Costa, 
1983) 
Second, Block claimed that the concept of traits is not fully agreed. It is not certain what 
a trait that can remain stable across situations should comprise. Whether traits are truly 
internal or are the product of actions and social construction has been an issue of debate 
(Hogan, 1991). In addition, the boundaries of traits are not agreed. For example traits 
include some unobservable behaviour, emotions, motives and attitudes (Buss, 1989; 
McCrae & Costa, 1990; McCrae & John, 1991), but do not include unconsciousness and 
individual identities (Pervin, 1993). Hence it was suggested that there is a lack of clarity 
whether traits describe or explain behaviour. 
Third there has been considerable debate over whether personality is a cause of cross- 
situationally consistent behaviour. An important criticism of personality theory and the 
issue of consistency was published by Mischel in 1968. In this year, personality had been 
defined as "more or less stable factors that make one person's behaviour consistent from 
one time to another, and different from the behaviour other people would manifest in 
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similar situations" (Child, 1968, p83). Mischel, however, presented theoretical and 
empirical evidence that behaviour is not consistent across situations, that scores on 
personality measures were not strongly related to behaviour, and claimed that the 
construct of personality itself was invalid because it relies on the notion of consistency of 
behaviour. This criticism stimulated much debate in the field of personality theory and 
led to the development of behavioural models of personality, for example the social 
learning theory of Mischel (1973), and the notion that personality is shaped by internal 
factors interacting with the environment (e. g. Argyle, 1976; Bern, 1972). However 
Mischel's later work (1977) concerning the different effects that `strong' and `weak' 
situations exert on behaviour has contributed to the resolution of this debate. He 
suggested that in strong situations people are influenced more strongly by environmental 
constraints, and therefore the correlation between personality and behaviour is reduced. 
Conversely, in weak situations people are more free to act in accordance with their 
underlying dispositions. The conceptualisation of situations into strong and weak could 
have an influence the consistency of risk preferences. It could be that people with strong 
personality-based risk preferences are more likely to have risk preferences that are 
consistent across situations, however in situations that exert strong controls, their 
behaviour might not be consistent with their risk preferences. In experimental 
manipulations, behaviour might be observed to be inconsistent, however as Weber and 
N illiman (1997) suggested, underlying risk preferences could remain stable. 
In sum, the Five Factor model of personality is the current optimal conceptualisation and 
guide to the measurement of personality. There is considerable empirical support for the 
model. It is regarded generally as the best approach available for the purposes of 
personality profiling and for researching relationships between personality and behaviour. 
In addition, the model seems likely to be an important set of factors that contribute to 
consistent risk-related choice behaviour. The Five Factor trait model is the most 
appropriate for use in this study. 
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3.1.4 Empirical research into personality and risk behaviour 
A number of strong relationships between personality and behaviour have been 
demonstrated in research. Two studies are discussed in the first part of this section. 
These studies have been selected for discussion because of their direct relevance for the 
research described in this thesis. The second part of this section considers a specific 
aspect of personality: sensation seeking. 
The research of Kowert and Hermann (1997) discusses many of the issues central to this 
thesis. Their work was directed at leadership and risk taking in foreign policy decision 
making. They considered risk propensity and personality to be key factors in 
understanding and predicting leader behaviour. Their work emphasised the centrality of 
personality to much risk-related decision making and revealed different personality 
profiles associated with different approaches to risk. Kowert and Hermann proposed that 
individual level understanding of people's approaches to risk could not be gained if 
primarily economic models of decision making, such as the much-cited prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), are applied. They cited evidence that prospect theory has 
not been found to apply equally well to individuals (e. g. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 
1991; Quattrone & Tversky, 1988). Prospect theory is discussed in more detail in the 
next section of this chapter. 
Kowert and Hermann's research focused on individual difference variables that might 
influence risk taking. Four measures were used: a modified version of the 1964 Kogan 
Wallach Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire comprising 13 real-life scenarios; the Personal 
Risk Inventory which asks participants about business, sports, financial and other lifestyle 
risks based upon the work of Kogan and Wallach; the NEO PI-R personality 
questionnaire and the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), an alternative theoretically- 
based measure of personality. Participants were 126 political science undergraduates (50 
men and 76 women). 
The first stage of the analysis considered correlations between the measures. When 
personality was considered in terms of five factors, four factors showed significant 
correlations with the risk measures. There were two strong relationships. First, low 
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scores on the conscientiousness factor (C) were associated with risk taking. Second, high 
scores on the openness factor (0) were related to risk taking. The authors suggested that 
careful considerations of risk, likely to be associated with conscientiousness, would 
decrease risk taking whereas openness to experience is likely to increase risk taking. 
When the NEO PI-R facets were considered, several aspects of the 0 and C scales 
emerged again as significantly associated with risk taking. In particular, anxiety, self- 
consciousness and impulsiveness (all facets of the N scale) and altruism (a facet of the A 
scale) were highlighted. There were some significant relationships between the MBTI 
factors and risk scores. In sum, close associations were revealed between personality and 
scores relating to a number of different types of risk taking. Kowert and Hermann 
proposed, on the evidence of the patterns of relationships between personality and risk 
taking, that people can be grouped into three categories. First, people who seek risky 
experiences and have high scores in openness and excitement seeking. Second, people 
who take risks because they are impulsive and do not think through risky situations, or 
are not aware of risks. Third, people who are agreeable and try to avoid risk because of 
the potentially negative implications for others. 
The second stage of Kowert and Hermann's analysis considered the relationship between 
personality and the predictions of prospect theory, i. e. that risk aversion is associated 
with gains and risk seeking is associated with losses. Prospect theory was operationalised 
in terms of a series of decision problems designed to test the effects of positive and 
negative framing. Three different types of problems were used: economic, medical and 
political. The latter two problem types involved decisions about human lives. Participants 
could opt for a certain outcome or a risky outcome for each problem type. Framing 
effects were found to be significant, particularly for the medical and political problems. 
The general tendency for the economic choices was to be risk averse. When the pattern 
of responses was related to personality variables there were some interesting findings. 
Four response patterns were distinguished: risk taking under conditions of loss; risk 
aversion under conditions of gain; a combination of both (prospect theory) and the total 
number of certain (risk averse) choices regardless of frame. Groups 1 and 3 showed the 
least number of significant correlations with personality factors and facets. The result for 
group 3 demonstrated that inconsistent risk taking was not associated strongly with 
personality. Groups 2 and 4, however, showed a number of significant relationships. 
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Preferences for certainty under conditions of gain and regardless of frame, i. e. risk 
aversion, were associated with low openness at the factor level, high anxiety (Ni), low 
scores on fantasy (01) and actions (E4) at the facet level. Overall preference for 
uncertainty was also related to low scores in agreeableness at the factor level, self- 
consciousness (N4) and altruism (A3). Kowert and Hermann suggested that these 
findings supported their proposition that people with different personality profiles have 
different disposition-based approaches to risk and will seek or avoid risk to fulfil 
different goals. 
Further analysis of the relationships between personality, problem type and problem 
frame was then carried out. Participants were grouped according to whether they 
selected the risky alternative or the certain alternative for each of the three problem 
types. Mean scores for personality factors and facets were compared. Results showed 
that some aspects of personality, anxiety and conscientiousness, were associated with 
choices that were both problem and frame insensitive. That is, people with either very 
high scores or very low scores in anxiety, self-conscientiousness, conscientiousness and 
deliberation, had consistent approaches to risk. The former group was risk averse and the 
latter group was risk seeking. In addition, people with higher scores in agreeableness and 
altruism preferred to avoid risk regardless of situation. Kowert and Hermann revised 
their risk categorisation and suggested the following groups: 
1. People who respond to risk in the directions that prospect theory predicts; risk 
seeking under conditions of loss and risk aversion under conditions of gain. 
2. People who are consistent in their responses to risk and do not attend to problem 
domain or framing effects. 
3. People who are influenced by framing, but not in the direction predicted by prospect 
theory, e. g. people who score highly in the openness personality factor take risks 
because they focus on the potential for gain. 
4. People who prefer generally to avoid risks because they are altruistic and wish to 
avoid loss to others. 
The authors divided participants into two groups: those who behave in the way that 
prospect theory predicts and those who do not. An analysis of variance test was used to 
examine differences between the groups. The key differences to emerge were in altruism 
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(A3) and openness (04) (p < . 05). Further analyses of variance were then carried out for 
loss and gain frames separately. In the loss frame, altruism was the only personality 
variable that approached significance between high and low risk takers (p = . 086). In the 
gain domain, actions (04) and the MBTI intuiting dimension, which has been shown to 
correspond to the NEO PI-R factor of openness (Costa & McCrae, 1991), were 
significantly different between the two groups. Fantasy (01) approached significance. It 
was suggested that these characteristics could interact with framing such that the gain 
frame could increase the likelihood that people with high openness scores would take 
risks while the loss frame would decrease the likelihood that altruistic people would take 
risks. 
Kowert and Hermann suggested that risk taking is a combination of gender, risk 
awareness, agreeableness, anxiety, thrill seeking and the MBTI dimension of intuiting. 
They tested this proposition using a regression analysis with the total score on the 
Personal Risk Inventory as the dependent variable. The results of the regression showed 
significant Beta values at the level of p< . 01, with the exception of 
intuiting (p < . 10). 
The adjusted R squared was . 55 showing that the predictor variables contributed 
significantly to variance in the Personal Risk Inventory. 
The research of Kowert and Hermann is relevant to the research discussed in this thesis 
for several reasons. First, it demonstrates that there are clear relationships between 
personality and risk taking. Second, it identifies several different patterns of risk 
behaviour that are associated with particular personality profiles. The authors showed 
that some people are relatively frame and problem insensitive, that is, they are consistent 
in their approaches to risk, while others who have different profiles are sensitive to 
situation variance. These results and their implications are central to the research 
described in this thesis. They provide strong support for the role of individual difference 
factors, in particular personality, in shaping consistent or inconsistent approaches to risk. 
A second relevant study of the personality factors which influence risk taking assessed 
the influence of personality on risk taking and found that there are some significant 
relationships (Bartram, Clough & Williams, 1997). Participants were 85 undergraduate 
students. The personality measure was the PREVUE ICES inventory (Bartram 1993, 
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1994,1996). This measure assesses a number of facets of personality relating to the four 
factors of Independence, Conscientiousness, Extroversion and Stability. The authors 
have demonstrated relationships between their measure of personality and Five Factor 
model measures including the NEO personality inventory (Bartram 1993,1996). Two 
risk measures were administered: a set of behavioural questions, concerning behaviours 
such as smoking and drug use, and the Personal Risk Inventory (Hockey & Clough, 
1996). The PRI presents participants with a series of 20 dilemmas. It is the same measure 
as the one used in the research of Kowert and Hermann (1997) reviewed above. The PRI 
adapted the Kogan and Wallach items to assess everyday decisions rather than significant 
life events. The results showed that although the two measures of risk-related decision 
making were found not to be closely related, there were significant associations between 
some aspects of both scales and personality facets. People who reported participation in 
risky behaviours were more extravert, competitive, had a need for sensation, were 
impulsive, showed a lack of concern for others and a lack of concern for social and moral 
rules than participants who reported less risky behaviour. People who perceived risks as 
greater were non-assertive, timid, viewed the world as a hostile place, and yet were 
outgoing and sociable. It was also noted that participation in different types of risks, for 
example everyday hazards versus hazards with potentially serious long term 
consequences, was related to different personality profiles. The authors suggested that 
this study showed not only that particular combinations of personality factors predict risk 
seeking or risk aversion, but also that different types of risk differentially engage 
particular facets of personality. Thus the results have implications for the research 
described in this thesis. The data indicated that where people are consistent in their risk- 
related decisions, the choices that they make could be related to their personality profile. 
In addition, personality might also impact upon domain-specific risk choices. For 
example, people scoring high in the agreeableness dimension might select risks that 
concern only themselves, for example some high risk sports, but would not take risks 
that could have detrimental effects on others. People scoring low in the agreeableness 
dimension might be less discerning about their risk-related choices. In sum, there is 
evidence to support the hypothesis that there are close associations between a number of 
personality factors, risk preferences and risk taking. 
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The next part of this section discusses the concept of sensation seeking, a facet of 
extroversion in the NEO PI-R measure of personality, and its relationship with risk 
taking. Kowert and Hermann (1997) found that sensation seeking predicted risk taking 
significantly. The main author of the work into sensation seeking is Zuckerman, who 
began research into sensation seeking approximately three decades ago. He has published 
numerous studies supporting the concept and demonstrating its relationship with 
behaviour. He has described sensation seeking as "the need for varied, novel and 
complex sensations and experiences and the willingness to take physical and social risks 
for the sake of such experience. " (Zuckerman, 1979a, p10). Sensation seeking is 
measured using the Sensation Seeking Scale. The current version is the Sensation 
Seeking Scale V (Zuckerman et al 1978). It was developed following rotated factor 
analysis of a number of items relating to sensation seeking and items used in previous 
versions of the test. American data (Zuckerman, 1971) and English data (Zuckerman, 
Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978) have revealed the same four facets of sensation seeking: thrill 
and adventure seeking, experience seeking, disinhibition and boredom susceptibility. 
Each aspect is measured using ten items. Support for the concept has been derived from 
several sources. For example, analysis of data from 2000 people revealed significant 
correlations between different aspects of sensation seeking (Zuckerman & Neeb, 1980). 
Second, there is genetic evidence for sensation seeking. A study of twins showed that for 
422 pairs of twins, 70% of the genetic variation was due to a general factor common to 
both sexes (Fulker, Eysenck & Zuckerman, 1980). 
Zuckerman has demonstrated that sensation seeking can be used to predict a range of 
other behaviours, many of them risk related. The relationship between sensation seeking 
and risk taking applies to many different risk behaviours. For example, high sensation 
seekers take more physical risks in dangerous sports (Zuckerman, 1983 a); smoke heavily 
and expose themselves to health risks (Zuckerman, Ball & Black, 1990); drive too fast 
(Zuckerman & Neeb, 1980); drive recklessly t or while under the influence of alcohol 
(Donovan, Queisser, Salzberg & Umlauf, 1985); volunteer for combat units in the army 
(Hobfoll, Rom & Segall, 1993); use illegal drugs (Zuckerman, 1983b); take bigger bets 
in gambling (Anderson & Brown, 1984; Dickerson, Hinchy & Fabre, 1987); make more 
risky financial investments in simulations (Harlow & Brown, 1990). 
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Zuckerman has suggested that there are several reasons why differences exist between 
people who seek sensation and those who do not. First, there might be biologically based 
individual difference factors that predispose some people to take more risk than others. 
Second, sensation seekers could have a greater optimistic bias (Weinstein, 1980) than 
low sensation seekers. That is, they could believe that they are less likely to experience 
the negative outcomes of risky behaviours and more likely to experience the benefits. 
Third, there might be differences in information processing strategies that are associated 
with the sensation seeking trait. Zuckerman (1979a) suggested that this trait has been 
shown to affect risk perception. He proposed that high sensation seekers might be more 
likely to perceive a risk as smaller than low sensation seekers because of different 
information processing strategies. For example, information contrary to tendencies to 
seek or avoid sensation might not be attended to. Zuckerman (1979a) showed that 
people with low sensation seeking tendencies attend more closely to information which 
amplifies risk and which reinforces their aversion to risk taking. People with high 
sensation seeking tendencies selectively attend to the positive consequences of risk 
taking, which can lead to psychological and behavioural reinforcement of risk seeking 
and risk aversion. This relates to other research into selective attention to and processing 
of information. For example, it has been noted that there is a qualitative difference 
between the person who has not heard of a hazard and the person who has heard of a 
hazard, thought about the hazard and decided there is no risk, so does not act. The 
former will be open minded about the hazard (Janis & Mann, 1976,1977) but will not 
actively seek out information. The latter will have a biased commitment to their point of 
view, will selectively attend to information which supports this (Festinger, 1957; Frey, 
1986; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976), counter argue and maintain beliefs when faced with 
disconfirming evidence (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). 
A proposed mechanism for the relationship between perceptions, behaviour and 
sensation seeking is a feedback loop where outcomes of behaviour inform perceptions 
and future behaviour. Horvath and Zuckerman (1992) proposed that risk appraisal is a 
consequence rather than a cause of risky behaviour, and that behavioural outcomes are 
likely to be interpreted within an existing framework of risk preferences. Hence high 
sensation seekers might perceive that there is less risk in the environment, and that they 
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have a greater ability to avoid negative outcomes as they continue to take risks. In 
addition, the authors suggested that high sensation seekers attend to the opportunities 
not the costs of risk taking. That is, they might be motivated to take risks because of the 
association between risk and gain, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
In sum, sensation seeking is another dimension of personality that is an important 
contributor to risk seeking and risk averse behaviour. People with particularly high or 
low scores in this trait could be consistent in their risk-related choices. Sensation seeking 
is a component of the trait of extroversion in the Five Factor model of personality. 
People with particularly high or low scores on a measure of extroversion could be 
predicted to have preferences for seeking risk or avoiding risk, respectively. However, it 
is likely that the sensation seeking trait interacts with other aspects of personality to 
shape whether risk taking is consistent or domain-specific. For example, a person with a 
high score in sensation seeking and a high score in the agreeableness factor might be 
willing to take risks to achieve sensations, but limit their risk taking to sports that are not 
likely to have a detrimental effect on others, such as bungy jumping. A second example is 
a person with high sensation seeking needs and a low score in the conscientiousness 
factor. This person might take risks in the work environment in order to make their day 
more interesting, and not be concerned about making mistakes in their job. Alternatively, 
if sensation seeking is coupled with the trait profile identified by Kowert and Hermann 
(1997) as being the risk taking profile (e. g. low in agreeableness and high in openness), 
an individual is likely to take risks consistently. 
3.2 Summary of personality and risk research 
The study of personality is important to the study of risk behaviour for a number of 
reasons. First, there are strong relationships between dispositions and risk-related 
decision making and behaviour. Second, empirical evidence suggests that people with 
strong disposition-based preferences will have relatively stable, characteristic approaches 
to risk. All the traits in the Five Factor model of personality have been associated with 
risk preferences. Data have suggested that particular personality profiles might be 
associated with consistent risk seeking or risk aversion. A typical profile of someone 
67 
who likes to take risks might comprise low scores in neuroticism, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness, and high scores in extroversion and openness. However, variations in 
the characteristic risk profile could lead to domain-specific risk preferences. For 
example, agreeableness could be an important factor. A high score in this dimension 
combined with an otherwise risk seeking profile could lead to domain-specific risk 
choices; that is, people might be willing to take risks if they will not impact adversely on 
others. It is plausible that people who lack the strong dispositional orientations to risk 
are likely to be influenced by situationally variable factors that influence their cognitive 
and emotional appraisals of risk. 
To conclude, personality is an important element of a psychological framework of risk- 
related decision making. It is a key component of the data gathered in the research 
discussed in this thesis. 
3.3 Loss, gain and framing 
The theoretical and empirical work reviewed in relation to personality indicated that for 
some people, such as those without strong dispositional bases for their behaviour, 
situational factors are likely to account for some portion of the variance in risk-related 
decision making. This section discussions theoretical and empirical work that considers 
factors that that could influence the inconsistency of risk preferences. 
The main theory in this field, which has been the source of much work into the effects of 
loss and gain and variable risk behaviour, is prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). Prospect theory is important to this research because it predicts that decision 
making and behaviour depend upon perceptions of loss and gain and are situationally 
variable. Prospect theory concerns decision situations involving monetary outcomes 
under conditions of risk, but not uncertainty. That is, probabilities are known. This 
distinction between risk and uncertainty is similar to the discussion of Knight (1921, 
1965) discussed in Chapter 1. The authors sought to build a non-normative framework 
that could explain why behaviour differs under conditions of loss and gain. 
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The theory suggested that there are two key phases of choice behaviour. First, there is an 
initial analysis of the decision problem. In this phase, choice alternatives are framed. That 
is, some options are selected from the full range of alternatives based upon whether they 
are presented positively or negatively, the potential outcomes, the habits and 
expectancies of the decision maker and the features of the choice alternative e. g. shared 
characteristics of alternatives are cancelled out, and dominated alternatives are excluded 
from further consideration. 
The second phase of decision making is evaluation. The outcome, or prospect, which has 
the highest value is chosen. An important part of this process is the assignment of 
decision weights to each of the framed prospects that were selected in the first phase. 
The weighting function operates such that events of low probability are over-weighted, 
hence the popularity of lottery tickets, and events of high probability that near certainty 
are under-weighted. It is at the extremes, i. e. probabilities very close to 0 or very close to 
1, that decision weights tend to show greater subjectivity because of the simplification of 
choices that has taken place in the editing phase of decision making. 
In the evaluation phase in the model a subjective value is assigned to each prospect. 
Subjective values are proposed to be arranged in a distribution above and below a 
reference point, which is zero. Hence an increase in wealth of £100 from £0 is relatively 
greater than the increase from £1,000 to £1,100. The value of each alternative is a 
measure of how far it is from the reference point. The shape of the distribution is an S 
shape about the reference point; concave for gains and convex for loss. The slope is 
steeper in the domain of losses reflecting observations that losses have a greater impact 
on decision making than equivalent gains. The use of subjective values is an important 
aspect of prospect theory and distinguishes the theory from other approaches that require 
objective evaluation of risk. Figure 3.2 shows a representation of prospect theory 
hypothetical value function on the next page. 
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Figure 3.2: Representation of the prospect theory hypothetical value function 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p279) 
value 
losses gains 
The evaluation stage of decision making is followed by choice. Two aspects of risky 
choices are considered in the decision making process - the value function, which 
concerns the change in wealth a choice alternative represents and can be either positive 
or negative, and the decision weight. 
Prospect theory predicts that behaviour will be risk seeking in the domain of loss and risk 
averse in the domain of gains. The corollary is that people's risk behaviour will change 
from risk aversion to risk seeking if they are given choices in the gain domain then 
choices in the loss domain and vice versa. Both actual and perceived loss or gains are 
important influences on behaviour. Kahneman and Tversky cited the example of a 
decision maker who has an expectation of a gain which, if not met, will result in a 
perception of loss. If the loss is not accepted, behaviour is risk seeking because the 
situation is negatively framed and the decision maker is in the domain of loss. If the loss 
is accepted, the reference point is adjusted. This example demonstrates an important 
property of the reference point that influences decision making: reference points may 
shift, and different decisions at any point in time can have difference reference points. 
Reference point shifts are also associated with whether alternatives are considered in 
terms of absolute loss and gain rather than in terms of relative loss and gain. 
70 
In sum, prospect theory represents an important conceptualisation of risk-related 
decision making and behaviour. Prospect theory sought to apply a more psychological 
framework to the expected utility model of choice behaviour. The theory proposes that 
loss, gain and reference points are critical influences on decision making. In addition, the 
use of decision weights, the differential impact of different probabilities and the overall 
range of outcomes are important factors that tend to lead to inconsistent risk behaviour. 
It is one of the most frequently cited and decision making frameworks and has received 
considerable empirical support. The theory has important implications. In particular, with 
respect to the effects of positive and negative framing of information and the reference 
point which suggest that risk preferences could be inconsistent and influenced by 
situational information. 
The authors of prospect theory carried out several pieces of research into the effects of 
loss and gain and whether the manipulation of perceptions of loss and gain through 
framing influenced choice behaviour. A key study to demonstrate the framing effect was 
that of Tversky and Kahneman (1986). The authors presented participants with what has 
become known as the Asian flu problem. The problem has two forms. Both forms 
concern a choice between two programmes to fight the disease. The first form presents 
programme A as saving a fixed number of lives and programme B as having a given 
probability that a certain number of lives will be saved. The second form of the problem 
presents programme C as the cause of a fixed number of deaths and programme D as 
having a given probability of a certain number of deaths. The outcomes of programmes 
A and C are the same. The outcomes of programmes B and D are the same. The framing, 
however, is different - lives saved versus deaths. The first form of the problem tends to 
lead people to choose programme A, whereby a certain number of lives are saved, and 
programme D, where there is a chance that all lives might be saved (although all might be 
lost) rather than a fixed, certain number of lives lost. The authors suggested that these 
findings demonstrate how simple semantic changes can result in difference choices. 
The Asian flu problem is just one type of framing effect. There are a number of other 
ways that the decision making process can be influenced by altering the presentation of 
the information the decision is based upon. Bazerman (1994) summarised 9 different 
ways that framing can change decision outcomes: 
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1. Framing of choices as gains or losses 
2. Framing of outcomes as gains or losses 
3. Framing of choices as certain or pseudo-certain 
4. Paying premiums versus accepting sure losses 
5. High versus low transaction quality 
6. Whether losses and gains are summed or presented individually 
7. Different judgements of time to be spent on the decision problem are made according 
to how the problem is framed 
8. Value of a commodity according to whether it is owned by the self or another 
9. Different judgements can be made at different points in time 
Different types of framing were considered by Kühberger (1998) who carried out a meta- 
analysis of studies of framing effects. He reviewed the results of 136 papers with almost 
30,000 participants. Results showed that two aspects of framing have particularly strong 
influences on decision making: whether the manipulation is concerned with reference 
points or with outcome salience and the type of decision outcome i. e. fixed choice versus 
ratings or judgements. There were no systematic differences that indicated particular 
types of decision making associated with loss or gain domains. It was concluded that the 
framing effect is reliable, but that studies which measure outcome salience should be 
considered separately from research which manipulates reference points. However it was 
noted that framing effects are not always observed. Further work by the author and 
colleagues examining the framing phenomenon (Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck & 
Perner, 1999) concluded that cognitive and motivation factors should be considered in 
addition to problem and domain characteristics (Maule, 1995; Reyna & Brainerd, 1991; 
Schneider, 1992; Tykocinski, Higgins & Chaiken, 1994). 
The inconsistent results of research into the effects of framing could be due to individual 
difference factors that affect perceptions of'loss and gain. It has been noted in the 
discussion of personality and risk preferences that some people are likely to have 
psychological characteristics that predispose them to particular, stable approaches to 
risk. Individual difference characteristics and dispositions were not considered in 
Kühberger's meta-review. These ideas have, however, formed the basis of research by 
Highhouse and Yüce (1996). These authors claimed that previous research which has 
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found risk taking for opportunities and risk aversion for threats (e. g. Hollenbeck, Ilgen, 
Phillips & Hedlund, 1994) is not a contradiction of prospect theory's predictions of risk 
aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses. Rather, Highhouse and Yüce claimed that 
the picture is more complex - perceptions of what a threat is and what an opportunity is 
can differ according to position in the loss or gain domain. They cited the work of March 
and Shapira which suggested that people will take risks so long as they perceive the 
potential for worthwhile gain (1987). Highhouse and Yüce proposed that the concepts of 
loss and gain are distinct from the concepts of opportunity and threat. Hence when 
participants are shown the Asian flu problem, what appears to be risk seeking in the 
domain of loss could be due to perceptions that there is an opportunity to save lives 
rather than losing lives for sure (e. g. Maule, 1989). Likewise, they cited work that has 
shown that risk taking is greater when the probability of gaining is emphasised (e. g. Bier 
& Connell, 1994; Levin, Johnson, Russo & Deldin, 1985); Levin, Johnson & Davis, 
1987). 
Highhouse and Yüce proposed that it is possible to perceive both opportunities and 
threats in both loss and gain domains. Participants in their study were 244 undergraduate 
students. They were presented with the Asian flu problem and a measure that assessed 
perceptions of choice alternatives as opportunities or threats (Highhouse, Paese & 
Leatherberry, 1996). They found that participants in the loss domain perceived the risky 
alternative as an opportunity. In the gain domain, the risky alternative was perceived as a 
threat. In a second study involving 84 students, the interaction between framing and 
perceptions was examined. The test materials were two memos similar to the in-basket 
task used by MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986). One memo was framed in the gain 
domain and one was framed in the loss domain. Each memo had two versions -a threat 
version and an opportunity version. The risks in each were the same. Results showed that 
participants were more risk taking for opportunity-framed risks than for threat-framed 
risks. More risks were taken for the loss problem than the gain problem. Highhouse and 
Yüce suggested that the presentation of situations as opportunities does influence 
perceptions of risk and increase the likelihood of risk taking. In sum, the research of 
Highhouse and Yüce indicated that risk behaviour can be variable. However, they also 
suggested that individual difference factors such as motivation and dispositions, in 
particular trait neuroticism and need to avoid risk, could be important influences on 
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choice behaviour and affect perceptions of opportunity and threat. Thus, if people have 
specific emotional and motivational dispositions for risk aversion, their behaviour might 
be relatively consistent because they perceive almost all situations as threats and are 
resistant to framing effects. 
A different aspect of framing that is also relevant to this thesis concerns the decision 
domain rather than the loss and gain domains. The decision domain has been shown to 
have a significant impact on choice behaviour because the decision maker is required to 
consider different reference points. Additionally, there are different values, costs and 
benefits for important life decisions such as health, relationships and finance 
management. This topic has not been widely researched, but there are some interesting 
studies in the field that are salient to the research presented in this thesis. It could be that 
people who do not have disposition-based consistent risk preferences could still be 
consistent in their preferences, but in some decision domains only. For example, as 
suggested in the above discussion of personality, someone with a high score in 
agreeableness in combination with an otherwise high risk personality might take risks in 
some domains such as dangerous sports, but not in other domains where risk taking 
could be detrimental to other people, such as reckless driving. Overall, the effects of 
decision domains are important to consider because there could be a distinction between 
people who have generalised, cross-domain risk preferences that are consistently 
oriented towards risk seeking or risk aversion, and people who have domain-specific risk 
preferences. In the case of the latter group, examination of the decision making processes 
related to different decision domains could provide insights into risk preferences that are 
domain specific. 
Highhouse and Paese (1996) carried out two studies that considered the interaction of 
loss, gain, opportunity and threat in the contexts of jobs and money. The first study 
presented versions of Bazerman's (1984) job layoff problem. There were four variations 
based upon combinations of loss, gain, opportunity and threat. Participants were 
assigned to one of the four conditions (52 - 56 student participants per condition, 
including two control groups). Following participants' choice between prospects, two 
items were administered to assess whether translation of threat to opportunity, or vice 
versa, occurred. Scores on the items were summed. A low score represented perception 
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of threat. A high score represented perception of opportunity. Analysis of the data 
showed that framing effects were found in both the opportunity and threat domains. In 
addition, the presentation of the problem had important effects. Risk averse choices were 
more frequent in the opportunity domain. However, in general the participants were risk 
averse and did not behave in the ways the prospect theory suggests. There was little 
evidence for the translation of threats into opportunities or the reverse. The authors 
suggested that this could be because opportunity and threat are not different ends of a 
single continuum, but different dimensions altogether. The interaction between frames 
and decision arena could influence the magnitude of framing effects. 
Highhouse and Paese suggested that decision domain could be an important factor that 
influences framing effects. Hence a second study was carried out to consider money- 
related threat and opportunity. The participants were 252 students. The measures were 
problems similar in structure to the first study and concerned with money and taxes. The 
same translation scales were used as for the first study. Framing effects were found in 
both domains, however the effect was great in the loss domain. When problems were 
framed as opportunities, participants tended to be risk averse. When problems were 
framed as threats, the difference in frequency of risk aversion and risk seeking was 
smaller. Translation effects were weak, as in the first study, suggesting that reference 
points might not be changed as a result of problem framing. Perceptions of problems as 
threats or opportunities did not influence the relationship between framing and choice 
behaviour. 
Overall, Highhouse and Paese concluded that framing effects were observed, but that 
reversals of preference were not. They proposed that studies of framing show more 
about the reliability of preferences than about preference reversals. The authors 
suggested that people might be more reliable, or consistent, in their choices in the gain 
domain than in the loss domain. Evidence was cited for the loss domain provoking 
greater goal conflict (Schneider, 1992) and a greater number of attempts to prevent loss 
(Dunegan, 1993) than the gain domain, thus increasing the variability of choice 
behaviour. They concluded by suggesting that the interpretation of framing studies needs 
to be carried out carefully. First, there is a need to clearly distinguish between a choice 
reversal and a framing effect. Second, the problem domain itself might cause behaviours 
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not generalisable to other problem domains. Third, the risk-return trade off needs to be 
considered. 
The work of Highhouse and Paese is relevant to this research because it attempted to 
examine the cognitive effects of framing and to assess whether people do change their 
perceptions of threat and opportunity. It provides some data concerning the reliability, or 
consistency of behaviour under conditions of loss and gain. As with other framing 
studies, it would be interesting to examine individual-level data to assess stability of 
preference and its relationship with individual difference variables. However, the authors 
suggested that inconsistent behaviour is more likely when people consider themselves to 
be in a loss situation. The data do not preclude the possibility of relationships between 
disposition variables and susceptibility to framing effects. 
A second, relevant study was carried out by Fagley and Miller (1997). These authors 
examined the effects of two decision domains, hypothetical money and human life 
situations, on choice behaviour and found that domain did influence choice. After 
reviewing the literature into the framing effect, Fagley and Miller suggested that the 
existence and size of framing is influenced by a number of variables including sex, the 
decision problem, the nature and degree of loss and gain and the decision context. They 
proposed that multiple problems are required to understand the framing effect and cited 
evidence to support this proposal (Chapman, 1994; Frisch, 1993). Fagley and Miller 
hypothesised that there could be two possible predictions for the relationship between 
framing and decision domain. First, it could be that decision domains are perceived as 
qualitatively different and that loss and gain do not have uniform effects in the different 
decision domains. Second, it could be predicted that decision domains are considered in 
terms of a continuum ranging from more to less important. In the case of this study, 
money could be regarded as less significant than human life, and the overall framing 
effect could be as prospect theory suggests. Hence it was suggested that choices in the 
gain domain would be more risk averse for human life than for money, and that choices 
in the loss domain would be more risk seeking for human life than for money. 
Participants in Fagley and Miller's research were 297 undergraduate students. Three 
decision problems were developed for each decision domain, rather than just one 
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problem in each decision domain, to increase the construct validity of the measure (Cook 
& Campbell, 1979; Maher, 1978). The human life problems were a version of the Asian 
flu problem, modified to increase the number of lives at risk (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981), a military ambush problem (from McKean, 1995) and a civil defence problem 
(from Fischoff, 1983). The money domain problems concerned a stock investment item 
(from Roszkowski & Snelbecker, 1990), an industrial supplier problem (from Hogarth, 
1987) and a home selling problem developed by the authors. 
There were a total of 16 experimental conditions resulting from the interaction of 
decision domain (money, life), loss or gain domains, labelling (A and B versus C and D) 
and presentation order of the certain version of the problem (first versus second). 
Participants were assigned randomly to a condition. Multiple regression was used to 
analyse the data. Choice was the dependent variable. Results showed that decision 
domain had a significant effect (p < . 001). There was an 
interaction between frame and 
sex (p < . 00 1). 
Women chose more risky options in the negative framing condition than 
in the positive framing condition. Men made more risky choices in the positive frame 
than in the negative frame. However the differences in choices were only significant for 
women, and the effect was not as great as previous research has found (e. g. Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). When the problems were considered individually, three out of six 
showed significant framing effects for women. None showed significant effects for men. 
The reflection effect (preference reversal) was not significant. The authors suggested that 
sex differences are an important consideration in the interpretation of framing research. 
Overall, an interaction between frame and decision domain was not observed. The effects 
of decision domain, however, were significant. Participants tended to be risk taking in 
decisions concerning life in both loss and gain frames preferring to try to save lives rather 
than accepting sure loss of life. The authors hypothesised that different decision domains 
evoked different reference points and aspirations, which are associated with different 
risk-return trade-offs. In addition, they concluded that individual risk propensity could be 
an important, unmeasured variable that influences the effects of framing. They suggested 
that risk propensity could be an important element of future research. 
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An alternative approach to framing was taken by Chapman (1996). Her research 
considered two different decision domains (health and money) and examined the 
characteristics of these domains that influenced choice behaviour. The particular focus of 
the research was the effects of the sequential presentation of information. Student 
participants completed a questionnaire that presented a series of decision problems 
concerned with money and health. Overall, the results showed that preferences were 
found to be influenced by expectations of health and financial state, the former being 
expected to decline and the latter to rise over a lifetime. This pattern was perceived to be 
preferable to the reverse situation. When presented with short term (one year) decision 
making tasks, preferences for health and wealth did not fit this pattern. However, there 
was internal consistency. While preferences varied for money and for health, preferences 
did fit in with expectations for each. Chapman suggested that expectations mediate 
between decision domain and sequence length. The trade off between health and wealth 
is an important consideration. It is well known that health will decline with age but the 
projected increase in wealth and associated comfort might be perceived as an adequate 
substitute. 
Chapman's study provides further evidence for the relationship between decision 
domains and choice behaviour. As with the work of Highhouse and Paese, this research 
has shown that expectations and reference points associated with different decision 
domains affect the decision process. 
3.4 Summary of framing research 
There has been considerable theoretical and empirical effort directed towards the 
exploration of situational effects on risk-related decision making and behaviour. Much of 
this research has focused upon the variability of risk behaviour and the key factors that 
might cause inconsistency. Two important situational variables have been identified: 
framing and the decision domain. There is evidence to suggest that people take more or 
less risk depending upon whether a situation is presented in positive terms or negative 
terms. Many authors have concluded that people are largely inconsistent in their risk 
preferences. However, it has been noted by some authors that framing effects are not 
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always observed and that there could be interactions between individual difference 
variables, framing effects and decision domains that influence risk taking. In addition, 
study of individual-level variability in susceptibility to framing effects and inconsistent 
behaviour has not commonly been part of the research method. In sum, it can be 
concluded that some situational factors do impact upon risky choices. Yet the possibility 
of stable individual preferences remains. First, because some people without strong 
disposition-based preferences could be influenced by situational effects. Second, because, 
as with some of the research reviewed in the previous chapter, it could be that 
perceptions and choices might change in accordance with situational influences while 
underlying preferences remain stable. 
3.5 Emotion 
This section discusses the nature of emotion. Theoretical and empirical evidence for the 
relationship between trait and state emotions and risk-related decision making are 
reviewed. There is a considerable volume of published research concerned with emotions 
and decision making. Hence a number of studies are mentioned in brief only. A small 
number of cogent studies have been selected for more detailed analysis due to their 
relevance to the research described in this thesis. 
Emotions are relevant to risk preferences and risk taking for three key reasons. First, 
trait-based emotions are important. Emotions are closely associated with dispositions, in 
particular the trait of neuroticism, sometimes referred to as negative emotionality. The 
relationship between personality traits and risk taking has been discussed in the previous 
section. People scoring high on the emotionality scale are likely to be consistently more 
risk averse than average (e. g. Bartram, Clough & Williams, 1997). 
Second, state-based emotions need to be considered. Emotions can have powerful effects 
on the decision making process, as will be illustrated below in the discussion of empirical 
research. If risk behaviour is more closely associated with emotions that change on a 
situational basis than to dispositions, at least for some individuals, then it might show 
little cross-situational consistency. 
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A third issue, related to point two above, is that there is likely to be a close relationship 
between emotions and risk because actual and perceived loss and gain are associated 
commonly with negative or positive affect. Again, where this is true, risk behaviour 
might be situationally dependent and inconsistent. 
3.5.1 The nature of emotion 
Recent research has confirmed the importance of emotions in the decision making 
process. Emotions have been demonstrated to have physiological bases and to be linked 
to many different areas of the brain (Davidson & Irwin, 1999). Emotions have been 
shown to have the ability to over-take thoughts before the individual is aware of them 
(Le Doux, 1986) and can prompt action without conscious intervention (Goleman, 
1996). This research and other similar works have resolved a debate about whether 
emotions or cognitions play the primary role in the decision making process, (e. g. 
Lazarus, 1984; Zajonc, 1984). 
As with research into personality traits, there have been a number of attempts to resolve 
the issue of how emotions are organised and categorised. Recently there has been some 
convergence upon a conceptualisation that arranges emotions on four bipolar 
dimensions. These are represented on the next page (from Watson & Tellegen, 1985, 
based upon Russell's circumplex, 1980). It needs to be acknowledged that the 
representation that follows is schematic. Watson, Wiese, Vaidya and Tellegen (1999) 
suggested that the four dimensions are not truly independent and they are not strictly 
bipolar (the exception being pleasantness - unpleasantness). A circumplex does not 
accurately represent the relationships between the different emotions, that is, there is 
evidence that some emotions are clustered together rather than being equidistant from 
each other. Nonetheless, the diagram illustrates usefully the range and type of emotions 
and presents an approximate representation of the relationships between different 
emotions. 
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Figure 3.3: The emotion circumplex (Watson & Tellegen, 1985) 
Pleasantness 
Content, happy, kindly, 
pleased, satisfied, warm- 
hearted 
Low negative affect 
At rest, calm, placid, 
relaxed 
Strong engagement 
Aroused, astonished, surprised 
High negative affect 
Distressed, fearful, hostile, 
jittery, nervous, scornful 
Unpleasantness 
Blue, grouchy, lonely, sad, 
sorry, unhappy 
3.5.2 Emotions and decision making 
The first section of this chapter discussed personality and its influence on risk behaviour. 
It was noted that the trait of neuroticism is especially relevant to risk taking. Research 
into the emotions associated with neuroticism and its relationship with decision making 
has shown that this trait influences the intensity of emotions and the frequency of positive 
versus negative emotions (George, 1995). Trait anxious people pay more attention to 
threatening information (Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988; MacLeod & Cohen, 1993; 
Mathews & McLeod, 1985), act faster when prompted by threatening stimuli (Broadbent 
& Broadbent, 1988) and believe that they are more likely to experience negative events 
than others (Butler & Mathews, 1987). Gasper and Clore (1998) suggested that people 
with high trait anxiety tend to believe their anxiety has a stable source and feel the 
anxiety in different aspects of their lives. These people are more influenced by short term 
causes of anxiety, and involve their emotions in their decision making because the 
feelings fit in with their general anxious state of mind. In contrast, people with low trait 
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High positive affect 
Active, elated, enthusiastic, 
excited, peppy, strong 
anxiety tend to believe that the anxiety they experience is due to short term and specific 
causes. In sum, research evidence suggests that people who are high scorers in a measure 
of neuroticism are likely to be consistently more risk averse than people who have low 
scores in the same measure because of their emotion-based motivations to avoid risk. 
In addition to research on trait based emotions, state emotions have many important 
influences on the decision making process. For example, mood state influences numerous 
aspects of perception and interpretation of outcomes (Johnson & Tversky, 1983). 
Emotions have been found to influence the way that memories are structured (Bower, 
1981) and to influence memory and recall processes (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Positive 
affect has been found to activate subconsciously positive thoughts and vice versa for 
negative affect (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Emotions can change usage of decision making 
rules, such as the selection of information processing rules (Forgas, 1989), decision 
coping patterns and heuristics (Janis, 1989; Janis & Mann, 1977). Emotionally driven 
heuristics have been shown to impair self-regulation (Keinan, 1987) because a quick, 
easy solution is sought that does not involve cognitive analysis of outcomes (Baumeister, 
Heatherton & Tice, 1994). It seems clear that there is likely to be an important 
relationship between state emotions and risky decision making. People without strong 
disposition-based emotions are more likely to display cross-domain variance, as 
discussed in the personality section of this chapter. This variance could, in part, be due to 
emotional variance. A number of research studies have explored the reasons why 
emotions influence risk behaviour. 
Research by Hockey, Maule, Clough and Bdzola (2000) examined the relationship 
between mood and risk taking. The research showed that there are interactions between 
negative affect, in particular fatigue, and risk preferences. 
Three affect dimensions were selected for study: anxiety, depression and fatigue. An 
interesting feature of this research, compared with other research that uses mood 
induction to measure the effects of different emotions, was the use of a mood diary to 
establish characteristic patterns in individual-level emotion. This enabled the authors to 
calibrate mood to assess individual-level variability and baseline emotions. The mood 
diary was used to record emotion daily for two weeks prior to the test session. Data 
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analysis showed that the mood diary was an effective way to measure affect, and to 
separate state changes in affect from underlying trends. 
Participants in the first study were 34 undergraduates. The first measure was the 
Personal Risk Inventory (PRI), which presented participants with a series of 13 scenarios 
designed to represent typical everyday decisions. Participants were asked to chose 
between a safe option and a risky option using a 10-point Likert scale to show strength 
of preference, to rate each option in terms of the effort involved in carrying out the 
choice, and to rate how much risk the choice involved. In addition, participants rated 
their familiarity with each situation, the importance of getting a favourable outcome and 
the emotional impact of the problem. The results showed that people who were more 
fatigued, both in general and at the time of testing, had a somewhat stronger preference 
for choosing the risky options in the scenarios than people who were not fatigued. 
Anxiety had no relationship with risk choice, although it was noted that test anxiety 
might have contributed to the relationship between fatigue and risk choices. There were 
no significant associations between mood and perceived risk. The authors suggested that 
state rather than trait mood had a stronger effect on choice behaviour. Further, it was 
proposed that people who have greater variability in state mood might be more likely to 
vary their decision choices. This suggestion supports the point raised in the personality 
section of this chapter: that people with consistent trait based emotions, e. g. a low score 
in the neuroticism scale, might be more consistent in their risk preferences than people 
without this profile who have greater susceptibility to situational variance and the 
associated emotional variance. 
The second study by Hockey and his colleagues aimed to assess whether the findings of 
the first study could be confirmed in a different test setting and whether the relationships 
between mood and choices could be explored further. In particular, anxiety was 
considered to be an important factor that was not revealed to be independently 
significant in the previous study. In this study, participants completed the mood diary for 
four weeks and completed the PRI at home on two occasions two weeks apart. The 
participants were 58 students. These data did show a significant negative relationship 
between the stable measure anxiety and risk choices for both sets of PRI results, i. e. 
people who were more anxious were more risk averse, and between fatigue and choice in 
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one set of PRI results. There were no relationships between mood and perceived risk. 
When the relationships between the state mood and risk data were analysed, the only 
significant associations were between risky choice and fatigue. There were no 
relationships with anxiety or between mood and perceived risk. It was suggested that the 
results might have been due to the timing of data collection. One set of PRI scores was 
gathered on a Saturday when levels of the negative moods were in general lower than 
weekdays. Examination of both sets of PRI data showed that there was not a general 
trend towards consistent responses. The situational characteristics were shown to have 
some relationships with preferences and perceptions. People took more risks with 
familiar situations than with unfamiliar situations, and perceived familiar situations to be 
less risky. Participants took less risk with situations they rated as important, but data 
showed that when fatigue was greater, caution was reduced and people were more 
willing to take risks in important situations. The date indicated that fatigue and anxiety 
co-varied. It was suggested that there are likely to be complex interactions between these 
two affective states that are associated with changes in risk taking. Further examination 
of the data showed that less anxious individuals took more risk when they are moderately 
fatigued. More anxious individuals took more risk at medium to high levels of fatigue. 
The authors proposed that people who have underlying levels of high anxiety are likely 
to be risk averse, except when they have high levels of fatigue. 
The third study by Hockey and colleagues considered the effects of mood manipulation 
on risk-related decision making. Participants were 55 management trainees. The 
participants were divided into two groups: a control group, and a group in which fatigue 
was induced. The PRI was administered both before and after the mood manipulation. 
The induction comprised giving the participants a difficult set of practical exercises with 
little feedback or opportunities for control. The mood induction was found to be 
effective in changing mood ratings, particularly with respect to fatigue and anxiety. The 
PRI data showed changes in risky choices and perceived risk. Risk taking was found to 
increase with increased fatigue. In addition, the results indicated that fatigue has a 
greater impact on risky choice when combined with high anxiety. 
These studies have provided some useful information concerning the relationships 
between emotions and risk-related decision making. First, in these studies risk 
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preferences, in terms of choices, changed while risk perceptions remained relatively 
stable. This suggests that at least some components of the decision process can be 
relatively consistent. As Weber and Milliman (1997) proposed, the identification of the 
specific stable components is likely to depend upon the conceptualisation and 
measurement of the decision process. Second, the results of the studies showed that trait 
anxiety was a significant influence on the decision making, such that high levels of 
anxiety are associated with risk aversion except under conditions of high fatigue that 
reduces the habitual level of caution. In sum, there is evidence for individual differences 
in the consistency of risk-related decision making. People with particular combinations of 
traits are more likely to be consistent across situations than others are. A key factor that 
is likely to influence consistency, and that could moderate the relationship between traits 
and preferences, is the degree of fatigue. The importance of individual factors rather than 
situational factors in influencing risky choices was emphasised. 
A second study that is relevant to the research in this thesis is the work of Mittal and 
Ross (1998). The subject of framing and its effects on decision making have been 
discussed in the previous section. It was shown that perceived and actual loss and gain 
affect behaviour. Research that considers the emotional states associated with framing, 
loss and gain has added some insight into why the framing effect might occur. The study 
by Mittal and Ross examined the impact of positive and negative emotion and framing on 
issue interpretation and risk taking. 
The Mittal and Ross study focused on transient affective states, not strong emotional 
states or trait-based emotions, and related them to two aspects of strategic decision 
making: issue interpretation and risk taking. Risk taking was operationalised similarly to 
Sitkin and Pablo (1992), as, the degree to which participants "were willing to spend 
resources to obtain an outcome with a given expected value" (p299). These two 
variables were chosen because they are suggested to be critical to organisational 
performance (Ginsberg & Venkatraman, 1992; Hickson, Butler, Cray, Mallory & 
Wilson, 1986; Thomas, Clark & Gioia, 1993). The research had three aims: to examine 
the effects of positive and negative affect on risk taking; to assess the effects of framing a 
situation as a threat or an opportunity; to try to generalise past work in this area to a 
managerial context. Two studies were carried out. The first study examined the direct 
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effects of mood on risk taking and issue interpretation. The second study examined how 
mood moderates the impact of issue framing. 
Participants in the first study were 63 undergraduate and MBA students. The procedure 
involved the participants reading a short story designed to evoke positive or negative 
emotion (adapted from Johnson & Tversky, 1983). Participants were divided into two 
groups. One group was given a negatively framed story, concerning a student with 
leukaemia, and the other group was given a positively framed story, concerning a student 
being awarded a scholarship. Manipulation checks assessed whether the mood induction 
was successful. The second stage was the presentation of an ambiguously worded 
business scenario (adapted from Jackson & Dutton, 1988 and Thomas & McDaniel, 
1990) followed by a questionnaire to measure issue interpretation and risk taking. Issue 
interpretation was measured using a five-item Likert scale. An example of an item is the 
statement: these new developments are a threat. Risk taking was measured as the amount 
of money a participant was willing to pay for nine different action plans that could follow 
the strategic decision. This type of measure has been used in previous research (e. g. 
Mano, 1992; 1994). Each plan included a level of profit and the likelihood of attaining 
that profit level. Three profit levels and three probability levels were combined to form a 
total of nine options. 
Results showed that the stories were effective in inducing the desired mood state. 
Analyses of variance were used to examine the relationships between mood, issue 
interpretation and risk taking. It was found that in the positive condition, issues were 
significantly more likely to be interpreted as opportunities than issues in the negative 
condition. Affect was also found to have a significant impact on risk taking. Participants 
showed greater willingness to pay for plans, i. e. risk taking, when in a negative affective 
state than the positive affect group. People in the negative affect group were willing to 
spend more at all probability levels and the rate of increase of willingness to spend as 
profit levels rose was greater than people in the positive affect group. The authors 
suggested that these results indicated that people experiencing positive mood are more 
reluctant to take risks and increase the chance that they will incur negative outcomes that 
could reduce their mood. They also suggested that mood might be acting to influence 
risk preference. 
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The second study was developed to build on the results of the first. This study 
considered whether positive and negative states have different effects and whether there 
is an interaction between threat, opportunity, positive and negative affective states. 
Participants were 80 undergraduate and MBA students. There were several. stages to the 
procedure. First, participants took the General Business Skills Test which measured 
grammar, algebra, economics and current events. Next, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two groups: a positive feedback group and a negative feedback group. 
Feedback was unrelated to task performance. After receiving feedback, affective state 
was measured using a scale developed from Mano (1992). Finally, participants competed 
the strategic decision making task. There were two versions of the task: a threat-framed 
scenario and an opportunity-framed scenario. As with the first study, the two key 
variables were issue interpretation (measured using a three item scale reduced from five 
items) and risk taking (measured using the same nine plans as for the first study). 
The results showed that affect had a significant influence on issue interpretation. Positive 
affect was associated with positive perceptions of the decision situation and negative 
affect was associated with negative perceptions. The effects of emotion on issue 
interpretation were not symmetrical. Negative affect was found to have a larger impact 
upon issue interpretation than positive affect. Mittal and Ross suggested that negative 
mood leads to less effective information processing. Positive affect could lead to 
increased likelihood of perceiving a threat as an opportunity due to the desire to maintain 
a positive state of mind. Risk taking, in terms of willingness to spend, increased with 
negative framing. The result was similar to Sitkin and Weingart's (1995) finding. 
Increased risk taking was also associated with increased levels of profit and likelihood of 
profit. Overall, affect was not found to moderate the relationship between issue framing 
and risk taking. However, when the frames were considered individually, it was revealed 
that framing did influence risk taking in the negative affect condition, but not in the 
positive affect condition. In sum, it was suggested that affect influences risk taking 
through effects on assessments of the amount of money involved in a choice, and that 
framing influences both perceptions and probability assessments. 
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Mittal and Ross concluded that both affect and framing are critical to the understanding 
of risk taking behaviour. The interaction of these two factors has important influences on 
the motivational goals of behaviour, for example the maintenance of positive mood, and 
the processing of information. 
One possible reason why emotions influence decision making and behaviour discussed by 
a number of authors, including Mittal and Ross, is that they are fulfilling the important 
roles of self-protection and self-regulation. Behaviour, including risk behaviour, could 
reflect needs associated with different emotions. The mood protection hypothesis 
(Davison, Suppes & Siegel, 1956) suggests that someone experiencing positive emotions 
is likely to be motivated to maintain their mood and behave accordingly. This can be 
manifested in risk aversion because taking a risk and making a gain is not likely to 
significantly improve mood but a loss would decrease mood. The reverse is the case 
when the emotion experienced is negative. Taking a risk that results in loss will not 
greatly decrease mood, but making a gain could significantly lift mood and hence risk 
taking becomes an attractive option. The mood protection hypothesis is, to some extent, 
an extension of Prospect Theory and adds the construct of emotion to the domains of 
loss and gain. 
There is some empirical evidence to support the mood protection concept. For example, 
Mano (1992) found that high negative affect increased risk seeking in terms of 
willingness to pay for lotteries, but risk aversion when choosing between a gamble and 
its certainty equivalent. He suggested that in the context of a lottery, taking part is the 
only way to make possible gains to improve mood. In the case of gambling, the certainty 
equivalent provides an opportunity for sure gain and mood improvement. Hence Mano 
(1992) suggested that risk taking becomes more appealing under certain emotional 
conditions. 
Mood protection is also related to changes in perception. People with positive affect can 
be more sensitive to potential loss because affect interacts with probability and subjective 
weighting of likelihoods (Isen, Nygen & Ashby, 1988). These authors suggested that 
likelihoods are assessed when considering gains. When considering losses, both 
likelihoods and the impact on mood also are taken into consideration. Judgements 
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regarding losses are more influenced by affect than assessments of gain. Gains might not 
serve to improve mood significantly. Losses, however, can significantly reduce mood and 
are therefore aversive. 
The hypothesised mechanism by which mood protection occurs concerns the relationship 
between emotions and cognitions whereby emotions increase the complexity of the 
cognitive context by priming affective features and by activating certain brain regions 
(Isen, 1987). Motivational changes associated with different emotional states are also 
important. Isen proposed that people are naturally inclined to maintain a happy state, 
rather than a sad one. They use positive affect as a cue, but not negative affect. In 
addition, the cognitive structures associated with positive and negative affect may differ 
in ways that result in differences in recall and cueing. For example, decision making 
processes are simplified when tasks are not enjoyable (Lewinsohn & Mano, 1993). Isen 
(1992) suggested that this is because a smaller range of material is accessed by negative 
affect than by positive affect. 
The relationship between positive and negative emotions and risk taking is likely to be 
complex. As suggested in the discussion of framing and reference points, it could be that 
there are subtle interactions. What appears to be a gain might not in fact be perceived to 
be a gain and might not have positive associated emotion. This hypothesis was applied to 
data gathered by the author and colleagues at London Business School as part of an 
ESRCI co-funded research project. This research examined individual and organisational 
influences on the performance of traders in investment banks. Four top-tier international 
banks with offices in the City of London were involved in the research. Participants were 
118 traders and 10 senior managers who did not trade (Nicholson, Willman, Fenton- 
O'Creevy & Soane, 2000). The method comprised gathering survey data, administering a 
computer-based task and a semi-structured interview. During the interview, traders were 
questioned about their emotions and the impact of their emotions upon decision making. 
Qualitative analysis of the interview transcripts revealed that, contrary to the trading lore 
which suggests traders are unemotional 'operators, (e. g. Kovner in Schwager, 1989) 
' Reference number L211252056 
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emotions are a pervasive and significant part of both the traders' everyday experiences 
and their decision making processes. 
When asked about the effects of positive and negative emotions, an interesting pattern of 
results emerged. As previous research has suggested, positive and negative emotions 
were found to have different effects. The pattern of behaviour changes in the loss and 
gain domains was complex. The most straightforward interpretation of prospect theory 
and the mood protection hypothesis would be to suggest that risk taking was associated 
with losses and risk seeking was associated with gains. There was some evidence to 
support these predictions. A small number of participants did report risk seeking, or an 
increased likelihood of risky decision making in the domain of losses, as the following 
quotation shows: 
"If you are down the temptation is to take the chance. If one position is a bit 
offside, you are more willing to run with it in the hope that it will come back flat 
or a bit positive rather than lock in a loss. " 
The general trend, however, was not to be increasingly risk seeking as losses increased. 
This is due to increased managerial controls in the domain of losses (Willman, Fenton- 
O'Creevy, Nicholson & Soane, in press). Losses were often managed successfully. The 
quotation below is typical of the comments made by managers about managing traders. 
"My role as a manager is to cover the downside rather than the upside. I try to 
enforce the discipline of cutting losses rather than pushing them to add to 
positions. " 
In the domain of gain, a few traders did report becoming risk averse, as prospect theory 
predicts. 
"I have 2 or 3 big trades a year. If these make money I just shut up shop. " 
The majority of traders, however, did not initially appear to fit with the mood protection 
hypothesis and its prediction of risk aversion in the domain of gain. Many traders 
associated gain with positive emotion, ý confidence ý and increased risk taking. For 
example: 
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"The times I have lost money are the times when I am up. I feel very relaxed and 
put on trades that I shouldn't. " 
"If you are sitting on a pile of money you have made, you feel more confident. 
... When you are 
feeling good, you have momentum and you have a bit more 
passion. You are able to do what your intuitions or emotions say. " 
"When you feel you are on a run, you are more inclined to roll the dice a bit 
more. Got more money to play with. " 
When the traders' comments were examined in relation to their discussions concerning 
their bonus targets, however, it became apparent that framing and reference points were 
exerting an influence on traders' perceptions of loss and gain. The traders who reported 
risk taking in circumstances of positive emotion and confidence also talked about how 
they continued to take risks because they wanted to make more money. They were not 
willing to be conservative when they still had opportunities to overreach their target and 
increase their end of year bonus payment. Thus the traders perceived themselves to be in 
a position of loss compared with their profit target. Their continued risk taking might be 
explained in terms of positioning in the domain of loss. The presence of positive 
emotions could be associated with past profit and the anticipation of future profit. To 
test for relationships between personality and emotion-led behaviour change, individual 
interview data were coded into one of two groups according to whether participants 
reported changing their behaviour in response to emotional reactions or not. Group 
membership was correlated with NEO PI-R facet data gathered for 52 participants. The 
reduced sample size for the personality data was due to the voluntary and time- 
consuming nature of the questionnaire. Changes in behaviour were associated 
significantly with three low scores in facets of the conscientiousness domain: 
competence, order and achievement-striving (p < . 05). These results support 
further the 
notion that consistent behaviour has important dispositional anchors. 
In sum, emotions were found to be an important influence on traders' decision making 
processes. Positive and negative emotions did have different effects on risk taking. The 
pattern of effects was complex, and related to individual-level perceptions of loss and 
gain, showing the importance of framing and reference points. However, consistent 
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behaviour was likely to have a disposition-based component associated with the 
conscientiousness trait. 
3.6 Summary of risk and emotion research 
Emotions have been shown to be powerful influences on decision making and behaviour. 
Disposition-based emotions have been shown to be associated with consistent patterns of 
risk behaviour. In particular, a high scale score in the trait of neuroticism has been related 
to risk aversion. State, or situation, based emotions also have been demonstrated to have 
important effects on decision making and behaviour. It is likely that there are some 
relationships between positive and negative emotions and the effects of positive and 
negative situational frames. One possible reason for the observations that emotions affect 
decision making is that experiences of different emotions lead to inconsistent, 
situationally variable risk behaviour because of changes in perception and information 
processing strategies. The effects of emotions could be similar to the effects of framing. 
As discussed in the previous section, there is some evidence to suggest that situational 
variables can affect perceptions and judgements, while underlying preferences are 
relatively stable. Likewise, emotion-related changes in decision making could be 
consistent with general risk preferences. 
In sum, as has been suggested in the previous section summaries in this chapter, it is 
possible that two key categories of individuals exist. First, those for whom emotions are 
trait based, relatively stable and are associated with relatively consistent approaches to 
risk-related decision making. Second, those for whom emotions are situationally variable 
and lead to inconsistent risky choices. 
3.8 Hypotheses 
These theory and research discussed in this chapter and preceding chapters led to the 
development of a set of hypotheses be tested in this research: 
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1. Risk propensity can be conceptualised and operationalised in terms of cross- 
domain risk preferences. 
2. Whether people are consistent or inconsistent in their cross-domain risk 
preferences, and the degree of consistency of cross-domain risk preferences, 
will be influenced by personality factors and the consistency of cross-domain 
decision preference variables 
3. The predictors of domain-specific risk preferences are different for the work, 
health and finance domains. 
The method developed to test these hypotheses is discussed in the next chapter. 
3.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented and discussed issues that are important influences on risk- 
related decision making and behaviour. These factors have each been shown to be 
significant components of risk-related decision making. There are three sets of 
implications for the explanation and prediction of behaviour. 
First, personality. Particular sets of personality traits have been associated with relatively 
consistent cross-domain risky choices and risk behaviour. Specifically, low scores in the 
traits of neuroticism and conscientiousness combined with high scores in extroversion, 
which includes the facet of sensation seeking, have been demonstrated to be significant 
predictors of risk seeking behaviour. The reverse pattern of scoring has been shown to 
relate to consistent risk averse behaviour. Agreeableness is an additional influence on risk 
behaviour, but its effects are more complex. A low score in a measure of agreeableness 
when added to the risk seeking profile is likely to contribute further to risk seeking. A 
high score in agreeableness added to the risk seeking profile could lead to risk taking in 
some situations, or domains, that are judged not to impact adversely on other people. 
Hence that profile might be associated with behaviour that seems to be inconsistent, or 
domain specific. People without strong dispositional influences on behaviour could be 
less likely to show cross-domain consistency. 
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Second, loss, gain and framing. Changes in perception associated with framing, loss and 
gain have been shown to increase the variability of risk behaviour. Many research studies 
have shown that people tend to have risk preferences that change according to whether 
information is presented in positive terms or negative terms. However, a few researchers 
have taken an alternative approach and have shown that two alternative explanations are 
possible. First, when data are considered on an individual level, some people have been 
shown to be consistent in their preferences while others are not. Second, where 
preferences are variable, it has been shown that although perceptions of what seems to 
be the more attractive option might change, while the underlying preference for more or 
less risk remains relatively stable. Hence while it might indeed be true that risk-related 
decision making is open to the influence of situational variables, this is likely to be truer 
for some people than others. The interaction between variability, consistency and 
personality is an important area for study. 
Third, emotion. Emotions have been shown to have numerous effects on the decision 
making process and risk behaviour. Both trait and state emotions are important factors. 
As discussed in above, trait based emotions are likely to lead to relatively consistent 
approaches to risk-related decision making. State emotions associated with situational 
factors could be associated with variations in perception and sensitive to situational 
variance. 
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Chapter 4 
Method 
4.1 Chapter abstract 
Chapter 4 describes the research framework and the method used to gather data. The 
research was designed to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. The aims were 
threefold. First, to assess of risk preferences in several decision domains (work, health 
and personal finance). Second, to examine the factors that are associated with consistent 
and inconsistent risk preferences. Third, to assess the differences between cross-domain 
risk preferences and domain-specific risk preferences. 
The chapter describes the development of the research measure and how data were 
gathered. The measure was a questionnaire that assessed biographical variables, a set of 
cognitive and emotion related decision preference variables for each decision domain, 
and a set of domain-specific decision preference items. Personality was measured using 
an existing personality inventory. The sampling strategy was to create a sample that 
encompassed a range of different approaches to risk. There were five sample groups: 
academics, chess players, fire fighters, mountain climbers and traders. 
The chapter concludes by summarising the key characteristics of the research method 
and discussing how this method relates to previous work in the field. 
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4.2 The research framework 
The aims of the research were to contribute to the literature concerning individual-level 
consistency with respect to risk-related decision making, and to explore whether 
consistency or inconsistency are related to factors such as personality. The focus of the 
research is the individual. 
The research sought to be both exploratory, to assess the relationships between decision 
styles and individual difference variables, and descriptive, to characterise participants in 
terms of whether they were consistent or not in their cross-domain risk preferences as 
well as the degree of inconsistency. 
The research framework was developed to fulfil the aims of the study. The design was 
between-participants and - cross-sectional. This enabled the examination of the 
relationships between biographical variables, personality factors, decision preference 
variables and risk preferences. A normative approach was taken. 
The research method drew closely upon other research into the concepts of risk 
propensity and risk preferences. The focus of much previous work has been on the 
concept of risk propensity. As demonstrated in the literature reviews in Chapters 2 and 3, 
a number of previous researchers have operationalised risk propensity in terms of risk 
preferences or risk choices in only one decision domain. A typical approach has been to 
measure risk preferences using a small number of Likert scale items. In this research, the 
Likert scale method of measurement is used. Since the central aim of the research was to 
examine the concepts of cross-domain and domain-specific risk preferences, risk 
propensity is operationalised in terms of the degree of consistency of cross-domain risk 
preferences. This operationalisation was derived from the work of Sitkin and Pablo 
(1992) who proposed that risk propensity would be reflected in expressed preferences. 
Hence, an individual who shows strong preferences for taking risk in each of the decision 
domains measured has something akin to what Sitkin and Pablo would call a propensity 
to take risks. However, it could be that cross-domain preferences for general risk seeking 
or risk avoidance are associated with different decision processes from those that drive 
domain-specific risk seeking or risk avoidance. That is, the personality and decision 
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preference profile of someone who is a consistent risk seeker is likely to be different both 
from a person who consistently avoids risk, and someone who takes risks in one domain 
but not others. The concept of risk propensity in the Sitkin and Pablo terms does not 
encompass those different patterns of risk preferences. Hence the two key concepts that 
the measure was developed to assess were domain-specific risk preferences, associated 
with work, health and finance decision domains, - and cross-domain risk preferences that 
represent the consistency of risk preferences across the three decision domains. 
4.3 The research method 
Research in this field can be categorised in terms of method. First, a common method is 
laboratory-based work. Studies using this method often present standardised scenarios to 
participants, e. g. the Kogan Wallach choice dilemmas (1964). Responses to scenarios are 
commonly assessed using Likert scales. Second, an alternative approach is to use 
standardised gambles or lotteries, for example the work of MacCrimmon and Wehrung 
(1986). Gambles are usually designed to vary with respect to the size and probability of 
payoffs. Participants are asked to state which gamble they prefer. A third research 
method is the use of the normative survey technique. An example of this method is the 
work of Kärhä (1998) reviewed in chapter 3. Kärhä's study used the survey method to 
examine the individual and organisational influences on the decision making of managers 
in the timber industry. This format uses Likert scale items to assess a range of individual- 
level variables. 
The method chosen for use in this research was a structured questionnaire designed to 
provide normative data. This method was considered to be more appropriate than both 
standardised scenarios and gambles because it enables best the aims of the research to be 
met. This research was developed to examine the consistency of individual-level risk- 
related decision making and to assess whether patterns of decision making could be 
anchored in other individual characteristics. The triangulation method is used commonly 
in psychological research and is a feature of a number of the studies reviewed in chapters 
2 and 3. What is notable about the research discussed in those chapters is that while they 
aim to assess risk propensity, there is a tendency to measure risk preferences with respect 
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to a small number of decisions in one domain. In particular, studies in this field have 
focused largely on business decision making and financial decision making. The small 
number of studies that have been conducted on decision making in different domains has 
shown that decision domain has important effects on choice behaviour (e. g. Fagley & 
Miller, 1997). This research was developed to contribute to development of a cross- 
domain conceptualisation of risk preferences. The aim was to assess more than one 
decision domain in order to explore and describe the issue of decision consistency rather 
than just to focus on risk preferences in one domain. Reported risk taking or risk 
preferences in one decision domain alone might not be the optimal way to operationalise 
the concept of risk propensity in the way that Sitkin and Pablo (1992) define it. 
A questionnaire method was suitable for this type of research for three further reasons, 
as discussed by Robson (1993). First, the survey method provides data on a large 
number of standardised variables. This enables the quantitative analysis of within- 
participant and between-participant data. Second, the survey method is an efficient way 
to collect a large amount of data at relatively low cost, in terms of both time and money. 
Third, the anonymity that a survey provides can be useful in increasing response rates. 
There are several potential disadvantages of the survey method, also discussed by 
Robson (1993). Data might be influenced by how interested or motivated the respondent 
is in the topic. It is common for response rates to be low when surveys are conducted by 
post. There can be ambiguity in the survey items. Participants may not perceive the item 
to be asking the same question as the survey developer believes it does. Respondents 
may not be truthful in their answers. Efforts were made to overcome these 
disadvantages. First, the questionnaire was piloted to try to eliminate ambiguous 
questions. Second, the survey was voluntary. Third, whenever possible, I met or spoke 
with respondents on the telephone, or had individual email contact. This process was 
useful to explain the aims of the research and to answer questions about questionnaire 
completion. Only one out of five sample groups surveyed had no contact with the 
researcher. This group was the academics who were likely to have experience of 
completing questionnaires and were less likely to require an explanation of the research 
procedure. 
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4.4 Sampling 
The aim of the sampling strategy was to target people who have self-selected into groups 
where the nature of risks involved vary. The method was non-probability sampling of the 
heterogeneous type (Robson, 1993) where the aim is to gather data from individuals 
representing the range of individual difference characteristics being measured. It is likely 
that a random sample of the general population could have served to meet these aims. 
However a random sample would have had to be sufficiently large to ensure that a range 
of risk orientations was captured. The targeted sampling strategy was a more efficient 
way to gather the necessary range of data. The aim of the sampling strategy was not to 
use sample groups as the basis for comparison, although data were examined to see 
whether there were significant differences between the groups. Rather, the aim was to 
achieve variance on the individual-level variables in the questionnaire. Both work and 
nonwork foci were used to select the sample groups. The groups were academics; chess 
players; fire fighters; mountain climbers and traders in financial markets. It is 
acknowledged that the groups are not mutually exclusive, but that this sampling strategy 
could be an effective method to achieve heterogeneity within and across groups. The 
methods used to gather data from each of these groups are described section 4.9 below. 
4.5 Questionnaire development 
The questionnaire was developed to gather standardised data. No specific knowledge 
was required to complete the questionnaire. The questionnaire was structured to assess a 
range of demographic and individual-level variables that reflected the aims of the 
research. The level of analysis was the individual and, as Fishbein and Azjen (1974) 
suggested, the level of specificity in the questions reflected this. 
A key feature of the questionnaire was the measurement of concepts in three decision 
domains in order to assess the consistency of individual risk preferences and risk-related 
decision making. Three decision domains were selected on the basis that this is the study 
of different decision arenas is a basic requirement of a measure which seeks to examine 
the factors that are associated with consistent and inconsistent risk preferences and the 
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concepts of cross-domain and domain-specific risk preferences. The three risk-related 
decision domains were work, health and finance. These arenas were chosen for three 
reasons. First, it seemed likely that a sizeable proportion of the variance in cross-domain 
risk preferences could be captured by assessing three key domains that are central to 
many people's lives. Second, it was thought that these domains would be applicable to 
almost all respondents in the sample groups chosen. Third, there is a history of research 
in each of the three domains from which to draw measures. However, as noted, the items 
in the questionnaire could not all be based upon work in the field of risk propensity alone 
since research in this field has tended to focus on just business or finance decisions. 
In the questionnaire risk was defined as being a choice where there are possible negative 
outcomes that you prefer to avoid. This very general definition was chosen to reduce the 
likelihood that participants' perceptions of risk would be shaped by the researcher. The 
loose definition was presented in a way that was intended to allow individual-level 
interpretation of risk. In addition, the definition needed to be broad enough to apply 
across different decision arenas and to encompass the notion that not all risk involves 
loss. This definition does not acknowledge the possibility of gain, as the definition does 
that is used in the discussion of the nature of risk in this thesis, however, the aim was to 
present a relatively non-academic definition which would be a general frame for 
approaching the questions. A definition that indicated a risk event was one which could 
lead both to positive and negative outcomes could have lacked face validity; it could 
have appeared too general to be useful to participants. 
4.6 Validity and reliability 
The questionnaire comprised newly developed items, items based upon the work of other 
authors adapted to each decision domain and a previously developed scale to measure 
personality. The development and adaptation of items raises several issues concerning 
the validity and reliability of the measure. 
There are a number of different types of validity. Three types of validity are relevant to 
this study. Construct validity concerns whether the items measure the concepts of 
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interest in the research (Cook & Campbell, 1976). This issue was particularly relevant to 
the items concerned with measuring the consistency of decision making. Where possible, 
items were used that have been shown to have construct validity in previous studies by 
different authors. The design of new items attempted to maximise construct validity by 
developing items that are clearly linked to the construct they are trying to measure, 
rather than by using opaque items which have been shown to relate to the concepts in 
previous research although the causal mapping might be unclear. The research design 
was to assess relationships between the decision making items and other individual 
difference characteristics, namely demographic, biographical and personality data. The 
data were gathered using one instrument, the questionnaire, and as such the approach 
does not allow multi-method data comparisons, for example between questionnaire 
responses and an independent measure of risk taking. However, the design did allow 
triangulation. This enabled the examination of whether the decision making variables 
developed for this research related to biographical information and a well established 
approach to the measurement of personality. 
The second type of validity that is an issue for this research is external validity. This is 
the degree to which the results of the study generalise to the wider population (Cook & 
Campbell, 1979). The greater the range of demographics, decision making preferences 
and personality captured by the sampling, the more likely it is that the results are 
generalisable to the population. The sampling strategy was developed to try to capture 
variance on the variables in the questionnaire by gathering data from people likely to 
have a range of orientations to risk. This increased the likelihood that the study had 
external validity. 
Third, the face validity of the questionnaire was considered. The items were developed 
and presented in a way that would increase the likelihood that participants would 
perceive them to be appropriate to the subject of study and the aims of the research. 
The second important issue relating to questionnaire construction is reliability. There are 
two key components of reliability that apply to the measure used in this research. First, 
the reliability of a measure concerns whether data gathered at one point in time would be 
the same as data gathered at a different point in time. Second, reliability concerns the 
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consistency of responses. For example, items within a scale should relate to the same 
underlying construct and answers should be relatively consistent. A high degree of 
inconsistency could indicate that the items were measuring a number of different 
constructs. It is anticipated that responses to the questionnaire developed for this 
research could change over time and with experience of difference risk-related events. 
However, questions were developed to assess some relatively enduring decision making 
preferences that were likely to be related to personality that is relatively consistent over 
time for a portion of the sample. In this respect, it was expected that the first aspect 
reliability of the questionnaire could be increased. The second aspect of reliability, 
concerned with the consistency of responses, was a less important issue. Items were not 
developed with the intention of forming scales. Rather, cross-domain consistency was the 
focus of the research of the. Lack of inconsistency of responses was considered to be a 
characteristic of the individual respondent, and analysed in terms of other individual-level 
data such as personality and demographic information. The sets of items that were 
specific to each decision domain items were developed to be assessed as individual items, 
however, they were also examined to see whether they formed reliable scales that could 
be related to other individual level characteristics. These data are discussed in Chapter 7. 
4.7 Variables in the questionnaire 
The questionnaire is shown in Appendix 2. The sections that follow discuss the items in 
the questionnaire and their derivation. 
4.7.1 Questionnaire section I 
The first section concerned demographic and biographical variables: age; sex; highest 
level of education; seniority within the organisation operationalised in terms of levels 
between the individual and the CEO, or most senior person in the London offices of the 
organisation if it was very large such as the investment banks; tenure; annual income 
including bonuses and overtime pay. There was an additional open-ended question that 
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asked participants to note the risks they perceive their job and their nonwork activities to 
involve. 
This section of the questionnaire had to be adapted for some of the sample groups. The 
open-ended question was not included in the traders' version of the questionnaire 
because data collection from traders was part of a wider research project and a number 
of other questions related to the project had to be added to this section of the 
questionnaire. For reasons of keeping the data collection to a manageable time, these 
two open-ended questions were omitted. The fire fighters' questionnaire also had to be 
altered at the request of the London Fire and Civil Defence Authority. It was suggested 
that the change would both increase perceptions of anonymity, thus increasing the 
likelihood of participation, and reduce the overall length of time spent on the 
questionnaire. This was because respondents were undergoing selection assessments and 
had already completed a lengthy battery of measures prior to completing the 
questionnaire used in this research. The different versions of this section of the 
questionnaire are shown in Appendices 2b, 2c and 2d. 
4.7.2 Questionnaire section II ,, 
This section comprised a set of items that were repeated across decision arenas. These 
items were adapted from previous research into risk-related decision making that has 
identified some of the key concepts related to choice behaviour. In particular, the work 
of Sitkin and Pablo (1992) was important. 
The first item in this section was an open-ended item that asked participants to record 
any significant positive or negative risk-related events. This item had two purposes. It 
allowed the gathering of some qualitative individual data regarding the risk experiences 
of participants. The item had the additional aim of shifting participants' thinking from one 
decision domain to the next and encouraging them to think about each domain prior to 
answering further questions. Recent examples of risk experiences were requested 
because it has been suggested that this is the optimum time frame to use when asking 
participants about potentially negative events. If longer time periods are asked about, the 
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events reported are likely to have been subject to psychological manipulation that 
influences the accuracy of recall (Cannon and Nicholson, 1997). 
The next eight items in this section were presented in the form of statements that were 
rated on a 5-point Likert scale (Likert, 1932). Participants were asked to circle the 
appropriate number. These items were essentially the same for each decision domain. 
The only differences were the adaptation of the item to make reference to work, health 
or personal finance. These items were constructed to reflect previous research and to 
assess cognitive and emotional aspects of risk-related decision making. 
Items one and two in this section considered reactions to events noted in the previous 
open-ended question. The two items considered change in risk related behaviour as a 
result of experiencing risk (rated from -significant change to no change) and the direction 
of change in behaviour (rated from less cautious to more cautious). These items were 
developed to assess whether behaviour was variable, changing in response to risk events, 
or relatively consistent and resilient despite recent risk experiences. 
The third item drew upon the work that has considered emotions and risk, reviewed in 
the previous chapter. This item measured general affect in each decision domain. The 
response range was negative feelings to positive feelings. 
The reference point was the focus of the fourth item. This item was based upon the 
research of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the associated work, which was reviewed 
in Chapter 3, that has shown that perceptions relating to loss and gain can influence 
decision making. The response range was worse than usual to better than usual. 
The fifth item assessed the cognitive aspect of decision making for each domain. This 
item was included because of the research into perceptions of risks that has shown 
information processing and cognitive biases to be important components of risk-related 
choice (e. g. Forgas, 1989; Janis, 1989; Janis & Mann, 1977). An additional influence was 
the tradition of expected utility theory-based research that considers decision making to 
be a rational process involving the consideration of decision alternatives. The item asked 
participants to rate the frequency of consideration of payoffs and costs of each 
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alternative in decision making to show whether a generally cognitive approach was taken 
to risk-related decision making. The response range was very rarely to very often. 
Emotions were the focus of the sixth item. Emotions have been shown to be a key factor 
influencing decision making in a number of research studies (e. g. Hockey et al, 2000; 
Mittal & Ross, 1998). This question asked participants to rate the frequency of influence 
of emotions on decision-making. The aim was to assess whether a generally emotional 
decision making strategy was preferred. The rating scale ranged from very rarely to very 
often. 
The seventh and eighth items were developed from the Sitkin and Pablo's paper on risk 
propensity (1992). These authors proposed that the two key factors in risk behaviour 
were risk perception and risk preference. Participants were asked to rate their overall 
level of perceived risk in each domain ranging from much risk to little risk. General risk 
preference was measured in terms of whether people rated themselves as preferring to 
take risks or avoid risks. 
4.7.3 Questionnaire section III 
The third set of questions was developed to measure issues that were specific to each 
decision domain. Items in this section were selected on the basis of the previous 
empirical evidence into risk perception, risk propensity and risk taking. The specific 
questions for each domain followed the general questions, as recommended in Robson 
(1993). The domain-specific items were included in the questionnaire for two reasons. 
First, these items provided further data concerning the nature of the decision making 
process. Second, the data gathered could be correlated with the demographic, biological 
and personality variables to assess whether individual difference characteristics were 
associated with particular patterns of decision making. Third, the items could be factor 
analysed and then used to develop scales for further analysis of domain-specific decision 
preferences. 
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The items in this section of the questionnaire were, by their nature, domain specific. This 
was to assess whether there were overarching approaches to risk-related decision making 
that were more significant in the decision making process than the decision domains 
themselves. The themes for each set of domain-specific variables were the following: 
1. Risk as positive 
2. Risk as negative 
3. Negative emotions associated with risk 
4. Positive emotions associated with risk 
5. Behavioural frequency 
These themes were chosen to reflect the cognitive, emotional and behavioural facets of 
risk. The dimensions of emotion were high positive affect and high negative affect 
following a consideration of the emotion and sensation seeking literature reviewed in 
Chapter 3. 
The form of each question was a 5-point Likert scale item. The response range was 
strongly disagree to strongly agree for each item. 
Within each decision domain there were two sets of items designed in this way. This was 
to increase the likelihood of capturing cross-domain consistency while keeping the 
overall length of the questionnaire within reasonable limits. The section that follows 
describes the items used in each domain and the derivation of items. The items are shown 
in the questionnaire in Appendix 2e, and are numbered q10 and q11 in each domain. 
4.7.4 Work domain specific items 
Work was the first decision domain to be considered. This domain was chosen because it 
is the key focus of much theoretical and empirical work in the risk field. In addition, 
there is increasing concern about the management of risk taking in the workplace. The 
items sought to assess whether individual differences in risk orientation were associated 
with particular perceptions and reactions to work-specific risks. The aspects of work- 
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related risk taking included in the questionnaire were error risk taking and taking risks to 
meet goals. 
4.7.5 Error risk taking at work 
These items were taken from the Error Orientation Questionnaire (EOQ), developed by 
Rybowiak and his colleagues (1999; unpublished version 1997). This questionnaire was 
developed to measure how people perceive and behave in relation to errors. The authors 
considered errors as being important issues in organisations that result in negative 
consequences such as accidents, stress and low morale. 
One aspect of the EOQ is error risk taking. The authors proposed that error risk taking is 
caused by general flexibility and openness towards errors, or to high achievement 
orientation. The implication is that errors will be accepted as a part of achieving higher 
order goals. This scale was adapted for inclusion in the questionnaire because making an 
error is applicable to almost all jobs. Second, individual differences in the error risk 
taking could be associated with other aspects of risk-related decision. Third, the scale 
relates to the risks that might be associated with errors, including the disruption of goal 
directed behaviour (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Leitner, Luders, Greiner, Weber & Hennes, 
1987, Semmer, 1984), which is the second work-specific set of items. 
4.7.6 Meeting targets at work 
The second set of items concerned goal directed behaviour. These items considered the 
level of risk that individuals are prepared to take in order to meet goals. The items were 
considered relevant for a number of reasons. First, the concept relates to prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory proposed that when people are below 
their targets they are more willing to take risks than when they are at or above targets. 
This theory has been the focus of much research. It is one of the most important 
frameworks to propose that risk-related decision making is contingent upon situational 
factors. Second, the items complemented the error risk taking questions. Third, the items 
107 
assess general goal orientation. This construct could have an interesting relationship with 
other areas of risky decision making. For example, a person who has a strong orientation 
towards risk seeking might also be willing to accept risk in order to achieve goals. These 
individuals might have different decision making and personality characteristics from 
people who are not willing to accept risks. 
4.7.7 Health domain specific items 
Health was considered to be an important area to include in the questionnaire because 
health is an issue that is relevant to everyone. Risks that have negative impacts on health 
can have subsequent effects on other areas of life, such as work. 
The issue of individual-level choices about health behaviours and risks to health has been 
the subject of theoretical and empirical work. The complexity of risk behaviour has led to 
the health-related risk research being largely separate from the work-related risk 
research. Different theories have been developed to describe, explain and predict 
behaviour in the different risk domains. There is very little published research applied to 
health decision making that considers the issue of risk propensity in the way that Sitkin 
and Pablo have conceptualised it. The items that were included in the questionnaire 
attempted to capture two aspects of health-related risk choices that could be related to 
risk perceptions and preferences. The issues concerned health protection and the balance 
between work and nonwork. Both sets of factors have been used in previous research. 
4.7.8 Health protection 
Health protection was the focus of a paper by Moorman and Matulich (1993). These 
authors considered the impact of individual-level health-related perceptions and beliefs 
on health protective behaviours and health information seeking. Health protection was 
chosen as an appropriate topic to be included in the questionnaire because of its 
widespread application to the general population, and growing awareness of health issues 
among the general population (Moorman & Matulich, 1993). In addition, as the authors 
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noted, given that there is large expenditure and considerable research into how to 
develop preventive health behaviours, it is interesting to examine whether health 
protection beliefs are associated with other individual difference characteristics. 
The items in this section of the questionnaire were adapted from the Moorman and 
Matulich scale to fit in with the cross-domain item structure. 
4.7.9 Life balance 
Life balance refers to the relationship between different key activities, in particular, work 
and nonwork. Zedeck (1992) defined nonwork as encompassing activities and attitudes 
related to family, as well as leisure, hobbies, health-related behaviours, religion, 
community and social activities. This division became apparent after the industrial 
revolution when the nature of work changed fundamentally. The rationale behind the 
item is that physical and mental health could be at risk if a balance between work and 
nonwork cannot be achieved. 
The balance between work and nonwork was chosen for inclusion in the questionnaire 
because it was a second issue of interest in the above-mentioned paper by Moorman and 
Matulich (1993). Life balance was considered by the authors to be one of the factors that 
contributes to health protective behaviour. Again, potential relationships between these 
variables, other risk-related decision choices and individual difference characteristics 
might help to explain health risk taking choices within an overall risk preference 
framework. The items in this section were adapted from items developed by Moorman 
and Matulich (1993). 
4.7.10 Finance domain-specific items 
The finance domain has been the focus of much previous empirical work. A lot of this 
work in this field has used hypothetical gambles. This method of item construction was 
not applied to the questionnaire because different types of items might have led to 
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different results. Hence the format of items was different from some of the research in 
the field, however the areas of interest were typical of previous studies. 
4.7.11 Use of money 
The first set of items considered the use of money. The choice to include this concept 
had two bases. First, it could be that the use of one's own money might reflect well an 
individual's underlying preferences that could differ from choices made with others' 
money (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1991). Second, the work of MacCrimmon and 
Wehrung (1986) found that use of own money was an interesting part of the profile of 
executive risk preferences. Their research examined a number of different aspects of risk 
taking, and was summarised in Chapter 2. The set of items in this section was adapted 
from MacCrimmon and Wehrung's research to fit in with the cross-domain framework. 
4.7.12 Gambling 
Gambling is defined as the risking of money, in particular, with the possibility of ultimate 
gain (Reber, 1985). Gambling is a much studied risk behaviour (e. g. Wagenaar & Keren, 
1985) and a number of causes have been proposed. For example, it has been 
hypothesised that gamblers are taking risks to meet different goals such as seeking 
excitement and making money (Wagenaar, Keren and Pleit-Kuper, 1984). It has also 
been suggested that gamblers perceive risk in a different way from non-gamblers, e. g. 
March and Shapira (1987) and Gilovich (1983). This set of items was included to 
examine whether individual differences in decision making and personality profiles were 
associated with different perceptions and feelings about gambling. 
The items in this section were not drawn from one specific paper. Rather, the items 
reflected the widespread research interest in the gambling phenomenon. In addition to 
the cross-domain items, there was a forced choice item that asked participants whether 
they gambled or not. This item was added following the advice of a colleague who 
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suggested that people might have an ethical stance against gambling and would not 
appreciate an assumption that they did gamble. 
4.7.13 Questionnaire section IV 
This section comprised the Big Five Inventory (John, Donahue & Kentle, 1991). The Big 
Five Inventory comprises 44, five-point Likert scale items designed to assess the five key 
dimensions of personality: neuroticism (8 items), extroversion (8 items), openness (10 
items), agreeableness (9 items) and conscientiousness (9 items). This measure provides 
data on the five factors only and not the constituent facets that are assessed in other 
measures e. g. the NEO PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1991). Data can be used for research 
purposes. The results are not sufficiently detailed for individual-level feedback. This 
measure was found following an Internet search for personality measures. I contacted 
Oliver John at the Institute of Personality and Social Research at the University of 
California, Berkeley. It was agreed that I could use the measure provided it was for 
research purposes only. 
The measure is headed "I see myself as someone who... ". Participants are asked to rate 
their level of agreement with statements such as "Is inventive". A number of the items 
are worded negatively and recoded subsequently. A set of items corresponding to each 
of the five personality factors is summed to give a score for each factor. 
The traders' version of the questionnaire did not include this section. This is because the 
access to this sample group was part of a wider research project that involved a number 
of other measures. These measures included a longer personality measure, the NEO PI-R 
(Costa & McCrae, 1991) that enabled detailed personality information about the traders 
to be gathered and allowed for personal level feedback, an important component of the 
research project. It did not seem reasonable to, ask trader participants to complete a 
second personality measure. The two measures have been found to correlate well (John, 
Donahue and Kentle, 1991). It is likely that the two measures do indeed measure the 
same five factors of personality. In the analysis each individual's factor score was 
111 
transformed into a standardised z score to enable more effective comparison of data from 
the two measures. This process is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
4.8 Pilot study 
The pilot work for this research had two components. First, semi-structured'interviews 
were conducted with 21 participants. The interviews were part of the development of the 
London Business School research project concerning the influences on financial trader 
performance in which I was employed as research officer. The participants were people 
who were students at London Business School with experience of working in investment 
banking. The concepts of risk perceptions and risk preferences that are central to the 
research described in this thesis were explored during the interviews. Although the 
participants were all drawn from the investment banking population, interview data 
showed a range of responses concerning risk perception, risk preference and behaviour. 
The second stage of the pilot work was to test the questionnaire items and format. The 
questionnaire was given to 20 social sciences graduates. Feedback from the respondents 
was used to clarify the wording of a few items. A full pilot study to test the new items in 
the questionnaire was not considered to be necessary because the construction of the 
questionnaire enabled triangulation with biographical and personality variables that were 
assessed using established methods. In addition, many of the items were selected from 
previous research. 
4.9 Data collection 
This section describes the data collection method and process for each of the five sample 
groups. The aim was to have approximately 50 people in each sample group to enable 
quantitative analysis of a sufficiently large overall data set. 
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4.9.1 Academics 
This sample group comprised academics at the University of Sheffield. The first survey 
was carried out in November 1998.250 questionnaires were put into faculty pigeonholes 
with an accompanying letter explaining the research. Seven departments representing the 
disciplines of science, social science and arts were chosen. The aim was to collect data 
from a range of areas. The departments were psychology, physics, animal and plant 
sciences, modem languages, Oriental studies and landscape design. A total of 34 
questionnaires were returned. This was a response rate of 13.6%. 
A second survey was carried out in April 1999 to increase the sample size. The 
departments involved in this round of data collection were economics, health studies, the 
management school and mechanical engineering. 200 questionnaires were distributed. A 
total 35 were returned. This was a response rate of 17.5%. 
4.9.2 Chess players 
Participants with an interest in chess were recruited from several sources. A visit to the 
London Chess and Bridge Centre on 27 October 1998 led to the recommendation that an 
advert be placed both the shop and in Chess Monthly, a quality specialist publication. 
The advert in the shop took the form of an A4 description of the project. The advert in 
the magazine had to take the form of a classified, paid for advert and as such was 
restricted in size. Twenty questionnaires were also left in the shop and one of the 
employees agreed to encourage colleagues and customers to take part. The advert for 
Chess Monthly was submitted in November 1998. 
The British Chess Federation was contacted on 29 October 1998. It was recommended 
that a classified advert be published in the BCF newsletter. This publication had a 
circulation of approximately 1400. The advert was submitted to BCR newsletter in 
December 1998. The adverts are shown in Appendix 3. 
113 
The advertisements yielded a very low response rate. It seemed that an advert for risk 
research was not appealing to the magazine readers. There were 3 responses and all 
completed the questionnaires. One participant, however, was enthusiastic about the 
research and agreed to help with distribution of questionnaires. This participant organises 
chess tournaments and agreed to take some questionnaires along to tournaments, along 
with a note explaining the research. In addition I attended two tournaments in April 
1999. The tournaments yielded a further 24 responses. As the overall response rate was 
low, a different strategy was used to contact chess players. An email was sent out to all 
students, faculty and staff at London Business School. A total of 22 people responded 
and completed the questionnaire. 
4.9.3 Fire fighters 
Information concerning the organisation of the London Civil Fire and Defence Authority 
(LFCDA) was gathered from their website. A letter was sent to the chairperson of the 
LFCDA. This letter was passed on to the occupational psychology department, which is 
in charge of carrying out recruitment and development centres. A meeting with an 
occupational psychologist was arranged and data collection was discussed. It was agreed 
that I could distribute my questionnaire as part of the recruitment assessment centres. 
The assessment centres take place after the application form and initial screening stages. 
The assessment centre stage of the process involves grouping candidates and presenting 
them with a range of psychometric measures at the LFCDA training centre in London. I 
attended each session for the summer 1998 block of candidates. On completion of their 
psychometric tests, an LFCDA assessor introduced me as a research officer seeking to 
gather data. Participants were told that: the questionnaire was part of research being 
carried out by the London fire brigade and London Business School; it is completely 
confidential; the questionnaire has nothing to do with the selection process; participation 
is voluntary; there would not be feedback because of the number of people involved. 
Questionnaires were distributed to all the candidates. A total of 123 were completed. 5 
questionnaires were left blank. The response rate was 96.1%. 
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4.9.4 Mountain climbers 
Data in this sample came from several sources. First, an advert was placed in "High" 
magazine, which is, the official, magazine of the British Mountaineering Council. This 
advert took the form of a brief description of the project and a request for volunteers. 
The advert is shown in Appendix 3. This yielded 22 responses. All requests for 
questionnaires resulted in a completed returned questionnaire. 
The next stage was to contact The London Mountaineering Club to assess interest. The 
club secretary took 16 questionnaires with her on a climbing weekend. 14 were 
completed. I attended a meeting of the club to discuss the research with individual 
members directly and distribute the questionnaire. This resulted in a further 19 
questionnaires being completed. The overall sample size was 55. 
4.9.5 Traders in financial markets 
Access to traders in financial markets was gained through my involvement in an ESRC 
funded project "Individual and Contextual Influences on the Market Behaviour of 
Finance Professionals. " It was agreed with my employers at London Business School 
that I could use the access into organisations to collect my own data. The sample 
comprised 118 traders from 4 major investment banks. The data was collected between 
September 1997 and March 1999. In the early phase of the research project, 
questionnaires were given to traders to complete voluntarily. This led to a low response 
rate. The research strategy was altered to include the questionnaire in the data gathering 
session developed for the ESRC project. The total sample size was 77. 
4.10 Chapter summary 
The research method described in this chapter was developed to enable the hypotheses to 
be tested. The aim of the research framework was to collect data that could be used to 
examine the key questions of what biographical variables, personality factors and 
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decision preference variables were associated with consistent and inconsistent risk 
preferences, and whether same factors were associated with domain-specific risk 
preferences. Open-ended questions were included in the questionnaire to gather some 
qualitative data concerning risks that people considered to be part of their everyday lives 
and recent risk events in each of the work, health and finance domains. These data were 
used to gain insight into the domain-specific risk issues that could explain why people 
take risks in some domains but not others. 
The measure was a survey format questionnaire developed from several pieces of 
previous research. In this research, risk propensity is operationalised in terms of the 
degree of consistency of cross-domain risk preferences. The main influence was the work 
of Sitkin and Pablo (1992) and the empirical research that has been founded upon it. The 
concept of risk preferences was chosen as the key variable first, because of its 
significance in the work of Sitkin and Pablo. These authors proposed that risk 
preferences are one of the components of risk propensity and that risk propensity is 
reflected in expressed preferences. Second, risk preferences were measured because they 
have been noted to be a factor that is associated with personality and can be consistent 
across situations (Weber & Milliman, 1997). 
The questionnaire was used to survey five sample groups that were chosen to represent a 
range of approaches to risk. The sample groups were academics, chess players, fire 
fighters, mountain climbers and traders. A total of 371 participants completed the 
questionnaire, yielding 358 usable questionnaires. 
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Chapter 5 
Data screening and description 
5.1 Chapter abstract 
Chapter 5 considers the nature of the data gathered using the survey questionnaire. In 
particular, the data screening and data distributions are discussed in relation to 
characteristics of the data set that might influence subsequent analysis. 
The first section sets out the aims of the chapter, followed by the presentation of 
descriptive statistics for the key variables measured in the questionnaire. The 
differences between the sample groups were considered to examine whether there was 
variance both within and between sample groups. In general, variance was achieved on 
all items across the sample. The full descriptive statistics for each item are shown in 
Appendix 4. 
It is concluded that, overall, the data do not raise significant problems for the analysis 
that follows. 
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5.2 Chapter aims 
This chapter discusses the preliminary screening and examination of the data with a 
view to highlighting issues that might affect the interpretation of the analysis, discussed 
in subsequent chapters. The aims of the chapter are the following: 
1. To describe the data screening process. 
2. To describe the data in terms of the overall sample and the 5 sample subgroups. 
3. To assess whether analysis discussed in subsequent chapters is likely to be affected 
by the nature of the data e. g. non-normality. 
4. To examine whether there are characteristics the sample groups that might affect the 
interpretation of the analysis. 
5. To examine the distributions of the continuous demographic data. 
6. To describe the sample in terms of personality characteristics and examine 
differences between sample groups using a oneway analysis of variance. 
All data screening and analyses were carried out using the Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS). 
5.2 Data screening 
The raw data were screened prior to analysis. This took place in several stages. First, the 
descriptive statistics function was used to check that the raw data had been entered 
correctly. Examples of mistakes identified included `11' instead of `1' and `23' instead 
of a `2' followed by a `3'. Referring back to the original questionnaires for the correct 
data rectified these data entry errors. 
Second, missing data were considered. Three strategies were used to cope with missing 
data. First, 13 cases were deleted. In 7 cases, only the `general information' and `work' 
sections of the questionnaire had been completed. Insufficient data remained for those 
cases to be included in the analysis. A minimum of 10 responses had been omitted in 
the other 6 cases. The pattern of omission was such that replacement of missing data 
would have proved unsatisfactory, for example, missing out items key to risk behaviour 
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prediction, or leaving incomplete a section of the Big Five Inventory. This left a total of 
358 cases. A number of cases still had some missing data on a small number of 
variables. This was dealt with in two ways. The variables in the work, health and 
finance sections in the SPSS data set and the completed questionnaires were visually 
scanned. It was assumed that missing data were random. The `listwise' or `pairwise' 
deletion facilities in SPSS were used in the analysis, whichever was appropriate for the 
procedure. 
Second, missing data in the Big Five Inventory (BFI) was replaced using regression. A 
total of 13 cases had one item each missing on 12 items in the BFI. One person had 
missing data on two items. The replacement of missing data was particularly important 
for the personality data to ensure a score for each factor could be derived for each 
individual and used in further analysis. Such replacement prevented these cases being 
excluded from the analysis. It appeared from an examination of completed 
questionnaires that data was missing due to the oversight of the participant rather than 
systematic biases. I 
The missing data were replaced using regression. The regression method puts the 
variable with the missing data as the dependent variable. The other relevant variables, in 
this case the other items which together form each personality factor, as the predictor 
variables. The standardised beta weights for each of the predictor variables were used to 
calculate the missing value. 
For example, the first item on the neuroticism scale, Ni is missing. There are 8 items in 
the scale. Ni is calculated using regression. For the single case with the missing Ni 
value, the following equation was used: 
Ni = Constant + (standardised beta weight for N2 x N2 value for that case) + .... 
( standardised beta weight for N8 x N8 value for that case) 
This process has the advantages of being objective, being more sophisticated than 
replacing a missing value with a mean and enabling cases to be retained for analysis 
rather than excluding them. There are three problems. First, because the regression 
procedure uses each case's other data, the replacement value can be closer to the other 
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data in value than it actually would have been. Second, the variance is potentially 
reduced. Third, estimates do not always fall within the range of the item (Tabachnik & 
Fidell, 1989). This was the case for one item. The result of the regression analysis was a 
figure that exceeded the maximum scale value of 5 by approximately . 1. The value was 
entered into the database as S. Given the small number of values replaced using the 
regression method, these problems were not considered likely to have a significant 
impact on subsequent analyses. 
Third, the normality of all the variables was assessed by checking the skew and 
kurtosis. These data are shown in Appendix 4. No variables were excluded from the 
analysis on the basis of non-normality. 
Fourth, outliers were considered. Outliers are cases or variables with unusual values, or 
in the case of multivariate outliers, unusual combinations of values. Outliers can have 
an important influence on the distribution of values and statistical analyses. Outliers 
were not considered to be an a priori problem for the data that were used to create the 
dependent variables. This process is discussed in detail in the next chapter. In the 
multivariate analyses discussed in the next chapter, the SPSS program checked for 
outliers. No outliers were revealed in the regression analyses. 
Fifth, the differences between the two personality measures were considered. As 
discussed in the method chapter, the Big Five Inventory was used to gather data from 
the majority of participants: academics, chess players, fire fighters and mountain 
climbers. The traders, however, were part of a larger research project carried out with 
colleagues at London Business School that involved gathering extensive data regarding 
a number of issues. In order to provide full data and enable personality profiling, the 
NEO PI-R was used. 
The reliabilities of both personality scales were examined. The results are shown in 
table 5.1 on the next page. 
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Table 5.1: Cronbach's alpha for the Big Five Inventory and the NEO PI-R 
BFI alpha NEO alpha 
Neuroticism . 853 . 834 
Extroversion . 878 . 
661 
Openness . 767 . 579 
Agreeableness . 624 . 748 Conscientiousness . 833 . 777 
Cronbach's alpha reaches the recommended minimum of .7 (Nunnally, 1978) for 7 out 
of 10 personality factors. The 3 factors that have Cronbach's alphas of below .7 were 
retained in future analysis without alteration. While the value of the alpha could have 
been increased by deleting scale items, and thus changing the construction of the scales, 
the questionnaires have been developed and validated in previous research. To change 
the construction of the scales could have changed fundamentally the nature of the 
personality factors that were measured. All the scales were retained in their original 
form for use in the analysis. 
Given the background of the two personality measures, as discussed in Chapter 4, it was 
assumed that they both had validity and that they both measured the same five 
personality factors. In order to assign each individual a value for each personality factor 
that could be included in the analysis, the factor scores were transformed into 
standardised z scores. The transformation took place in two stages. First, the Big Five 
Inventory scores were transformed. Second, the NEO PI-R scores were transformed. 
This process resulted in a score for each individual that represented their position in 
relation to a standardised distribution for each personality factor. 
5.3 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics that follow are shown for the overall sample and for each of 
the five sample groups. The results are presented for each sample group to see whether 
there was heterogeneity within and across sample groups. The aim of the sampling 
strategy was to gather data that reflected a range of responses to risk. 
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5.3.1 Descriptive statistics: Categorical variables 
This section presents descriptions of demographic and biographical factors measured. 
The aim was to examine the nature of the data to assess whether any issues arise that 
might influence the interpretation of subsequent analysis. Data are presented for the 
overall sample and for each sample group. The variables considered in this section are 
sex; level of education; seniority (levels to CEO); annual income; whether the job 
referred to is current or past. 
The table on the next page shows the frequency of distribution of men and women in 
the overall sample and for each sample group. The results show that, overall, women are 
under-represented in the sample compared with the average population. The sample 
groups have tended to be male dominated, apart from the academic sample group. 
Table 5.2: Frequencies of men and women for the overall sample and each sample 
group 
Frequency Valid % Frequency Valid % 
_ Sample overall Fire fi ghters 
Male 309 86.3 122 99.2 
Female 49 13.7 1 .8 
Total 358 100 123 100 
Missing 0 0 
Academics Mount aineers 
Male 33 50 37 72.5 
Female 33 50 14 27.5 
Total 66 100 51 100 
Missing 0 0 
Chess players Tra ders 
Male 41 100 76 98.7 
Female 0 0 1 1.3 
Total 41 100 77 100 
Missing 0 0 
The following two tables show the highest level of education and the number of levels 
between each participant and their CEO. For the fire fighter sample group, there was no 
data concerning levels to CEO. This was due to the editing of the first section of the 
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questionnaire that was carried out at the request of the London Fire and Civil Defence 
Authority in order to reduce the total time taken to complete the questionnaire. 
Table 5.3: Frequencies of categories of education for the overall sample and each 
sample group 
Fre uenc Valid % Frequency Valid % 
Sample overall Fire fi ghters 
PhD 65 18.5 3 2.6 
Masters 58 16.2 1 .9 
Degree 79 22.5 13 11.3 
Di loma/HND 29 8.3 15 13.0 
A-Level 35 10.0 17 14.8 
O-Level/GCSE 85 24.2 66 57.4 
Total 351 100 115 100 
Missing 8 8 
Acad emics Mount aineers 
PhD 39 59.1 7 13.7 
Masters 16 24.2 12 23.5 
Degree 9 13.6 25 49.0 
Diploma/HND 2 3.0 4 7.8 
A-Level 0 0 2 3.9 
O-Level/GCSE 0 0 1 2.0 
Total 66 100 51 100 
Missing 0 0 
Chess players Traders 
PhD 6 14.6 9 11.7 
Masters 13 31.7 16 20.8 
Degree 11 26.8 21 27.3 
Di loma/HND 5 12.2 3 3.9 
A-Level 5 12.2 11 14.3 
O-Level/GCSE 1 2.4 17 22.1 
Total 41 100 77 100 
Missing_ 0 0 
The results of the above table concerning highest level of education show that in all 
groups there is a spread of educational achievements from the highest level measured, 
PhD, to the lowest level measured, O-Level, with the exception of the academics group. 
Overall, the fire fighters showed the lowest mean level of academic qualification. 
The data on the next page show the seniority levels of participants. 
123 
Table 5.4: Frequencies of different levels to CEO for the whole sample and each 
sample group 
Frequency Valid % Frequency Valid % 
Sample overall Mount aineers 
0 26 11.3 12 24.0 
1 53 23.0 8 16.0 
2 85 37.0 20 40.0 
3 41 17.8 8 16.0 
4 18 7.8 1 2.0 
5 5 2.2 1 2.0 
6 2 .9 0 0 
Total 230 100 50 100 
Missing 128 1 
Acad emics Tra ders 
0 5 7.7 0 0 
1 27 41.5 11 14.3 
2 24 36.9 27 35.1 
3 8 12.3 20 26.0 
4 1 1.5 14 18.2 
5 0 0 3 3.9 
6 0 0 2 2.6 
Total 65 100 77 100 
Missing 1 0 
Chess Wavers 
0 9 23.7 
1 7 18.4 
2 14 36.8 
3 5 13.2 
4 2 5.3 
5 1 2.6 
6 0 0 
Total 38 100 
Missing 3 
Fire fighters 
Missing 3 123 
Table 5.4 shows that within each sample group people from a range of positions within 
their organisation are represented. Self-employment or the most senior position 
accounted for approximately one quarter of the participants from the chess and 
mountain-climber groups. The majority of participants were 2 to 3 levels below their 
CEO. In the case of people working for multi-national organisations, in particular 
traders, the CEO was the senior manager of London operations. Several traders' 
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reported being 5-6 levels below the CEO. Subsequent interviews carried out as part of 
the ESRC research and the sample strategy for that research, which precluded very 
junior traders, suggested that this result is likely to be due to the traders considering the 
CEO of the whole organisation rather than the CEO of the London operation. 
Annual income 
The table below shows the distribution of annual income, including bonus and overtime 
payments for the overall sample and for each sample group. The data showed that 
annual income was represented at each level measured in the sample overall, although 
traders were over-represented at the top end of the income scale compared with the 
other groups. 
Table 5.5: Frequencies for annual income for the sample overall and each sample 
group 
Annual Frequency Valid % Frequency Valid % Frequency Valid % 
income 
£1000 
Sample overall Chess players Traders 
< 20 55 23.8 16 40.0 0 0 
20 - 49.9 82 35.5 17 42.5 0 0 
50-99.9 20 8.7 7 17.5 3 3.9 
100- 499.9 55 23.8 0 0 55 71.4 
> 500 19 8.2 0 0 19 24.7 
Total 231 100 40 100 77 100 
Missing 127 1 0 
Academics Mount aineers 
< 20 15 23.1 24 49.0 
20 - 49.9 48 73.8 17 34.7 
50-99.9 2 3.1 8 16.3 
100-499.9 0 0 0 0 
> 500 0 0 0 0 
Total 65 100 49 100 
Missing 1 2 
Fire fi ghters 
Missing 123 
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Whether the job referred to is current or past 
The option of reporting experiences and perceptions relating to previous jobs was given 
to participants to avoid unfair discrimination against people not currently in work in the 
interest-group samples and the fire fighter applicants. 
Table 5.6: Frequencies for job status for sample overall and each sample group 
Frequency Valid % Frequency Valid % 
Sample overall Fire fi ghters 
Current 326 86.3 103 85.1 
Past 29 13.7 18 14.9 
Total 355 100 121 100 
Missing 3 2 
Acad emics Mount aineers 
Current 66 100 49 96.1 
Past 0 0 2 3.9 
Total 66 100 51 100 
Missing 0 0 
Chess players Tra ders 
Current 31 77.5 77 100 
Past 9 22.5 0 0 
Total 40 100 77 100 
Missing 1 0 
The results in the above table show that the majority of respondents are referring to their 
current job. This would be expected given that the sample procedure involved several 
occupational groups. The results indicate that problems associated with memory and 
perceptions of previous jobs are not likely to have a significant effect on the results. 
The table on the next page shows the distribution of participants across professional 
groups. This table is used to demonstrate one aspect of the diversity of the sample. In 
this aspect, the sampling strategy achieved its aim of diversity. 
126 
Table 5.7: Frequencies for business type 
Business type Frequency Valid Percent 
Academic/research 81 22.8 
Actin entertainment 2 .6 
Education/teaching 9 2.5 
Farming 1 .3 
Finance 85 23.9 
Fire service recruitment 123 34.6 
Government 4 1.1 
Industry/manufacturing 4 1.1 
Law 2 .6 
Medical/health professional 4 1.1 
Mountain/travel guide 4 1.1 
Policelforces/security 4 1.1 
Professional gambler/chess 3 .9 
Professional services 11 3.3 
Real estate 1 .3 
Reporter/photographer 4 1.1 
Retail/marketing 5 1.5 
Services industry 3 
Student 1 .3 
Transport 3 .9 
Missing 4 
Total 358 100 
5.3.2 Descriptive statistics: Continuous variables 
The following section considers the distribution of continuous variables - age and length 
of time in the job overall. There were no tenure data for the fire fighters because of the 
request of the organisation to minimise the biographical section of the questionnaire for 
reasons of reducing the time taken to complete the measure. The table on the next page 
presents descriptive statistics for the continuous variables. 
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Table 5.8: Descriptive statistics for age and tenure 
Age 
(years) 
Length of 
time in the 
job overall 
(years) 
Age 
(years) 
Length of 
time in the 
job overall 
(years) 
Overall sample Fire fi ghters 
N Valid 354 231 122 0 
N missing 4 127 1 123 
Minimum 18 0 18 
Maximum 70 37 39 
Mean 32.3814 8.0398 24.7541 
sd 9.8031 7.4717 4.6325 
Skew 1.045 1.514 . 653 
Skew z stat. 7.130 9.4625 2.9817 
Kurtosis 1.037 2.129 -. 090 
K. z stat. . 259 6.6740 . 
2069 
Academics Mountaineers 
N Valid 65 65 50 50 
N missing 1 1 1 1 
Minimum 24 . 20 22 0 Maximum 64 37 65 30 
Mean 40.2308 9.0208 35.6 6.1954 
Sd 9.8770 8.2320 9.9775 7.4054 
Skew . 292 1.256 . 888 1.839 
Skew z stat. . 297 4.2289 2.6350 5.4570 
Kurtosis -. 575 1.348 . 347 2.879 
K. z stat. . 586 2.300 . 5242 4.3489 
Chess Wavers Tra ders 
N Valid 41 39 76 77 
N missing 0 2 1 0 
Minimum 19 . 25 25 1 
Maximum 70 35 48 30 
Mean 37.5366 7.6603 33.0132 8.6017 
sd 11.7688 8.1859 5.0662 6.2900 
Skew . 975 1.892 1.013 1.531 
Skew z stat. 2.6422 5.0053 3.670 5.5876 
Kurtosis . 484 3.353 1.395 2.763 
K. z stat. . 6685 4.5250 2.5596 5.1072 
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Oneway analysis of variance was used to examine whether there were significant 
differences between sample groups with respect to age and overall tenure. 
Table 5.9: Oneway analysis of variance of age and tenure by sample group 
Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F 
Age Between groups 12280.513 4 3070.128 47.998 
Within groups 22323.343 349 63.964 *** 
Total 34603.856 353 
Tenure Between groups 262.569 4 65.642 1.180 
Within groups 12577.318 226 55.652 
Total 12839.886 230 
***px, 001 
Age was found to be distributed differentially between groups. 
Table 5.9.1: Tukey b analysis results for age by sample group 
Sample group N Subset for alpha = . 05 
1 2 3 4 
Fire fighter 122 24.754 
Trader 76 33.012 
Mountain climber 50 35.600 35.600 
Chess player 41 37.537 37.537 
Academic 65 39.769 
Harmonic mean sample size = 61.630 
Age was found to vary significantly across the different sample groups. The data show 
that there was variance in terms of age. 
Personality data 
The personality data were transformed to the standardised z distribution. The 
transformations were carried out to enable the comparison of data gathered using two 
measures of personality: the NEO PI-R, used to gather data from the traders, and the 
Big Five Inventory, used to gather data from the four remaining sample groups. Table 
5.10 on the next page shows the descriptive statistics for the personality data. 
N 
129 
Table 5.10: Descriptive statistics for personality data 
z score 
neuro- 
ticism 
z score 
extra- 
version 
z score 
openness 
z score 
agree- 
ableness 
z score 
conscien- 
tiousness 
Overall sample 
N Valid 329 329 329 329 329 
N missing 29 29 29 29 29 
Minimum -2.29 -2.90 -2.46 -2.94 -3.75 
Maximum 2.86 2.36 2.15 2.69 2.07 
Mean -3.14 E-18 7.53 E-16 -5.61 E-16 1.65 E-16 1.16 E-15 
sd . 999 . 999 . 999 . 999 . 999 
Skew . 427 -. 403 . 009 -. 271 -. 655 Skew z stat. . 134 . 134 . 134 . 134 . 134 
Kurtosis -. 083 -. 187 -. 632 -. 244 . 619 K. z stat. . 268 . 268 . 268 . 268 . 268 
Academics 
N Valid 66 66 66 66 66 
N missing 0 0 0 0 0 
Minimum -1.54 -2.90 -2.05 -2.25 -2.71 
Maximum 2.86 1.62 1.98 1.24 1.47 
Mean . 542 -. 469 . 102 -. 234 -. 183 Sd . 856 1.101 1.016 . 780 . 895 Skew . 100 -. 071 -. 158 -. 244 -. 512 
Skew z stat. . 295 . 295 . 295 . 295 . 295 
Kurtosis -. 087 -. 675 -. 942 -. 495 . 147 
K. z stat. . 582 . 582 . 582 . 582 . 582 Chess players 
N Valid 41 41 41 41 41 
N missing 0 0 0 0 0 
Minimum -1.87 -2.58 -2.40 -2.42 -3.75 
Maximum 2.53 1.62 2.15 1.42 1.64 
Mean . 402 -. 486 . 195 -. 387 -. 694 
sd 1.162 1.034 1.186 1.110 1.321 
Skew -. 334 -. 179 -. 193 -. 083 -. 351 
Skew z stat. . 369 . 369 . 369 . 369 . 369 Kurtosis -. 654 -. 643 -. 663 -. 780 -. 312 
K. z stat. . 724 . 724 . 724 . 724 . 724 
The table is continued on the next page. 
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Table 5.10: Descriptive statistics for personality data continued 
z score 
neuro- 
ticism 
z score 
extra- 
version 
z score 
openness 
z score 
agree- 
ableness 
z score 
conscien- 
tiousness 
Fire righters 
N Valid 123 123 123 123 123 
N missing 0 0 0 0 0 
Minimum -1.87 -1.18 -2.22 -1.90 -1.49 
Maximum 1.55 1.78 2.15 1.77 1.64 
Mean -. 520 . 444 -. 232 . 542 . 
447 
Sd . 734 . 644 . 903 . 767 . 
766 
Skew . 216 -. 150 . 372 -. 481 -. 440 Skew z stat. . 218 . 218 . 218 . 218 . 218 
Kurtosis -. 415 -. 324 -. 246 -. 068 -. 615 
K. z stat. . 433 . 433 . 433 . 
433 . 433 
Mountaineers 
N Valid 51 51 51 51 51 
N missing 0 0 0 0 0 
Minimum -1.22 -2.27 -1.70 -2.94 -2.36 
Maximum 2.86 1.78 2.15 1.42 1.47 
Mean . 228 -7.31 E-02 . 271 -. 
693 -. 284 
Sd 1.008 1.087 . 944 . 990 . 
848 
Skew . 898 -. 170 -. 338 -. 
053 -. 116 
Skew z stat. . 333 . 333 . 333 . 
333 . 333 
Kurtosis . 072 -. 902 -. 451 -. 282 -. 
356 
K. z stat. . 656 . 
656 . 656 . 
656 . 656 
Traders 
N Valid 48 48 48 48 48 
N missing 29 29 29 29 29 
Minimum -2.29 -2.09 -2.46 -1.80 -3.24 
Maximum 2.73 2.36 2.12 2.69 2.07 
Mean 5.07 E-16 -1.98 E-16 -3.26 E-16 8.50 E-16 1.21 E-15 
sd 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Skew . 634 . 386 -. 
309 . 514 -. 414 
Skew z stat. . 343 . 343 . 343 . 343 . 343 
Kurtosis 1.007 . 144 -. 127 . 354 1.099 
K. z stat. . 674 . 674 . 674 . 674 . 674 
The oneway analysis of variance test was used to assess whether there were significant 
differences between the sample groups with respect to personality factors. The results 
are shown in table 5.11 on the next page. 
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Table 5.11: Oneway analysis of variance of personality factors by sample group 
Sum of df Mean F 
s uares square 
z score Between groups 61.903 4 15.476 18.915*** 
neuroticism Within groups 265.097 324 . 818 Total 327.000 328 
z score Between groups 46.681 4 12.170 14.168*** 
extroversion Within groups 278.319 324 . 859 Total 327.000 328 
z score Between groups 12.591 4 3.148 3.244* 
openness Within groups 314.409 324 . 970 Total 327.000 328 
z score Between groups 59.866 4 14.967 18.153*** 
agreeableness Within groups 267.134 324 . 824 Total 327.000 328 
z score Between groups 50.708 4 12.677 14.866*** 
conscientiousness Within groups 276.292 324 . 853 Total 327.00 328 
*p<. 05, *** p <. 001 
The results show that there are significant differences between each group for all Big 
Five personality factors. Tukey b post hoc tests were used to examine where significant 
differences between the groups lay. 
Table 5.11.1: Tukey b analysis results for z score neuroticism by sample group 
Sample group N Subset for alpha = . 05 
1 2 3 
Fire fighter 123 -. 512 
Trader 48 . 006 
Mountain climber 51 . 228 . 228 
Chess player 41 . 402 . 402 
Academic 66 . 542 
Harmonic mean sample size = 56.745 
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Table 5.11.2: Tukey b analysis results for z score extroversion by sample group 
Sample group N Subset for alpha = . 05 
"1 2 3 
Chess player 41 -. 486 
Academic 66 -. 469 
Mountain climber 51 -. 007 -. 007 
Trader 48 . 000 
Fire fighter 123 . 444 
Harmonic mean sample size = 56.745 
Table 5.11.3: Tukey b analysis results for z score agreeableness by sample group 
Sample group N Subset for alpha = . 05 1 2 3 
Mountain climber 51 -. 693 
Chess player 41 -. 387 -. 387 
Academic 66 -. 235 
Trader 48 . 000 
Fire fighter 123 . 542 
Harmonic mean sample size = 56.745 
Table 5.11.4: Tukey b analysis results for z score conscientiousness by sample 
group 
Sample group N Subset for alpha = . 05 
1 2 3 
Chess player 41 -. 694 
Mountain climber 51 -. 284 
Academic 66 -. 183 
Trader 48 -. 000 
Fire fighter 123 . 447 
Harmonic mean sample size = 56.745 
The analysis of variance revealed that there is evidence of particular personality profiles 
associated with people in different occupational and special interest groups. Post-hoc 
tests revealed that the group which consistently emerges as significantly different from 
the others is the fire fighter sample group. The fire fighters show lower neuroticism, 
higher extroversion, greater agreeableness and greater conscientiousness scores than the 
other groups. It is possible that social desirability could be a factor influencing the 
results because the questionnaire was administered to participants after part of the 
London Fire and Civil Defence Authority selection process. It is also plausible that self- 
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selection is a factor. As discussed in Chapter 3, patterns of traits could be associated 
with different types of risk taking. For example, if people are oriented towards risk 
taking but also are interested in acting in teams on behalf of others (related to the A 
scale) they might choose to go into a job such as fire fighting. Other professional or 
academic groups might involve more specific domain-related risks. Overall, the 
personality data showed some homogeneity within groups, but heterogeneity across 
groups. 
5.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter has described the initial data screening and presented the results of 
preliminary analysis. 
The analysis discussed in this chapter aimed to examine the data, both in terms of the 
overall sample and the five sample groups (academics, chess players, fire fighters, 
mountain climbers and traders). The results of the analysis have several implications 
that will be taken into consideration in the interpretation of the subsequent analysis 
discussed in the forthcoming chapters. A summary of the key points and implications 
follows. 
1. Two personality scales were used. The NEO PI-R was used to gather data from the 
traders in the sample. The Big Five Inventory was used to gather data from the 
remainder of the sample. The NEO PI-R showed slightly lower overall levels of 
internal reliability that the Big Five Inventory. Two NEO PI-R scales and one Big 
Five Inventory scale had a Cronbach's alpha of less than . 7. The scales have been 
validated in previous research and development and were not altered to improve the 
Cronbach's alpha. The results of the analysis using the personality variables are not 
likely to be affected. 
2. There are significantly more men than women in the sample. The imbalance is 
particularly marked for the chess players, fire fighters and traders, which were 
almost exclusively male groups. 
3. The level of education varies across the sample overall. All sample groups showed a 
range of educational levels, the higher levels of education being better represented 
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than lower levels for all sample groups with the exception of the fire fighters. Level 
of education is not likely to be confounded with sample group effects in subsequent 
analysis. Seniority was found to be distributed similarly and, likewise, is not likely 
to be confounded with sample group effects. 
4. There was variance in categories of income for all sample groups. However, the 
traders had higher incomes than the rest of the sample. 
S. The majority of people in the non-professional sample groups referred to their 
current job rather than a previous job. It does not seem likely that there would be 
problems associated with recall of previous jobs. 
6. Distributions of the two continuous demographic variables, age and length of time 
in the job, did not show significant amounts of skew or kurtosis. Assumptions of 
normality were not likely to be violated in the analysis that follows. 
7. Personality data showed variance across the whole sample and were approximately 
normally distributed. There were a number of significant differences between the 
personality characteristics of different sample groups showing some evidence of 
self-selection into groups. 
8. In sum, the data show variance on almost all the key variables that are used in the 
subsequent analysis to discriminate between groups. There are few data issues that 
might have a significant negative impact on analysis or interpretation. 
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Chapter 6 
Correlation analyses 
6.1 Chapter abstract 
Chapter 6 discusses the results of bivariate correlation analyses. All the questionnaire 
variables were entered into analysis to examine the relationships between items both 
within and across domains. This type of analysis was used for two reasons. First, 
correlations indicate where there are relationships between variables, and are a useful 
complement to the multivariate analysis that follows in Chapter 7. Second, there is a 
tradition of using correlation analyses in the risk literature. This method has been used 
in several studies to draw conclusions about the consistency of risk taking. It has, in 
general, been found that different measures of risk taking and risk-related decision 
making do not correlate significantly, suggesting that risk taking is domain specific. 
The results of the correlation analyses discussed in this chapter are significant in many 
cases. The results show that the cross-domain items are correlated significantly in 
almost every case (e. g. the item do you prefer to take or avoid risk with your work/ 
health/ personal finances). The domain-specific items were associated significantly in 
many cases. The number and pattern of significant relationships suggests that there are 
likely to be some common factors that influence decision making in different domains. 
It does not seem likely that the results are explained by common method variance alone. 
In addition, there were many significant relationships between the decision preference 
variables, the biographical and the personality factors. The results provide some 
indications that some people might be consistent in their decision making and risk 
preferences, and that personality could be an important influence on decision 
preferences. 
The correlation tables are shown in Appendix 5. 
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6.2 Introduction to the correlation analyses 
One approach to the study of the consistency of risk-related decision choices has been to 
present participants with a range of measures to assess decision making and to correlate 
the results. Six studies that have used this approach were discussed in Chapter 2. The 
studies reviewed were the work of Slovic (1962), Kogan and Wallach (1964), Weinstein 
and Martin (1969), MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986), Salminen and Heiskanen (1997) 
and Smidts (1997). In general, the studies showed that there are some inter-relationships 
between scores in different measures of risk taking. However the general conclusion of 
this type of research method has been that the relationships between measures are not 
strong enough to suggest that there are generalised individual-level risk preferences. 
The study that took a different approach which showed that this might not true for all 
individuals is that of MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986). These authors showed that 
while the majority of correlations between decision making and risk taking measures 
might not be significant for a whole sample, when intra-individual data are considered, 
a different conclusion can be drawn. MacCrimmon and Wehrang found that some 
people in their sample could be classified as consistent risk seekers and others could be 
termed consistent risk averters. The relationships between measures of risk-related 
decision making for the consistent risk seekers and risk averters were strong. The 
remainder of the sample was not consistent. Relationships between measures for the 
inconsistent group were weak. It could be that if other research studies had taken a 
similar approach and used individual-level data to categorise people, a similar set of 
results might emerge. 
Pearson bivariate two-tailed correlation analyses were used to examine the relationships 
between the questionnaire items. Correlations between items were examined for the 
whole sample, rather than subdivisions of the sample based upon intra-individual 
response consistency, for two reasons. First, this strategy was used to describe the 
relationships between variables within and across domains prior to the multivariate 
analysis that could assess the relative impact of variables upon risk preferences 
discussed in the next chapter. Second, the correlation approach enabled the comparison 
of the results of this study compare with other empirical work that has used the same 
approach. It is acknowledged that 5% of the correlations could be significant due to 
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chance alone in this process. However, correlation analyses remain a useful preliminary 
process to begin to interpret the data prior to multivariate analysis. 
The correlation tables are shown in Appendix S. There are 25 tables. The items are 
classified into four categories. 
1. Biographical and personality data. These data comprise sex, age, highest level of 
education, tenure (overall length of time in the job), seniority, income and the five 
factors of personality (neuroticism, extroversion, openness, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness). The personality data were transformed into standardised z 
scores to enable the inclusion of both Big Five Inventory data and NEO PI-R data. 
The rationale for the transformation of raw scores to z scores was described in 
Chapter 5. 
2. Cross-domain item data. These data refer to items that measured the same concept 
across the three decision domains (work, health and personal finances). The items 
were the following: 
a. Have the risks mentioned above changed the way you manage risk at work/ with 
your health/ with your personal finances? (not at all - yes, significantly) 
b. Have these events made you more or less cautious in your behaviour at work/ 
with your health/ with your personal finances? (more cautious - less cautious) 
c. How do you feel about your job/ health/ personal finances at the moment? (very 
negative - very positive) 
d. Compared with the last few months, if your current general work/ health/ 
personal finance situation better or worse than usual? (much worse - much 
better) 
e. When making important decisions about risks at work/ with your health/ with 
your personal finances, how frequently do you think though all the payoffs and 
costs of each alternative? (very rarely - very often) 
f. When making important decisions about risks at work/ with your health/ with 
your personal finances, how are you influenced by your feelings, or emotions? 
(very rarely - very often) 
g. How much risk is involved in your job/ lifestyle/ personal finances? (much risk 
- little risk) 
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h. Do you prefer to take risks or avoid risks when making decisions at work/ with 
your health/ with your personal finances? (take risks - avoid risks) 
Items (a) and (b) referred to an open-ended item that asked participants about recent 
risk experiences in each domain. Respondents that had no recent risk events to 
record, approximately two-thirds of the sample, did not answer questions (a) and 
(b). The correlations that included these variables have a smaller number of 
participants. 
3. Domain-specific item data. These data are the results of items that were developed 
to measure domain-specific decision preferences. Work-related domain-specific 
items considered error risk taking and goal-related decision preferences. Health- 
related domain-specific items measured health protection and the balance between 
work and nonwork. Finance-related items assessed preferences regarding use of 
money and gambling. These items had been structured to reflect a common 
framework, as described in the method chapter. Each set of items assessed responses 
relating to a positive aspect of a decision choice; a negative aspect of a decision 
choice; positive emotions associated with a decision choice; negative emotions 
associated with decision choice; rated behavioural frequency. 
4. Correlations between the data gathered in this study and data gathered from the 
traders in this sample using a different measure of reported risk taking (Nicholson, 
Fenton-O'Creevy, Soane & Willman, 2000). The items used to gather data are 
shown in section 6.11 of this chapter. These correlations were examined to assess 
whether there were significant associations between the data gathered using the 
questionnaire developed for this study and data gathered using a separate measure. 
The tables show the correlation coefficient and star symbols (*) to represent the level of 
significance. The number of respondents in each analysis is shown on the second line of 
each cell. The analyses used the item raw scores. 
Tables A5.1, A5.2 and A5.3 show the inter-correlations for the general cross-domain 
items (work with work; health with health; finance with finance). Table A5.4 shows the 
results of correlations between work and health items. Table A5.5 shows the 
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relationships between work and finance items. Table A5.6 presents the correlations for 
health and finance items. Tables A5.7, A5.8 and A5.9 show the results of inter- 
correlations for the domain-specific items (work domain-specific items with each other; 
health domain-specific items with each other; finance domain-specific items with each 
other). Tables A5.10, A5.11 and A5.12 show the within-domain correlations between 
the cross-domain type variables and the domain-specific type variables (work cross- 
domain items with work domain-specific items; health cross-domain items with health 
domain-specific items; finance cross-domain items with finance domain-specific items). 
Table A5.13 gives the results for domain-specific work and health items. Table A5.14 
shows the correlations between work and finance items. Table A5.15 presents results 
for the correlations between health and finance items. The remaining tables show the 
relationships between the decision preference variables, biographical data and 
personality factors. Table A5.16 shows the relationships between the biographical and 
personality data. Tables A5.17, A5.18 and A5.19 give the results for correlations 
between each of the sets of cross-domain items (work, health and finance) with the 
biographical and personality data. Tables A5.20, A5.21 and A5.22 show the correlations 
between each of the domain-specific items with the biographical and personality data. 
Tables A5.23, A5.24 and A5.25 show the results of correlation analyses between the 
cross-domain variables for each of the work, health and finance domains and reported 
risk taking data gathered from a different source. The data from the second measure 
were gathered only from the traders in the sample who were part of a larger research 
project. 
6.3 Cross-domain item inter-correlations 
This section discusses the results presented in tables A5.1, A5.2 and A5.3. The 
correlations of the cross-domain items show that three items are highlighted as having 
the greatest number of significant relationships with other items. The three items are 
preferences for taking or avoiding risk, perception of risk and general positive or 
negative feelings concerning the work, health or financial situation. 
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In the work domain there were seven significant correlations. Feeling positive about the 
work situation was associated with a belief that work was better than usual, that there is 
risk involved in the job and a preference for taking risks. The perception that there is 
much risk in the work domain was related to an approach to decision making that 
involved thinking through the pros and cons of decision alternatives, and to decision 
making that is not emotional. Conversely, the perception that there is little risk in the 
work domain was related to a primarily emotional rather than cognitive approach to 
decision making. Preferences for taking risks were associated with a less cautious 
approach to risk resulting from recent risk experiences, feeling positive about work and 
perceptions that work involves risk. 
The results of the inter-correlations for the cross-domain work variables are interesting. 
The results show that, contrary to the suggestion of Sitkin and Pablo (1992), risk 
perceptions and preferences do not have an inverse relationship. Sitkin and Pablo 
proposed that a preference for taking risk was associated with a perception that risk is 
low. They hypothesised that perception is an important factor that motivates an 
individual to take risk, and differentiates between people who will take risks, because of 
low levels of perceived risk, and people who will not take risks, because of high 
perceived risk. The results of this research indicate that preference for taking risk is 
associated with an acknowledgement that there are risks to be taken. There are two 
factors that could influence the relationship between these two variables. First, it might 
be that people have self-selected into environments that suit their risk preferences. Their 
perceptions of risk are thus similar to their risk preferences. Second, it could be that a 
key factor that moderates this relationship is positive emotion. If people perceive risks 
but have generally positive feelings about their work situation, they could be motivated 
to take risks. Conversely, if the positive emotion is lacking, or there are negative 
emotions associated with work, perceptions of high risk might lead to risk aversion in 
the way that Sitkin and Pablo suggested. The importance of positive emotion has been 
found in the authors' empirical research into the relationship between traders' emotions 
and risk taking. Results showed that positive affect led to greater risk taking because of 
increased confidence, knowledge that previous gains could absorb short terms losses 
and an adjusted reference point whereby traders were seeking higher gains and prepared 
to take risks to achieve them (Soane, Fenton-O'Creevy, Nicholson & Willman, 2000). 
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The results from the health domain showed 11 significant correlations. The analyses 
highlighted the same three key variables of positive emotion, perceptions and 
preference, however the pattern of results was slightly different. The items concerning 
the health reference point and its effect on perceptions and reported behaviour were 
related. Recent experiences of health risks were associated with more cautious 
approaches to health risk management and to negative feelings about the health domain. 
General positive affect regarding health was associated significantly with perceived 
improvements in the health domain, with the perception that there were few risks to 
health and a preference for avoiding health risks. Preferences for avoiding health risks 
were also associated with frequent, careful considerations of health decisions and 
perceptions of little risk. Thinking through the pros and cons of health decisions was 
related positively to an emotional approach to decision making. This pattern of results is 
different from the relationships observed for the work domain. In the work domain, 
positive affect was associated with perceived risk and preferences for taking risk. In the 
health domain, positive affect was associated with the perceived absence of risk and 
preferences for avoiding risk. It seems that while risk might be associated with rewards 
and challenges in the work environment, risks to the health domain might be perceived 
as threats not challenges or opportunities. An additional interesting difference between 
the health and work domains is the relationship between the cognitive and emotional 
aspects of decision making. In the work domain, a cost-benefit approach to decision 
making was related to unemotional thinking. In the health domain, the results indicate a 
tendency either to think through decisions in a cognitive and emotional way, or not to 
use either approach. A similarity with the work domain is that the relationship between 
risk perception and preference is positive. Again, it seems that people who choose to 
take risks with their health are aware of the risks. 
There were 14 significant inter-correlations between the cross-domain finance-related 
variables. As in the work and health domains, general affect, perceptions and 
preferences were the three key variables that showed the greatest number of significant 
associations. Positive affect concerning the current financial situation was related to 
perceptions that the situation was better than usual, thinking through the costs and 
benefits of decision alternatives, unemotional decision making and perceptions of little 
risk in the personal finance domain. Perception of little risk was also associated with 
recent improvements in the financial situation, and unemotional decision making. 
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Preferences for taking financial risks were related to a less cautious approach to 
financial management as a result of recent risk events, decision making that does not 
frequently involve a cost - benefit approach and perceptions that there is risk in the 
finance domain. As with the work domain, the response to recent risk events was a 
reported decrease in caution applied to finance management, and there was a positive 
relationship between risk perception and risk' preference. This relationship between 
perception and preference, again, was not as hypothesised by Sitkin and Pablo. 
In sum, the cross-domain variables show a number of significant relationships. Of 
particular importance are the variables measuring risk preference, risk perception and 
general affect. These variables had significant relationships in each of the work, health 
and finance domains. These results suggest that these factors could be key components 
of the decision process and are important to decision making in each domain. The 
results fit with the proposition of MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) that there are 
likely to be associations between risk taking within domains. 
6.4 Relationships between work, health and finance cross-domain variables 
This section discusses the results presented in tables A5.4, A5.5 and A5.6. The 
correlation analyses that considered the relationships of the cross-domain variables with 
each other showed a number of significant results. The results indicate that there might 
be individual difference factors that influence decision making in several domains. This 
hypothesis is discussed further in the next chapter. 
The greatest number of cross-domain significant results was between the health and 
finance domains (19 significant correlations). The work and health domain analyses had 
18 significant results. The work and finance results showed 14 significant relationships. 
In sum, 51 out of 192 correlations were significant across the whole sample. As with the 
above analyses of the inter-relationships between the cross-domain variables discussed 
in section 6.3 above, general positive or negative affect about the decision domain, risk 
perception and risk preference showed a number of significant relationships with each 
other and different variables. For each domain, preferences are related significantly; 
preference for taking risk in one domain is associated with preference for taking risk in 
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the other domains. Perceptions of risk were relatively consistent. Perceptions were 
related significantly between work and health and between work and finance. 
Approaches to decision making were also associated. For each cross-domain analysis, 
there are significant correlations between cost - benefit approaches to decision making 
and between emotional approaches to decision making. People who tend to approach a 
decision in terms of costs and benefits in one domain do so in other domains; likewise 
for emotional approaches to decision making. A fourth variable that showed significant 
inter-correlations across each domain was general affect. Feeling positive about one 
domain was associated with feeling positive about other domains, and negative feelings 
were generalised similarly. The related variable, concerning whether each domain 
situation was better or worse than usual also showed significant results for each 
analysis. 
In sum, the correlation analyses that examined the relationships between variables that 
measured the same construct with respect to work, health and personal finances showed 
that there was a considerable degree of consistency between responses in all cases. 
There were two exceptions. First, the health and finance risk perceptions were not 
associated significantly. Second, the variables that measured the effects of recent risk 
experiences were not significantly related. It is possible that this result was due to the 
small number of people who answered these questions. The group size in these 
correlations ranged from 27 - 47. However, the overall results of the analyses were 
significant for the whole sample. The results suggest that there could be some people 
within the whole sample who have consistent emotions with respect to different 
decision domains. The analysis in Chapter 7 explores this issue further. 
6.5 Domain-specific variables inter-correlations 
The results for tables A5.7, A5.8 and A5.9 are discussed in this section. Table 7 
presented the results of the work domain-specific item inter-correlations. The 
correlation coefficients were significant in 35 out of 45 cases. The two items that had 
the largest number of significant relationships concerned the risk of making mistakes in 
order to achieve at work and avoiding the risk of making a mistake as often as possible. 
Table A5.8 showed that there were 20 significant correlations between health domain- 
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specific variables. The items that showed the greatest number of significant 
relationships concerned apprehension about health hazards, prevention of health 
problems, feeling that spending a lot of time at work is losing out on a full life and 
frequency of taking work home at the evenings and weekends. The inter-correlations for 
the finance domain-specific items revealed a total of 30 significant correlations. The 
item that had significant associations with all other items assessed apprehension about 
overspending. The gambling items showed a number of significant inter-correlations, 
which is similar to the finding of MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986). 
In sum, the domain-specific items revealed a number of significant inter-correlations. 
The themes that were used to structure the items in each domain were associated 
significantly in several cases. Each set of five items comprised an item framing risk as 
positive, risk as negative, positive emotions associated with risk, negative emotions 
associated with risk and a behavioural item. In the work domain, each item type showed 
significant correlation results, that is the error risk taking positively framed item was 
associated with the goal achievement positively framed item and so on. In the finance 
domain the positively framed items, the negatively framed emotion items and the 
behavioural items had significant correlations. In the health domain only the 
behavioural items were associated. It could be that in the health domain the two 
constructs being measured, health protection and work-nonwork balance, were not 
associated with the same type of risk-related decision preferences as the other items. 
6.6 Cross-domain and domain-specific variable correlations 
Three sets of correlation analyses were carried out to examine the relationships between 
the cross-domain and domain-specific variables for the work, health and finance items. 
Table A5.10 presents the results for the work domain. The item that had the greatest 
number of significant relationships (8 out of 10) was the variable `Do you prefer to take 
or avoid risks when making decisions at work? ' It is possible, as Sitkin and Pablo 
(1992) suggested, risk preference could indeed be a key factor that is the sum of a range 
of risk-related decision preferences and general risk orientation. However, the variable 
assessing the level of perceived risk in the work domain only correlated significantly 
with three other variables showing that perception might not be as important to the 
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decision process as preference in 'the work domain. This is contrary to the work of 
authors Sitkin and Pablo who predicted risk perception is the second key factor in the 
decision process. The items developed to measure the reference point showed some 
significant relationships. Response to recent risk events, in terms of whether behaviour 
was more or less cautious, was associated with five other domain-specific variables. 
General affect was related to four other variables, three of which concerned emotions 
(apprehension about making a mistake, apprehension about taking risks to achieve goals 
and risk being part of the interest and excitement of work). The latter variable 
concerning positive affect and risk was itself associated significantly with five of the 
cross-domain variables, including general affect, perception and preference. It seemed 
that emotions might be an important part of the overall decision process. It could be that 
emotions are a significant factor in determining the reference point, i. e. whether people 
perceive themselves to be in the domain of loss or the domain of gain, and their 
reference point-related risk choices. 
The results of the health domain analyses, shown in table A5.11, reveal a different 
pattern of associations. Three variables emerged as having a number of significant 
relationships. Feeling apprehensive about health hazards was associated significantly 
with six out of the eight cross-domain variables. The reported behaviour item 
concerning trying to prevent health problems was significant in five out of eight 
correlations. The cross-domain item concerned with whether the health domain was 
better or worse than usual was associated significantly with six out of ten domain. 
specific variables. This result is interesting, as the same variable in the work domain 
showed no significant relationships with the work domain-specific items. Another 
contrast with the work domain is that the risk preference item was correlated 
significantly with only five out of ten domain-specific items, which were those 
concerning health protection. The risk perception item showed significant relationships 
with the same five items. The relationships between perception and preference items 
with the domain-specific items were, however, all in the same direction. This showed 
that preference and perception were not related inversely as Sitkin and Pablo (1992) 
suggested. In general, the health protection items showed stronger relationships with the 
cross-domain variables than did the life balance items. It could be that the life balance 
items did not capture the components of the decision process that relate to risk decisions 
in the same way that the health protection items did. 
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The results of the finance domain cross-domain and domain-specific variables are 
shown in table A5.12. The strongest result to emerge from these analyses is the 
importance of the risk preference item. This variable correlated significantly with all ten 
of the domain-specific items. In contrast, risk perception had only three significant 
relationships. Other key variables included whether people prefer to spend or save 
money, whether people enjoy spending and whether people take a cost-benefit approach 
to financial decision making. The latter item, however, was associated only with the 
variables concerning the use of money and not with the gambling items. In general, the 
use of money variables had more significant correlation coefficients than the gambling 
items. The item concerning whether the financial situation is better or worse than usual 
was only related significantly to three variables. General affect concerning whether the 
financial situation was positive or negative was associated with four variables. In sum, it 
seemed that expressed preference was the key variable in these analyses in terms of the 
frequency of significant associations with other variables. 
Overall, the results of the cross-domain and domain-specific correlations for the work, 
health and finance domains revealed a number of interesting findings. First, reported 
preference for taking or avoiding risks was found to be the variable that had the greatest 
number of significant associations overall, particularly in the work and finance domains. 
It could be that, as Sitkin and Pablo (1992) suggested, preference is the sum of a range 
of other decision preference variables. Second, emotion-related variables had several 
significant relationships in each domain showing that emotions are likely to be a 
important component of the decision process as hypothesised in Chapter 3. Third, the 
perception of risk did not have as many significant associations with other variables as 
might have been predicted from the work of Sitkin and Pablo (1992) who proposed that 
risk perception is the second key factor in determining risk-related choice. The relative 
impact of the decision preference variables on risk preferences is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
6.7 Inter-relationships between domain-specific variables 
Correlation analyses were used to examine the relationships between each set of 
dornain-specific variables. Table A5.13 shows the results for the analyses of the work 
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domain-specific items and the health domain-specific items. There was a total of 31 
significant results out of 100 correlations. The sets of items that had the greatest number 
of significant inter-relationships were the items concerning goal-oriented risk taking 
with items concerning health protection. Two items concerning negative emotion 
showed several significant relationships: apprehension about health hazards and 
apprehension about risk taking to achieve work related goals. 
Table A5.14 presents the results of the correlations between domain-specific finance 
and health variables. Out of the 100 analyses, there were 35 significant results. The sets 
of items that had the strongest inter-item relationships were health protection and use of 
money. At the item level, variables concerning apprehension were shown again to have 
a number of significant relationships. 
The results for the health and finance domain-specific items are given in Table A5.14. 
There were 35 significant results out of 100 analyses. The two sets of items that had the 
greatest number of inter-correlations were goal-oriented risk taking and gambling. In 
general, people who had positive perceptions of gambling were more likely to consider 
risk taking to achieve goals as acceptable. As with the previous analyses, apprehension 
was an important factor. In particular, the variable assessing apprehension about 
spending money emerged as being related significantly to seven other items. Other 
variables that showed a number of significant results included two variables concerning 
positive affect: perceived enjoyment of gambling, and risk being part of the excitement 
and interest of work. 
In sum, it seemed that emotional aspects of decision making were important 
components of work, health and finance decision preferences. The number of significant 
relationships between variables measuring positive and negative affect indicates that it 
is possible that there are emotional orientations to decision preferences which are 
pervasive across domains. In particular, apprehension emerged as an important 
influence on decision making in each domain. This result is similar to the finding of 
Maule, Hockey, Bdzola and Clough (1998) that tension was a significant influence on 
risk perception and risk-related choice. As Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggested, it 
could be that losses and their associated negative emotions have a greater impact on the 
decision processes than positive emotions. 
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6.8 Biographical and personality data 
The relationships between the decision preference variables with biographical and 
personality data were analysed initially using correlations. These relationships were 
examined to assess whether there are significant associations between decision 
preferences and enduring dispositional factors or biographical variables. It was 
hypothesised in Chapter 3 that personality is an important factor that is associated with 
whether risk and decision preferences are consistent or not. These analyses enabled the 
assessment of the overall pattern of relationships prior to multivariate analysis that 
considered the relative impact of a range of variables, including personality factors, on 
risk preferences. 
Table A5.16 shows the inter-correlations between the biographical and personality data. 
There are a number of significant relationships between the biographical and personality 
data. The older part of the sample group comprised more women than men. Overall, the 
men were better educated. This result was likely to have been skewed by the inclusion 
of highly educated male traders in the sample. Similarly, the finding that men were 
better paid was also likely to have been influenced by the trader sample group. Women 
had higher scores in the neuroticism scale. The neuroticism result is similar to the data 
used in the Nicholson, Fenton-O'Creevy, Soane and Willman (2000) paper (N = 1822). 
Age had a number of significant relationships with other variables. There were inverse 
relationships between level of education and seniority. Again, this result was probably 
due to the number of relatively young traders in middle management positions. Age was 
significantly and positively related to overall tenure. Age also showed some 
relationships with personality. Age was associated positively with neuroticism and 
negatively related to extroversion and agreeableness. It is more likely that these 
relationships are due to the nature and demography of the sample rather than changes in 
personality over time (Costa & McCrae, 1991). 
Level of education was significantly related to all the other variables, with the exception 
of seniority. This exception could be due to the number of people in jobs where 
academic qualifications are not a requirement. Relationships with educational level 
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were positive for tenure, income, extroversion, agreeableness and conscientiousness. 
Relationships were negative for neuroticism and openness. 
Tenure had a negative relationship with seniority. Seniority had a positive relationship 
with income. Income was also associated with neuroticism (negatively) and 
conscientiousness (positively). 
There were several significant correlations between the five personality factors. These 
relationships do not cast doubt on the independence of the five factors, discussed by 
Costa and McCrae (1991). Rather, the results probably reflect the characteristics of this 
sample group. 
6.9 Cross-domain variables, biographical and personality data 
Tables A5.17, A5.18 and A5.19 show the results of correlation analyses between the 
cross-domain variables, biographical and personality data. Table A5.17 presents the 
analyses for the work domain. The results are significant for 31 out of 88 analyses. Two 
variables emerge as having many significant relationships. Both the neuroticism scale 
and the item concerning whether people prefer to take or avoid risk have seven 
significant relationships. Each of the biographical and the remaining four personality 
factors has significant relationships with the decision preference variables. All the 
decision preference variables had significant relationships with the individual difference 
factors, with the exception of the item asking whether recent risk experiences have 
changed the way risk at work is managed which was answered only be a subset of 
respondents. Overall, the results indicate that personality factors have stronger 
associations with work-related decision making that do biographical variables. 
The results of the correlations for cross-domain health variables with biographical and 
personality factors in Table A5.18 show a different pattern of results. The three 
variables that show the most significant relationships were general health-related affect, 
whether health is better or worse than usual and the personality factor of 
conscientiousness. Neuroticism and agreeableness were, however, also important; both 
factors have four significant relationships with the decision preference variables. Risk 
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preference and perception had four significant results out of a total of eleven analyses. 
Education and sex were associated significantly with four decision variables. The 
results suggest that personality and biographical factors are likely to be associated with, 
and perhaps shape, health-related decision preferences. The correlation results suggest 
that personality is more important to the health-related decision process than 
biographical factors. 
Table A5.19 gives the results of the analyses for the cross-domain finance variables 
with biographical and personality data. The results show a somewhat different pattern 
from both the work and health domain analyses, although some of the same key 
variables emerged as having significant relationships. Overall, there were fewer 
significant relationships, a total of 26 out of 88. The balance between personality factors 
and biographical factors was more even than in the other domains. Both types of factors 
are likely to be important influences on the decision process. The variable that emerged 
as the most significant was the personality factor of conscientiousness. The decision 
preference variables that had the greatest number of significant relationships were 
concerned with general affect about the finance domain and whether the financial 
situation was better or worse than usual. These factors showed five and six significant 
results, respectively. The item assessing risk preference had only four significant 
relationships. In sum, conscientiousness and the finance domain reference point could 
be important influences on finance-related decision preferences. 
In sum, the correlations between the cross-domain variables with biographical and 
personality factors show that there are significant relationships between the decision 
variables and individual difference characteristics. The results suggest that personality is 
likely to be a key factor in determining decision preferences. The correlation data 
indicate that the general personality profile of a risk taker is low neuroticism, high 
extroversion, high openness, low agreeableness and low conscientiousness. This result 
is the same as the results of other work by the author and colleagues (Nicholson, 
Fenton-O'Creevy, Soane & Willman, 2000). The results also cohere with the work of 
Weinstein and Martin (1969) who found that extroversion was associated with risk 
taking, and the work of Zuckerman who has found repeatedly that sensation seeking, a 
component of extroversion in the Five Factor model of personality, is a predictor of risk 
taking in several decision domains. 
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There are some differences between the decision domains in terms of which factors 
show the strongest relationships with decision preference variables. It seems that in 
general, there are domain-specific factors that influence decision making in each 
domain differentially. However, the possibility remains that people who are consistent 
in their decision preferences across domains are influenced equally in each domain by a 
common set of personality and biographical factors. In particular, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness could be significant influences on risk preferences. This result fits in 
with the work of Bartram, Clough and Williams (1997) would found that risk takers 
showed a lack of concern for others, which is a component of the agreeableness scale. 
The concepts of cross-domain risk preferences and domain-specific risk preferences, 
and the factors that are likely to predict these variables, are discussed further in Chapter 
7. 
6.10 Correlations between domain-specific variables, biographical and personality 
factors 
The results of the correlations between domain-specific variables, biographical and 
personality factors are given in Tables A5.20, A5.21 and A5.22. Table A5.20 shows the 
results for the work domain-specific items. There were 46 significant results out of 110 
analyses. These results show that, again, personality has important associations with 
decision preferences. However the relative importance of the five personality factors is 
different from the analyses including the cross-domain variables. In this case, openness 
emerged as having the greatest number of significant relationships (seven). 
Agreeableness and conscientiousness were also important, having six significant results 
each. Neuroticism had five significant results. Variables measuring positive and 
negative affect, as well as cognitive aspects of decision making and reported behaviour 
also had a number of significant associations with the individual difference 
characteristics. The item type that had the most significant results was the reported 
behaviour item. 
Table A5.21 presents the results of the health domain-specific, biographical and 
personality variables. There are 41 significant results. Conscientiousness again emerged 
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as the personality factor that had the most significant relationships (seven) with decision 
preference variables. Neuroticism, extroversion and agreeableness each had five 
significant associations with decision preference variables. There were a number of 
significant relationships between personality factors and the gambling items, reflecting 
the work of Slovic (1962). Of the biographical variables, age and level of education had 
the most significant relationships, four each, with decision variables. The decision 
variable that had the greatest number of significant relationships was the item `I feel 
spending a lot of time at work is losing out on a full life'. The items that framed risk as 
negative had the greatest number of significant results. Also highlighted were the item 
concerning the prevention of health problems, and the item that measured the 
importance of health. As with the results for the cross-domain and biographical 
variables correlations, the importance of personality factors was noted. 
Conscientiousness is, in particular, a key variable that seems likely to have a significant 
effect on health-related decision making. Biographical variation too seems likely to lead 
to some differences in health decision preferences. 
The results for the finance domain-specific item and biographical data correlations are 
presented in Table A5.22. There were 27 significant results out of 110 analyses. This is 
a lower total than either the work or health domains. The biographical data showed 
some significant relationships. The greatest number of correlations from the data were 
between income and financial decision preferences. There were four significant results 
out of ten analyses. This result seems to indicate that although income has some bearing 
on financial decision making, there is a range of other influences. Personality seems to 
be an additional important factor. As with previous results, conscientiousness was the 
most significant personality variable, with a total of seven significant relationships. This 
result is similar to the result of Kowert and Hermann (1997) who found that there was a 
negative relationship between conscientiousness and risk taking. The decision variable 
that had the most significant relationships was the item measuring positive affect 
associated with gambling. The item types that had the most significant correlation 
coefficients were the items that framed risk as positive and risk as negative. 
Overall, the results for the correlations between domain-specific variables, biographical 
and personality variables confirm the importance of individual difference 
characteristics, in particular personality, to decision preferences. The results suggest that 
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personality is likely to have significant effects on the decision process. The correlation 
analyses described in this chapter do not enable the exploration of causal relationships, 
however, the results do indicate that there are important associations. The relationship 
between personality and the consistency of decision preferences is examined in the next 
chapter. 
6.11 Correlations between decision preference data and reported risk taking 
The trader sample group was part of a wider research project, described in Chapter 4. 
The traders were presented with a range of measures developed to assess several aspects 
of the decision making process. One set of items was designed to measure reported risk 
taking. The items were developed to measure reported risk behaviour rather than 
expressed preferences. The items and data from a sample of 1200 managers are 
discussed in Nicholson, Fenton-O'Creevy, Soane and Willman (2000). 
The data from this item were correlated with each of the cross-domain items to examine 
whether there were any significant relationships between the two measures. 
The item used to gather the data for this analysis is shown on the next page. 
Seven scales were developed from the items. First, six scales were formed for each facet 
of the risk taking item by summing the now and past scores. Second, an overall risk 
taking scale was formed by summing all the now and past scores for each facet of risk 
taking. This process was used to form the scales following confirmatory factor analysis. 
The results of the factor analysis showed that there was one key factor that included all 
the data and a secondary set of factors representing the items from each risk domain. 
Reliability checks demonstrated that forming scales using the now and past scores for 
each risk domain was optimal way to scale the data (Nicholson, Fenton-O'Creevy, 
Soane & Willman, 2000). 
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Figure 6.1 Items used to measure reported risk taking 
We are interested in everyday risk-taking. Please could you tell us if any of the 
following have ever applied to you, now or in your adult past? 
Please use the scales as follows: 
1= never, 2=rarely, 3= quite often, 4= often, 5=very often 
Now Past 
1. Recreational risks (e. g. rock- 1234512345 
climbing, scuba diving) 
2. Health risks (e. g. smoking, poor diet, >1-. 2 34512345 
high alcohol consumption) 
3. Career risks (e. g. quitting a job 
without another to go to) 
1234512345 
4. Financial risks (e. g. gambling, risky 
investments) 
5. Safety risks (e. g. fast driving, city 
cycling without a helmet) 
1234512345 
1234512345 
6. Social risks (e. g. standing for 1234512345 
election, publicly challenging a rule or 
decision) 
The results of the correlations are shown in tables A5.23, A5.24 and A5.25. The results 
show that there are some significant relationships between the cross-domain variables 
developed for this research and a measure of risk taking that has been shown to be a 
valid. In particular, preferences for taking or avoiding risk in the health and finance 
domains were associated significantly with a number of facets of risk taking and the 
overall scale. Financial risk taking measured using the new scale was significantly 
related to perceptions that there are risks in the finance domain and preferences for 
taking risk. 
In sum, the cross-domain variable data and data gathered from a new scale of risk taking 
showed some significant associations. Although there was not a great number of 
significant correlation coefficients, the results provide some support for the validity of 
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the items developed for the research in this thesis. An important reason why the results 
might not be significant is that the risk taking items were not measuring components of 
the decision process that were measured in this research. Second, the risk taking scale 
presented risk domains somewhat differently from the work, health and finance 
domains used in the questionnaire used for this research. Third, the items emphasised 
behaviour rather than perceptions or preferences. 
6.12 Chapter summary 
Correlation analyses revealed significant associations between several key variables. 
The results indicated that there could be some factors that influence decision making 
across domains, and that the sample might include a number of the participants have 
consistent approaches to risk and decision making. Risk preferences for, each of the 
three decision domains were related significantly. Perceptions were significantly 
associated in two out of three analyses. Both cost - benefit and emotional approaches to 
decision making were related significantly across all domains. 
When the results of the inter-domain 'correlations were considered, the factors that 
emerged as being consistently important were general perceptions of how much risk is 
involved in each domain, preferences for taking or avoiding risk in each domain and 
general affect related to the reference point for each domain, that is whether people feel 
positive or negative overall. The reference point between the domains of loss and gains 
could be an emotional variable. It could be that positive and negative emotions 
associated with reference points might have a significant impact on behaviour. 
Emotions could act either by increasing confidence such that people feel they can 
achieve more. In this case, people might feel motivated to maintain their positive mood 
state, as suggested by Davison, Suppes and Siegel (1956). Emotions could also 
influence risk preferences by lifting the reference point. In this situation, people are 
below their reference point and take risks as Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggested. 
The result that positive emotion is associated with preferences for taking risks might 
thus not be contrary to the predictions of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
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Decision domains were shown to have some important effects on decision processes. It 
seems likely that a combination of cross-domain decision factors and domain-specific 
decision factors influence the decision making process and risk preferences. It is 
possible that the pattern of results could be explained by the sample characteristics. That 
is, the sample might comprise people with consistent cross-domain approaches to risk 
that are associated with particular personality profiles, and people with inconsistent 
approaches to risk who show cross-domain variation in their responses. 
An additional important finding of the correlation analyses is that biographical and 
personality factors are likely to be significant influences on the decision process and 
decision preferences. The results show some agreement with the work of Slovic (1962) 
that concluded that risk taking is subjective and multi-dimensional. This does not imply 
that in all cases, however, situational factors are more important than individual factors 
given the strength of the relationships between decision preference variables and 
personality factors. The results do fit in with the work of Weinstein and Martin (1969) 
who also found that risk taking measures were associated significantly with personality 
factors, although these authors did not use the Five Factor model of personality. The 
results do not agree with the Kogan and Wallach's (1964) research that suggested that 
risk taking is situational and variable. There were many more significant correlation 
results in this research than in the work of Kogan and Wallach, who found only 17 out 
of 192 correlations between measures of risk to be significant. 
Examination of the correlations between the cross-domain variable data gathered in this 
research and trader data gathered as part of a wider research project showed that there 
were some significant associations. 
In sum, the results suggest that for some people, approaches to decision preferences 
could be consistent across domains. For others, it seems likely that there are domain- 
specific factors that influence choice. It could be that research that has considered one 
domain such as work-related decisions or financial gambles is likely to have captured 
only a limited aspect of individual preferences. The relative influence of biographical 
variables, personality factors and decision preference variables on cross-domain and 
domain-specific risk preferences is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 
Analysis of risk preferences across 
and within domains 
7.1 Chapter abstract 
Chapter 7 presents and discusses the results of the analyses that were carried out to 
examine the factors that predict both the consistency of risk preference across domains 
and domain-specific risk preferences. The data indicated that people could be 
characterised in terms of the consistency of their cross-domain risk preferences, and that 
there are significant differences between people who have consistent cross-domain risk 
preferences and people who are inconsistent in their preferences. Hypothesis 1 was 
confirmed. 
Regression was used to analyse the relative impact of biographical data, personality 
factors and decision preference variables on both the degree of consistency of cross- 
domain risk preferences and domain-specific risk preferences. The results of the 
regression analyses confirmed hypotheses 2 and 3. Variance in personality traits and 
decision making preferences were also associated with the degree of inconsistency of 
cross-domain preferences. In addition, it was found that participants with consistent 
cross-domain risk preferences were significantly more risk averse than the inconsistent 
participants. Within-domain risk preferences were predicted significantly by a range of 
personality and decision preference variables, however the pattern of relationships 
differed for the work, health and finance domains. 
The results suggested that risk preference is generalisable across domains only for the 
subset of the population that has a disposition-based risk propensity. For the majority of 
people, it is proposed that domain-specific risk preferences vary, and can differ across 
domains. For these people, risk preferences are not generalisable across domains. It is 
proposed that it is more useful to consider risk propensity is in terms of the consistency 
of cross-domain risk preferences than to try to generalise risk preferences from one 
domain to another. 
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7.2 Aims of the analysis 
The aims of this chapter were developed to test the hypotheses, and were threefold. 
" To establish whether people can be categorised as consistent and inconsistent in 
their cross-domain risk preferences. -' 
" To examine the differences between people who are consistent and people who are 
inconsistent in their cross-domain risk preferences in terms of biographical 
variables, personality factors and decision preferences. The analysis was carried out 
in three stages. First, the differences between people who were categorised as 
having consistent and inconsistent risk preferences were assessed in relation to 
biographical variables, personality factors and the consistency of cross-domain 
decision preferences. Second, the differences between the two groups were 
considered with respect to within-domain decision and risk preferences. Third, the 
factors that predict the degree of inconsistency were examined through regression. 
" To consider whether the influences on risk preferences are the same for each of the 
work, health and finance domains or not. 
7.3 Discussion of hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that risk propensity can be conceptualised and operationalised as 
cross-domain risk preferences. This hypothesis was tested through the creation of a new 
variable that was based upon individual level responses to the risk preference item in 
each of the work, health and finance domains. 
The analysis began with the categorisation of individuals in terms of their responses to 
the risk preference item in each of the work, health and finance domains. The raw data 
were arranged on a five-point response scale ranging from prefer to take risks to prefer 
to avoid risks. The SPSS `recode' function was used to create a new variable that 
categorised people into one of two groups according to whether people had shown the 
same response to the risk preference item across the work, health and finance domains 
or not. Hence each individual was assigned to the consistent group or the inconsistent 
group. The frequencies for both groups are shown in table 7.1 on the next page. 
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Table 7.1: Frequencies for consistent and inconsistent groups 
Frequency 
Consistent group 51 14.2 
Inconsistent group 307 85.8 
The data confirmed hypothesis 1: people could be categorised into groups on the basis 
of whether they had consistent cross-domain risk preferences or not. 
The data in table 7.1 suggest that the majority of the participants in this sample had 
inconsistent risk preferences. The implication of this finding is that these people make 
domain-specific choices about risk. The data were considered further to examine the 
relationship between consistent and inconsistent group membership and sample group. 
It could be that some of the participants, for example the mountain climbers, take risks 
in one domain but not in others. Table 7.2 below shows the sample group derivation of 
participants in each of the consistent and inconsistent groups. 
Table 7.2: Frequencies of participants from each sample group in the consistent 
and inconsistent risk preference groups 
Consistent group Inconsiste nt group 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Academics 5 9.8 61 19.9 
Chess players 3 5.9 38 12.4 
Fire fighters 31 60.8 92 30.0 
Mountain climbers 7 13.7 44 14.3 
Traders 5 9.8 72 23.5 
Total 51 100 307 100 
The data in table 7.2 show that each sample group is represented in both the consistent 
and inconsistent risk preferences groups. The proportional distribution of participants 
from each sample group within the consistent and inconsistent group varies. The 
academics, chess players and traders had larger numbers of inconsistent participants 
than consistent. The pattern was the reverse for the fire fighters. The mountain climbers 
were evenly distributed. This result demonstrates that there was heterogeneity of risk 
preferences within each sample group, as well as across the whole sample. 
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7.4 Discussion of hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that whether people are consistent or inconsistent in their cross- 
domain risk preferences, and that the degree of consistency of cross-domain risk 
preferences, are influenced by personality factors and the consistency of cross-domain 
decision preference variables. 
7.4.1 Differences between people with consistent and inconsistent risk preferences 
in terms of biographical variables, personality factors and consistency of cross- 
domain decision preferences 
The first stage of the analysis to test hypothesis 2 considered the differences between 
the groups in terms of biographical variables, personality factors and decision 
preference variables. In order to examine the relationship between group membership 
and the decision preference variables, a new set of variables was developed from the 
items that measured the five aspects of decision preferences in each of the work, health 
and finance domains. The purpose of this process was to develop new variables that 
assessed the consistency of cross-domain responses that could be related to group 
membership. That is, the issue of whether consistency of risk preferences across 
domains was associated with consistency in other types of decision preferences was 
examined. It could be that people who have consistent risk preferences are also 
consistent in other aspects of decision making. Conversely, it might be that the 
consistency of risk preferences has no relationship with the consistency of the other 
decision preference variables. The SPSS `compute' function was used to create a new 
variable that was the within-case standard deviation of the scores for the items 
measuring risk preference in each of the work, health and finance domains. The new 
variable was a continuous variable ranging from zero to 2.31. A score of zero 
represented completely consistent responses across each of the work, health and finance 
domains. The higher the score was, the more inconsistent participants' responses across 
domains were. Table 7.3, on the next page, gives some examples of raw scores and the 
new standard deviation variable. 
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Table 7.3: Sample within-case standard deviations of risk perception items 
Work risk 
perception score 
Health risk 
perception score 
Finance risk 
perception score 
Within case 
sd 
Participant A 2 2 2 0 
Participant B 3 5 5 1.15 
Participant C 4 1 1 2.31 
The aspects of decision preferences measured for each domain are shown below. 
Descriptive statistics for the newly created variables are shown in Appendix 6. The 
abbreviation for each variable used in the results tables that follow, and in the tables in 
the appendices, is given. 
1. How do you feel about your job/ health/ personal finances at the moment? The 
response range was from very negative to very positive. The abbreviation in the 
results tables for this variable is `feeling'. 
2. Compared with the last few months, is your general work/ health/ finance situation 
better or worse than usual? The response range was from much worse to much 
better. The abbreviation in the results tables for this variable is `better or worse'. 
3. When making important decisions about risks at work/ with your health/ with your 
finances, how frequently do you think through all the payoffs and costs of each 
alternative? The response range was very rarely to very often. The abbreviation in 
the results tables for this variable is `payoffs and costs'. 
4. When making important decisions about risks at work/ with your health/ with your 
personal finances, how frequently are you influenced by your feelings or emotions? 
The response range was very rarely to very often. The abbreviation in the results 
tables for this variable is `emotion'. 
5. How much risk is involved in your job/ your lifestyle/ your personal finances? The 
response range was from little risk to much risk. The abbreviation in the results 
tables for this variable is `perceived risk'. 
The analyses that follow considered the differences between the people who had 
consistent cross-domain risk preferences and the people who had inconsistent 
preferences. Independent samples T tests were used to establish where differences 
between the two groups lay. 
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The literature reviewed in Chapters 2° and 3 presented two perspectives on the 
consistency of risk preferences. Theoretical models of risk propensity, such as the Sitkin 
and Pablo model (1992) suggested that risk preferences are relatively consistent. 
Similarly, a personality-based approach to risk preferences suggests that people with 
particular personality profiles will have particular risk dispositions. For example, the 
work of Kowert and Hermann (1997) found that aspects of trait neuroticism, openness 
and agreeableness were associated with particular approaches to risk. It was 
hypothesised in Chapter 3 that if risk preferences are rooted in personality, they are 
likely to be consistent across domains for people who have the critical trait 
characteristics. The hypothesis tested in this stage of the analysis proposed that 
personality would influence strongly whether people had consistent or inconsistent 
cross-domain risk preferences. 
Cognitive and emotional perceptions of risk and reference points have also been 
proposed to be potentially important factors following a review of the literature. Where 
these variables are consistent, it could be that risk preferences too are consistent. 
Conversely, it could be that people who are inconsistent across domains are influenced 
by factors such as their domain-specific reference points, and their relative position in 
the domains of loss and gain, as predicted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
Table 7.4, on the next page, shows the results of the independent samples T test 
analyses used to examine differences between people who had consistent risk 
preferences and people who had inconsistent risk preferences. The results in Table 7.4 
show that there are significant differences between the groups in 6 out of 20 cases at the 
level of p< . 05 or above. 
A non-parametric test, Chi square, was used to examine the distribution of men and 
women across the consistent and inconsistent groups rather than aT test analyses. The 
consistent group comprised 44 (86.3%) men. The inconsistent group comprised 265 
(86.3%) men. The significance level of the Chi square test was . 993. It was concluded 
that there are no significant differences between the groups with respect to sex. 
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Table 7.4: Independent samples T -test to examine differences between people with 
consistent and inconsistent risk preferences with respect to biographical variables, 
personality factors and the consistency of cross-domain decision preferences 
Equal variances were assumed. 
Mean score of 
consistent 
group 
N=51 
Mean score of 
inconsistent 
group 
N=307 
T value 
Age 33.020 32.276 . 497 
Level of education 4.245 3.356 3.198 ** 
Tenure 11.675 7.695 2.298 
Seniority 1.842 1.991 -. 503 
Income 2.474 2.580 -. 341 
Z score N -. 310 . 005 -2.311 
Z score E . 109 -. 002 . 804 
Z score 0 -. 187 . 003 -1.386 
Z score A . 282 -. 005 
2.101 
Z score C . 364 -. 006 2.728 
SD Feeling . 944 . 857 1.132 
SD Better or worse . 681 . 715 -. 
471 
SD Payoffs and costs . 
693 . 888 -2.088 
SD Emotion . 795 . 798 -. 
043 
SD Perceived risk 1.048 1.035 . 147 
*p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001 
The group with consistent cross-domain risk preferences were significantly better 
educated, longer tenured, lower in neuroticism, higher in agreeableness and 
conscientiousness, and had less variation concerning whether they think through the 
payoffs and costs of choice alternatives compared with the group that had inconsistent 
risk preferences. These results suggest that a combination of higher levels of education 
with work experience could be a factor in developing the way that people think. It could 
be that the effects of education and work experience lead people to have a consistent 
way of approaching decision making that has developed over time, and is more resistant 
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way of approaching decision making that has developed over time, and is more resistant 
to short-term situational variance than the decision making of people with less 
experience and education. It might also be that people with a personality profile that 
comprises conscientiousness and agreeableness are more likely to plan their careers and 
choose organisations that fit with their preferences and dispositions. 
The difference between the two groups in terms of personality profiles seems to fit in 
with the nature of the dispösitional factors. The trait of neuroticism is described by 
Costa and McCrae (1991) as representing emotional stability. A person with a low score 
in the neuroticism scale is more emotionally stable than a person with a high score. The 
association of a low neuroticism score with consistent risk preferences could suggest 
that emotional stability influences the stability of risk preferences. Other personality 
traits that distinguished the people with consistent risk preferences from people with 
inconsistent risk preferences were agreeableness and conscientiousness. A high score in 
the agreeableness trait represents someone is altruistic, co-operative and sympathetic to 
others. Consistent preferences were associated with this type of profile. A high score in 
conscientiousness was also associated with consistent risk preferences. It could be that 
these traits are associated with consistent appraisals of risk situations. For example, a 
person with a high score in agreeableness would not be likely to take risks that would be 
detrimental to others and this characteristic could be pervasive in their decision 
processes leading to greater consistency of preference than someone who does not show 
the same degree of regard for others. These data, and their relationship with the 
consistent and inconsistent groups, are returned to in the discussion of the next set of 
analyses. 
The data in table 7.4 also showed that there were significant differences between the 
groups with respect to the degree of consistency of the variables that assessed whether 
people though through the payoffs and costs of decisions across the work, health and 
finance domains. The participants who were consistent across domains tended to have 
less variability in their approaches compared with the inconsistent participants. This 
result suggests that people who are inconsistent, sometimes attending to situational 
information and sometimes not, are more likely to have inconsistent risk preferences. 
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The results showed that the degree of consistency of whether people are influenced by 
their emotions, whether they feel positive or negative, or better or worse about their 
situation, and perceived risk did not differ significantly between the people with 
consistent and inconsistent risk preferences. This result suggests that the aspects of 
decision making that were discussed in Chapter 3 are not uniformly important to risk 
propensity. That is, the data indicated that people could have consistent cross-domain 
risk preferences without being consistent in other aspects of their decision making. It 
could be that these aspects of decision preferences are more relevant to risk preferences 
within each domain than to the consistency of preferences across domains. 
In sum, the independent samples T test showed that there were significant differences 
between people who were consistent in their risk preferences across domains and people 
who were inconsistent across domains. Differences were apparent in three personality 
factors and one decision preference variable. In general, it was shown that consistency 
of risk preferences does not need to be associated with consistency in other types of 
decision preferences. 
7.4.2 Differences between people with consistent and inconsistent risk preferences 
in terms of domain-specific decision preferences 
A second set of T tests were carried out to examine the differences between the 
consistent and inconsistent groups in terms of the level of risk preferences and the other 
decision preference variables. For example, to see whether the consistent group were 
more risk seeking or risk averse than the inconsistent group. The variables in this set of 
analyses were the items that measured risk preference, cognitive and emotional aspects 
of the reference point, whether people thought through payoffs and costs, emotional 
influences on decision making and perceived risk in each of the work, health and 
finance domains. Table 7.5 on the next page shows the results of the independent 
samples T test to examine the differences between the consistent and inconsistent 
groups on the risk and decision variables in each of the work, health and finance 
domains. 
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Table 7.5: Independent samples T-test to examine differences between people with 
consistent and inconsistent risk preferences with respect to risk and decision 
preferences within the work, health and finance domains 
Mean score of 
consistent group 
N=51 
Mean score of 
inconsistent group 
N=307 
T value 
Work risk preference 4.120 2.893 7.273 
Health risk preference 4.143 3.730 2.488 
Finance risk preference 4.140 3.629 3.099 ** 
Work feeling 3.041 3.517 -2.838 ** 
Health feeling 4.059 3.882 1.075 
Finance feeling 3.451 3.489 -. 240 
Work better or worse 3.429 3.308 . 827 
Health better or worse 3.843 3.427 3.052 ** 
Finance better or worse 3.196 3.316 -. 831 
Work payoffs and costs 3.840 3.739 . 572 
Health payoffs and costs 4.000 3.389 3.286 ** 
Finance payoffs and costs 4.177 3.879 1.791 
Work emotion 2.980 3.019 -. 219 
Health emotion 3.118 3.272 -. 961 
Finance emotion 2.863 2.948 -. 469 
Work perceived risk 2.667 2.814 -. 687 
Health perceived risk 3.235 3.092 . 785 
Finance perceived risk 3.529 3.560 -. 182 
*p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001 
The results in table 7.5 show that there are some significant differences between the 
groups in terms of their risk preferences and decision preferences. The variable that 
shows the greatest number of significant differences was risk preference, which 
discriminated between the people with consistent and inconsistent cross-domain risk 
preferences in each of the work, health and finance domains. The group that had 
consistent cross-domain risk preferences had significantly stronger preferences for 
avoiding risk than the inconsistent group in each of the work, health and finance 
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domains. A frequency count of the number of people who were consistently risk seeking 
showed that no participants reported themselves as strongly preferring risk, and only 4 
participants rated themselves as preferring risk. The distribution of participants into 
groups on the basis of consistent preferences for seeking or avoiding risk for further 
analysis was not possible. This result indicates that people in this sample who are 
consistent are more likely to be risk averse than risk seeking. 
The skew towards a preference for risk aversion in each domain, and the association 
between risk aversion and cross-domain consistency raises two issues. First, this skew 
could indicate that people who prefer to take risk consistently are not as well 
represented in the sample as people who are consistently risk averse. It might be that the 
results of the analysis discussed in this chapter would be different if there were a more 
even distribution of preferences in the data. Second, it might be that a general tendency 
towards risk aversion is observed more frequently in the general population than 
consistent preferences for risk seeking. This pattern of results is similar to the work of 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986). who found that, when participants were presented 
with naturalistic decision making tasks, there was a set of individuals who were 
consistently risk averse, but no individuals who were consistently risk seeking. The data 
fit with the work of Highhouse and Paese (1996) who found that participants in their 
research were generally risk averse. The association between consistency and risk 
aversion was also observed in the risk taking scale data discussed by the author and 
colleagues that has been referred to previously in this thesis (Nicholson, Fenton- 
O'Creevy, Soane & Willman, 2000). Participants in this research were asked to report 
the frequency of their current and past risk taking behaviour in six domains 
(recreational, health, career, finance, safety, social) using the items presented in Chapter 
6, section 11. Within-case standard deviations were calculated for each individual using 
the same method as that described in this chapter (N = 1650). The result was two new 
variables describing the degree of consistency for both current reported risk taking and 
past reported risk taking. These variables showed significant (p < . 01), positive 
correlations with every aspect of risk taking. That is, the greater the degree of 
consistency, the lower the level of reported individual risk taking. 
These findings lead to two propositions concerning the nature of risk propensity. First, 
the data suggest that people who are consistently risk seeking are not commonplace. 
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Second, it can be suggested that, while risk aversion might be a characteristic way to 
approach risk situations, risk seeking is domain specific and might often be targeted 
towards to the achievement of particular goals. In sum, the conceptualisation of risk 
propensity in terms of the consistency of cross-domain risk preferences might apply 
more frequently to risk aversion than to risk seeking. 
The data in table 7.5 revealed differences between the groups in three decision 
variables. People who had consistent cross-domain risk preferences felt significantly 
more negative about their work situation, better about their health situation, and thought 
through payoffs and costs of health-related decisions more than people who were 
inconsistent across domains. These results can be interpreted within the framework of 
risk preferences. Since the consistent group were more risk averse than the inconsistent 
group, it is possible that risk aversion is associated with the negative emotion 
concerning the work situation, the caution in the health domain with respect to thinking 
though payoffs and costs and the positive feelings about health. These data suggest that 
reference points are complex, and can differ across domains as Tversky and Kahneman 
(1986) suggested. In the health domain, positive emotions could be associated with the 
domain of gain and risk aversion, as prospect theory predicts (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). However, in the work domain, risk aversion and consistency were associated 
with a negative appraisal of the situation. This could be due to the relative positioning of 
an individual in the domain of loss. That is, even though a person might consider their 
situation to be negative it might not be as bad as it could be and thus people could 
consider themselves to be in the domain of gain and risk averse (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). 
The results in table 7.4 showed that the consistent group had a lower score in 
neuroticism that the inconsistent group. It was suggested that the emotional stability 
associated with a low score was an important factor that could lead to consistent risk 
preferences. These results might seem contrary to the hypothesis that low levels of 
neuroticism might be associated with preferences for taking risk rather than avoiding 
risk. The relationship between low neuroticism and risk taking was found in research by 
the author and colleagues (Nicholson, Fenton-O'Creevy, Soane & Willman, 2000). 
However, further consideration of the composition of neuroticism shows that the trait 
comprises six facets in Costa and McCrae's 1991 NEO Personality Inventory (Revised): 
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anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness and 
vulnerability. Analysis of facet level data was not possible in this research given the 
small number of people for whom that type of data was gathered, but it could be that the 
stability component of trait neuroticism might be more significant than the anxiety 
component in terms of their relative contribution to relationship between the trait and 
the consistency of risk preferences. The relationships between personality facets and 
cross-domain risk preferences could be an issue for future research. 
The second set of personality differences between the consistent and inconsistent groups 
related to agreeableness and conscientiousness. Previous research has found both 
agreeableness and conscientiousness to be factors that influence risk preferences in 
other research. For example, Bartram, Clough and Williams (1997) found that low 
scores in agreeableness were related to risk taking. Kowert and Hermann (1997) 
demonstrated that low conscientiousness was associated with preferences for risk 
taking. When the differences between the consistent group and the inconsistent group 
were considered in terms of scores on risk preference items, it seems that the results of 
this research fitted in with the work of previous authors. That is, the consistent group 
who showed tendencies to be risk averse had higher scores in agreeableness and 
conscientiousness. 
7.4.3 Analysis of the degree of inconsistency of risk preferences 
The third stage of testing hypothesis 2 considered further the people with inconsistent 
cross-domain risk preferences. A continuous variable that represented the degree of 
cross-domain consistency was created using the within-case standard deviation 
procedure discussed in relation to the first set of analyses to test hypothesis 2. The 
descriptive statistics for this variable are shown in Appendix 6. In order to examine the 
influences on the degree of cross-domain consistency, the participants who showed 
complete consistency across domains, i. e. a standard deviation of zero, were excluded 
from the analyses discussed in this section. The aim of the analyses was to explore 
further the participants with inconsistent cross-domain risk preferences. The previous 
two stages of the analysis in this section have examined the differences between two 
groups categorised as having consistent or inconsistent risk preferences. The former 
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group is homogeneous with respect to cross-domain risk preferences - all the 
participants are consistent. The latter group, however, is heterogeneous. Some people 
are more inconsistent in their cross-domain risk preferences than others. The analysis in 
this section considers the factors that are associated with the degree of variability of 
cross-domain risk preferences. 
A multivariate test, linear regression, was used to assess the effects of biographical 
variables, personality factors and decision preferences on the degree of consistency of 
risk preferences. The regressions were carried out in several steps. First, the effects of 
biographical variables and personality factors were examined. This analysis was carried 
out twice. The fire service version of the questionnaire did not include all the 
biographical items at the service's request. Hence data concerning only age, sex and 
level of education were gathered for the fire service sample (N = 123). The remainder of 
the sample was also measured in terms of overall tenure (total time in the job including 
at doing the same job in other companies), seniority in the organisation (operationalised 
in terms of levels to CEO) and income. The regressions were repeated, first, to include 
either the three biographical variables that were measured for the whole sample, and 
second, to include the six biographical variables that were assessed for four out of five 
sample groups. The number of participants was greater when only three biographical 
variables were included. Second, the effects of the decision preference variables were 
assessed. Again, these regression analyses were carried out in two stages to both include 
the six biographical variables and to include the three biographical variables that were 
measured across the whole sample. Table 7.6, on the next page, shows the results of 
regression analyses. No outliers were identified in the analyses. 
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Table 7.6: Regression analyses of biographical, decision preference and personality 
data on the degree of consistency of cross-domain risk preferences 
Beta eights 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Sex -. 090 -. 116 -. 057 -. 057 
Age . 109 -. 017 . 105 -. 025 
Education -. 100 -. 081 -. 068 -. 051 
Tenure . 066 . 119 
Seniority -. 073 -. 053 
Income . 122 . 119 
Z score N . 145 
* 
. 122 . 149 * . 133 Z score E . 114 . 174 * . 085 . 123 Z score O . 088 . 102 . 101 . 139 Z score A -. 080 -. 040 -. 078 -. 039 
Z score C . 155 * . 203 * . 136 * . 180 * SD feeling -. 007 -. 048 
SD better or worse . 087 . 077 SD payoffs and costs . 143 
* 
. 168 
* 
SD emotion -. 026 -. 019 
SD perceived risk . 204 
** 
. 219 R=. 280 
Adj. R' =. 050 
df = 8,264 
R=. 334 
Adj. R2=. 053 
df = 11,167 
R =. 387 
Adj. RI =. 107 
df = 13,259 
R=. 432 
Adj. R2=. 107 
df = 16,162 
p<. 05, **p<. 01 
The data in table 7.6 show that the trait of neuroticism was a significant predictor of the 
consistency of risk preferences in models 1 and 3. The results provide some further 
evidence that low scores in neuroticism, and associated emotional stability, are 
associated with cross-domain consistency. Extroversion and openness showed some 
relationship with the degree of consistency, but the associations were relatively weak. 
The direction of the relationship indicated that low scores in extroversion and low 
scores in openness, are likely to predict a greater degree of consistency in cross-domain 
risk preferences. It could be that having an internal orientation reduces an individual's 
sensitivity to the social context of risk decisions, particularly when combined with the 
generally low levels of reactivity associated with a low score in neuroticism, thus 
leading to increased consistency of preferences across situations. Likewise, a low level 
of openness which is associated with tendencies for habitual ways of thinking and 
acting rather than abstract, speculative thinking seems likely to lead to risk preferences 
that show a greater degree of consistency than someone with a high score in openness. 
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The trait of conscientiousness showed significance in each of the four models. The 
results show that a low score in conscientiousness is associated with consistent cross- 
domain risk preferences. This result might appear contrary to previous research since 
the consistent group of people had a higher score in this factor than the people who were 
inconsistent. Previous research has shown that low scores in conscientiousness are 
associated with risk taking not risk aversion (Bartram, Clough & Williams, 1997), 
which is the general tendency of the people with consistent risk preferences. However, 
the association of low scores in the conscientiousness factor and consistent risk 
preferences in this stage of the analysis could be due to the nature of the trait and the 
nature of the sample. A high level of conscientiousness could be associated with 
focused, discriminating risk taking rather than the low levels of discrimination between 
risk situations that might be characteristic of people with low scores in this trait. When 
the item level conscientiousness data were considered, the only significant correlation 
was between the dependent variable and the Big Five Inventory item that asks 
participants to show their level of agreement with the statement `Does a thorough job'. 
It is possible that a person with a high level of conscientiousness might be comfortable 
taking risks, but only in specific contexts where the individual has considered the nature 
of the risks and returns, and when they believe that taking a risk is an important aspect 
of achieving their goals. Overall, people who score highly in a measure of 
conscientiousness might be more sensitive to the potentially differential demands of 
their work, health and finance situations. This increased sensitivity could lead to greater 
cross-domain inconsistency in a similar way that high scores in extroversion could lead 
to sensitivity to the social context of each domain, and high scores in neuroticism could 
lead to sensitivity to the differing emotional context of each domain. A second issue is 
that the people in this analysis did overall show a tendency towards being risk averse 
rather than risk seeking, and the association with conscientiousness is therefore as 
expected. If the sample was skewed towards risk seeking, the association with 
conscientiousness might have been different. 
The decision preference variables that had significant relationships with the degree of 
consistency of risk preferences were the items representing the consistency of thinking 
through the payoffs and costs of decisions, and consistency of perceived risk. The latter 
variable was not shown to discriminate significantly between the consistent and 
inconsistent groups in the T tests, however, the data in table 7.6 shows that it does have 
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an association with the degree of inconsistency of risk preferences. Less variability in 
approaches to considering choice alternatives and less variability in levels of perceived 
risk across domains were associated with consistent risk preferences. It could be that 
people who have greater cross-domain inconsistency might sometimes pay attention to 
situational information that influences, and increases the variability of, their risk 
preferences. The significance of the perception variables fits in with the work of Sitkin 
and Pablo (1992), in that perception was found to be. a key factor that was associated 
with risk propensity, operationalised here as cross-domain risk preferences. It is 
possible that changes in risk perception might be associated with varying levels of 
attention to situational information, although the cross-sectional data do not suggest the 
direction of the relationship between the two variables. It could be that decision making 
which considers fully payoffs and costs of decisions increases awareness of risk and 
raises perceptions. Conversely, it might be that increased levels of perceived risk lead to 
greater attention to choices in order to minimise risk or maximise returns. 
In sum, the results discussed in this section confirmed that personality was a significant 
factor that influences the degree of consistency of cross-domain risk preferences. The 
relationship between the level of consistency and the trait of conscientiousness was 
interesting. It was suggested that people with high levels of conscientiousness will be 
willing to take risks in some situations, but that people with this profile will be 
discriminating regarding the risks they choose to accept and those they choose to avoid, 
in contrast to indiscriminate risk taking that could be associated with low levels of 
conscientiousness. Decision preference variables are significant predictors of 
consistency in two cases: people who have less variability in their approaches to 
considering the payoffs and costs of choice alternatives, and people who have more 
consistent levels of perceived risk were less likely to have variance in their cross- 
domain risk preferences. It could be that these are situational factors that are 
consistently important determinants of risk preferences. Additionally, it might be that 
people who have consistent risk preferences also have consistent approaches to decision 
making that are associated with personality-based risk preferences. Such dispositional 
orientations for risk could lead to the development of habitual methods of information 
processing, heuristics, that decrease the likelihood that risk-related choices will be 
considered on a situational basis. 
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7.5 Discussion of hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 proposed that the predictors of domain-specific risk preferences are 
different for the work, health and finance domains. Support for hypothesis 3 could 
indicate that risk preferences are not, in most cases, generalisable across domains, and 
that a more effective way to consider risk propensity would be in terms of the 
consistency of cross-domain risk preferences, as discussed in relation to hypothesis 2. 
Lack of support for hypothesis 3 could suggest that risk preferences in different 
domains have the same underlying influences; risk preferences in one domain could be 
considered to be equivalent to risk preferences in a different domain. The participants in 
the analyses discussed in this section were the people who had inconsistent cross- 
domain risk preferences since these people were identified as having different 
preferences across domains. 
Hypothesis 3 was tested using regression analysis. The dependent variables were the 
domain-specific risk preference items that asked respondents to rate whether they 
preferred to take risk or avoid risk with their work, health and personal finances. The 
aim of these regressions was to assess whether domain-specific risk preferences were 
predicted by the same factors as cross-domain risk preferences. If the same variables 
were significant in both sets of regressions, it could be suggested that there is no 
distinction between domain-specific risk preferences and cross-domain risk preferences. 
That is, risk preferences in one domain might be generalisable to other domains. If 
different predictor variables were revealed as explaining a significant amount of 
variance in the dependent variable, it could be concluded that domain-specific risk 
preferences are subject to a different range of influences than cross-domain risk 
preferences. The distinction between the two concepts of the consistency of cross- 
domain risk preferences and domain-specific risk preferences was a point of interest in 
this research due to the nature of the two different approaches to risk propensity in the 
risk literature. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, some authors have proposed that risk 
propensity is concerned with risk preferences in one domain only, for example business 
decisions, while other authors have conceptualised risk propensity as cross-domain risk 
preferences. The approach of a number of previous empirical studies into risk 
preferences and risk propensity was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Several authors have 
operationalised risk propensity in terms of responses to items assessing risk preferences 
175 
in only one domain, such as business decision making or choices among hypothetical 
gambles (e. g. MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986). 
Twelve regression analyses were carried out. The dependent variables were rated risk 
preference for each of the work, health and finance domains. Four regressions were 
carried out for each dependent variable for the same reasons as the previous regressions 
discussed in this chapter: to include two sets of biographical variables each with and 
without decision preference predictor variables. The predictor variables were the 
biographical and personality factors that have been used in the other analyses. The 
decision preference predictor variables were the same type of variables as in the 
previous analysis, but the individual items within each domain were used, as in the data 
shown in table 7.5, rather than newly created continuous variables that assessed the 
consistency of decision preferences across domains. No outliers were identified during 
the analyses. Table 7.7 on the next page shows the results for each regression analysis. 
The results showed that domain-specific risk preferences were associated with some 
factors that could influence approaches to risk in each domain, and some domain- 
specific variables. 
The biographical variables were not, in general, significant predictors of domain- 
specific risk preferences, although there were some relationships. In the work domain, 
lower levels of seniority were associated with greater preferences for risk taking. Senior 
participants and managers were more likely to be risk averse. Sex almost reached 
significance in one regression analysis in the finance domain. Men were shown to prefer 
to take risks. This result could be due to the number of male traders in the sample whose 
job comprises risk taking, and the general trend for men to take more risks than women 
(e. g. Williams & Narendran, 1999). In the health domain, a higher level of education 
was a significant predictor of preferences for risk taking in one analysis and higher 
income was a significant predictor of risk aversion in models 2 and 4. 
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The personality data show some interesting relationships with domain-specific risk 
preferences. The finance domain risk preference variable did not have any significant 
associations with personality. Only the decision preference variables were significant 
predictors of finance risk preferences. In the work and health domains, there were a 
number of relationships between personality and risk preferences. The personality factor 
that showed the greatest number of significant relationships was extroversion. This 
variable was significant in each of the work and health domain regressions. In the work 
domain, a low score in extroversion was associated with a preference for avoiding risk. 
The relationship between high scores in extroversion and preferences for taking risk are 
likely to be due to the nature of the extroversion trait, and its association with activity 
and sensation seeking (Costa & McCrae, 1991). The direction of the relationship 
between extroversion and risk preference in the health domain was the reverse. A low 
score in extroversion was associated with a preference for taking health risks. This 
could be due to the nature of health risks compared with work risks. For example, an 
introvert might drink and smoke to help them to deal with social situations. 
The health domain was the only domain in which the trait of neuroticism had significant 
relationships with risk preferences such that high levels of neuroticism were associated 
with preferences for taking risk. The pattern of association could be due to similar 
reasons as the relationship with extroversion discussed above. Health risks such as 
smoking and drinking could be perceived to be effective methods for coping with 
anxiety and strain. 
A third personality factor that emerged as a significant predictor of risk preference in 
the health domain only was conscientiousness. A high score in conscientiousness was 
associated with a preference for avoiding risk. This relationship is also consistent with 
the work of Kowert and Hermann (1997) and Nicholson, Fenton-O'Creevy, Soane and 
Willman (2000). The strongest observed relationship for between conscientiousness and 
health risk preference was when only personality factors and biographical variables 
were included in the regression analyses. The association disappeared when all the 
biographical factors and decision preference variables were added into the regression 
equation. 
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The relationships between personality and risk preferences are not consistent either 
within or across domains. In the regressions that include biographical and personality 
variables, personality factors - have a number of significant relationships with the 
dependent variable. However; when the decision preference variables are added into the 
regression equation, the relationships with personality factors are changed. The pattern 
of these relationships suggests that the decision preference variables could moderate the 
relationship between personality and risk preference. It might be that personality is a 
strong influence on preference for taking or avoiding risk that could act by influencing 
the decision process that shape characteristic approaches to choices that entail risk. 
The decision preference variables showed a number of significant associations with risk 
preferences. The only variable that was consistently significant in each domain was risk 
perception. Perceived risk was a significant predictor in each of the six regressions in 
which it was included. In each case, perceptions of little risk were associated with 
preferences for avoiding risk. The direction of this relationship is the same as for the 
analyses discussed previously in this chapter and for the results of Williams and 
Narendran (1999), but contrary to the hypothesis of Sitkin and Pablo (1992). It could be 
that characteristic risk preferences shape perceptions. That is, people who are willing to 
take risks in order to achieve their goals such as high returns or sensations associated 
with risk taking, might be more aware of the risks in their environment and choose to be 
in situations where there are risks that might be related to the returns that they seek. 
Alternatively, it could be that participants in this sample have self-selected into 
environments that suit their risk preferences, as suggested in Chapter 5. The result could 
be, in part, a result of the method. Weber and Milliman (1997) noted that there might be 
differences between risk preference and risk perception measured in standardised 
scenarios versus self-rated Likert scale type items. It could be that if standardised 
situations had been used in this research against which participants' rated their risk 
preferences and perceived risk, the relationship between the two variables might be 
inverse as Sitkin and Pablo suggested. 
The variable that measured whether people think through the payoffs and costs of 
decisions was a significant predictor in three out of six regression analyses, and almost 
reached significance in two further analyses. In each case, thinking through decision 
alternatives was associated with a preference for risk aversion. Decision making that did 
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not involve thorough choice analysis was associated with preferences for taking risk. 
This result suggests that decisions to take, or accept, risks could be related to decision 
processes that involve the use of heuristics which preclude careful weighing up of 
choices in each situation. It is also possible that preferences for taking risks are 
associated with personality-based dispositions, such as sensation seeking, that lead to 
habit driven behaviour and the use of heuristics in some situations. In contrast, 
preferences for avoiding risk could be driven by different trait characteristics that lead 
individuals to take a cautious approach to making choices and to avoid situations where 
there is a likelihood of loss. 
The variable that asked participants whether their decision processes were influenced by 
their emotions showed a significant relationship with health risk preferences. People 
who preferred to take risks reported that they were influenced more frequently by their 
emotions when making decisions about risks than people who preferred to avoid risks. 
This was the only set of results that showed a significant association between the 
emotion variable and risk preferences. The data do not assess whether the emotions 
were positive or negative, and inferences cannot be drawn concerning the precise nature 
of the relationship between risk taking and emotions, although the existence of the 
relationship has been confirmed in a number of studies, several of which were reviewed 
in Chapter 3. The results could indicate either that people experiencing positive 
emotions are willing to take risks with their health because of feelings of confidence, or 
that people with negative affect take health risks such as drinking or smoking to try to 
alleviate their negative feelings, or to improve their mood. In addition, there could be an 
association between changeable emotions and inconsistent risk preferences, since the 
people who were inconsistent in their cross-domain risk preferences were in general 
more risk taking than those who were inconsistent. 
A fourth decision variable that influenced risk preference is the item that assessed the 
affective component of the reference point. That is, the item that measured whether 
people felt generally positive or negative about each domain. This variable had a 
significant impact on risk preference, but only in model 4 of the finance domain. 
Feeling negative about the finance domain was associated with preferences for risk 
aversion. The direction of this relationship does not seem to be as Kahneman and 
Tversky predicted in prospect theory (1979). These authors suggested that being in a 
180 
situation of loss could be associated with risk taking in order to try to get into a situation 
of gain. The results of this research could be explained in terms of a third factor that 
influences the effects of loss on risk preference: negative emotion. The results of the 
correlation analyses discussed in Chapter 6 suggested that this reference point variable 
was associated strongly with other emotional factors. It might be that emotions are an 
important moderator of the relationship between loss, gain and risk taking. As 
mentioned in relation to the interviews that were carried with the traders in this research 
as part of the ESRC project, emotions were an important part of their decision 
processes. A number of traders reported that when they were in the domain of gain they 
continued to take risks, rather than becoming risk averse as prospect theory would 
predict. The result could be explained in terms of the traders' positive emotions and 
level of confidence. Traders who did not express high confidence levels did not report 
continued risk taking in the domain of gains. The reverse could account for risk 
aversion in the domain of losses. Negative emotions associated with losses might lead 
to the desire to protect the self from further losses rather than the possibility of further 
loss that might be associated with risk taking. At the individual level, the precise 
relationship between the point at which people become risk averse or risk seeking could 
relate to thresholds that determine how much loss an individual is willing to accept. The 
relationship between feeling negative and risk aversion could also be due to the 
subjective nature of the reference points. For example, even when people in the domain 
of loss, their situation could still be better than expected, and thus the individual might 
be risk averse rather than risk seeking. If this is the case, then an individual might still 
be acting in accordance with prospect theory. 
Overall, the R squared statistics for all the analyses are relatively low, particularly when 
the predictor variables were biographical and personality factors only. These results 
suggest that personality does not have a significant impact on the preferences of people 
who are inconsistent across domains. It seems that personality had a small impact on the 
domain-specific risk preferences of the participants in these analyses, and that while 
domain-specific decision preference variables accounted for some of the variance in risk 
preferences, it seems likely that people who have variable, situation specific risk 
preferences are influenced by many factors that were not measured in this research. 
Other factors could include the social context of risk taking and the relationship 
between risk and return in each risk situation. In contrast, the decision preference 
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variables in the finance domain accounted for around one third of the variance in risk 
preferences in models 3 and 4. Personality had no significant association with finance 
risk preferences. These results suggest that perceived risk and consideration of payoffs 
and costs of decision alternatives are two key factors that influence finance risk 
preferences. 
In sum, the results suggest that risk preferences measured in one domain might not be 
generalisable to other domains. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 it seems likely that the 
approach of several authors, who have considered risk propensity in terms of how much 
risk people are willing to take in business or financial decisions, could be too narrow. In 
order to measure risk propensity, it would seem more effective to assess risk preferences 
in several domains than preferences in one domain. If risk preference in only one 
domain is of particular interest then it should be noted that results might not apply to 
risk preferences in other domains. 
7.6 Further examination of domain-specific decision making 
The issue of domain-specific decision making was examined further to assess the 
influences on some particular aspects of work, health and finance related decision 
making. 
This stage of the analysis considered the relationship between biographical variables, 
personality factors and a set of scales that were created from the variables that measured 
risk perceptions and preferences that were specific to each domain. The construction of 
the domain-specific items was discussed in Chapter 4. In sum, the work domain items 
assessed error risk taking and risk taking to achieve goals. The health domain items 
measured health protection and life balance. The finance domain items considered use 
of money and gambling. There were five items in each section. Principal components 
analysis was used to examine the factor structure of the ten items in each domain. The 
component matrix was rotated to maximise the variance between the factors. 
Cronbach's alpha was calculated for each of the factors. The data are shown in 
Appendix 7. The process resulted in the creation of five new scales by computing the 
mean of the relevant items. There was only one scale in the work domain since the 
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items measuring error risk taking did not form a reliable scale. Some of the items were 
reverse coded. The items that each scale was derived from are shown in Appendix 7. 
The inter-correlations between the scales are shown in Appendix 8. The scales were as 
follows: 
1. The work goals scale. This scale assessed the degree to which people were willing 
to take risks in order to achieve goals at work. A low score indicates taking risk to 
achieve goals. A high score indicates not taking risk to achieve work goals. 
2. The life balance scale. This scale measured whether people give work a priority in 
their life, or whether they prefer to balance work and nonwork. A low score 
indicates a work focus. A high score indicates a balance between work and 
nonwork. 
3. The health protection scale. This scale measured whether people value their health 
and seek to protect their health. A low score suggests people are protective of their 
health. A high score suggests that people are not protective of their health. 
4. The gambling scale. This score assessed whether people like to gamble and get 
enjoyment out of gambling or not. A low score is associated with a preference for 
gambling. A high score is associated with a preference for avoiding gambling. 
5. The use of money scale. This scale measured preferences for whether money is 
spent or saved. A low score is associated with preferences for spending. A high 
score is associated with preferences for caution, and saving rather than spending 
money. 
The new scales were used as dependent variables in regression analyses to examine 
whether they were associated significantly with biographical variables, personality 
factors and domain-specific decision preference variables, and whether the same factors 
predicted decision preferences in different domains. The pattern of relationships 
between the dependent variables and the predictor variables differs within and across 
domains. That is, each dependent variable had a different set of predictors. The results 
are shown two portions. Table 7.8 on the next page shows the results of regression 
analyses including demographic variables and personality factors. Table 7.9 shows, on 
the following page, the results of the regression analyses that included the decision 
preference variables in addition to the demographic variables and personality factors. 
No outliers were identified. 
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The set of results that had the greatest number of significant relationships between the 
predictor variables and the dependent variable was risk taking to achieve goals at work. 
Taking risks to achieve goals was associated with high scores in the extroversion and 
openness scales, and low scores in the agreeableness and conscientiousness scales. 
When income was added into the equation, high income was associated with risk taking 
and the agreeableness factor became non-significant. This result could be influenced by 
the traders in the sample who had high incomes, and reported having a risk taking 
orientation with respect to work goals. 
The two health preference scales had different sets of predictors. Seeking a balance 
between work and nonwork was associated with older age and low openness. It could be 
that people in this sample who are younger were more focused on their career 
development. Lack of health protection was related to low scores in the agreeableness 
and conscientious factors. This suggests that people who are tough minded and laid 
back are more interested in enjoying life, and perhaps being focused on the present, than 
in showing concern for protecting themselves from health risks that could seem abstract 
and in the future. The conscientiousness factor was significant for both gambling and 
use of money preferences. Again, low scores in conscientiousness were associated with 
preferences for taking risk. In addition, being male was associated with gambling, and a 
high score in extroversion was associated with preferring to spend rather than save 
money. 
The relationship between the dependent variables and the trait of conscientiousness was 
such that risk taking was associated with low levels of conscientiousness. It was noted 
earlier in the chapter that conscientiousness could be associated with preferences for 
risk seeking, and was found to predict a greater degree of cross-domain inconsistency. 
As proposed in section 7.4, a high level of conscientiousness could lead to 
discriminated, targeted risk taking which the individual has judged to be appropriate for 
the situation. This is in contrast to risk taking associated with a lack of such judgement, 
and low levels of conscientiousness. It could be that the scales discussed in this section 
have measured general aspects of work goal related risk taking and health-protection 
related risk taking, however, if specific areas of choice about taking or avoiding risks 
were explored, for example by using a semi-structured interview method, the 
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association between conscientiousness and targeted risk taking might be revealed more 
clearly. 
Overall, the relationships between personality and risk preferences in each domain are 
in accordance with the descriptions of each personality factor in Five Factor model of 
personality. The data show that the amount of variance explained by the biographical 
variables and personality factors is from about 6% to 18%. 
In sum, the data in Table 7.8 indicate two key findings. First, that personality is a 
significant component of decision preferences in each domain. In particular, a low score 
in the conscientiousness scale was associated with preferences for risk taking. Second, 
that the influences on preferences in different domains do show some variance. That is, 
the conceptualisation and construction of risk preferences within domains seems to be 
different from the conceptualisation and construction of consistency of risk preferences 
across domains. The results confirm further that, with the exception of a particular 
group of people for whom preferences are consistent across domains, risk preferences in 
one domain cannot be generalised to other domains. It is possible that, in order to assess 
risk propensity, either a domain-specific approach must be taken and it should be 
acknowledged that risk preferences might hold only for those domains or particular 
aspects of risk that were measured, or a method should be used that measures risk 
preferences in a number of different domains and calculates the degree of cross-domain 
consistency. Individual preferences both within-domains and across-domains can then 
be assessed to give a more complete picture of individual level risk preference. 
The data in table 7.9 reveal a somewhat different pattern of relationships. The reference 
point item has significant associations with several dependent variables, as does the 
emotional aspect of the loss and gain domain. Health protection behaviour was 
associated with feeling negative about the health situation, while reporting that the 
situation was better than usual; conversely, health risk taking was associated with 
feeling positive and thinking that the situation was worse than usual. This result 
indicates an interesting relationship between emotions and relative reference points. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the author's work with traders showed that positive emotions 
were associated with confidence and risk taking in the domain of losses. It was 
suggested that positive emotions were related to perceptions of opportunity being 
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associated with risk taking, rather than awareness of threats and losses. It is possible that 
the same explanation might be applied here. Feeling better or worse about the health 
situation was also associated with the balance between work and nonwork. General 
positive feelings were related to seeking a balance rather than focusing on work alone. 
This could be due to an increased emphasis on nonwork activities leading to improved 
mood. 
The two finance scales showed some significant relationships with the predictor 
variables. Gambling was associated with youth, lower tenure, low neuroticism, low 
conscientiousness, feeling positive about the current finance situation, while reporting 
that finances were worse than usual. As with the health domain, it seems that the 
association between being in the domain of loss while experiencing some positive 
emotions could lead to a preference for gambling, and taking risk, rather than being 
concerned with risk and loss. 
Approximately one fifth of the variance in the use of money scale was explained by the 
personality and decision preference variables. A preference for spending money rather 
than saving was associated with high scores in extroversion, feeling negative about the 
current financial situation, not thinking through the payoffs and costs of financial risk 
decisions and a preference for taking financial risks. 
In sum, the analyses that considered the domain-specific scales showed that personality 
and decision preference variables were associated significantly with a number of aspects 
of decision making and risk taking. In some cases, a large proportion of the variance in 
the dependent variable was accounted for by the combination of the personality factors 
and decision variables. The direction of the relationships between the dependent and 
predictor variables was, overall, -in line with previous research e. g. Kowert and 
Hermann (1997). In particular, the scales concerning risk taking to achieve goals at 
work, health protection behaviour and the use of money showed a number of significant 
associations with the predictor variables. It is possible that these scales measured 
aspects of risk taking better than the more complex concepts of the balance between 
work and nonwork and gambling, which could be associated more strongly with 
individual and contextual factors that were not measured. Reference points, emotions, 
risk perception and risk preferences were all shown to be significant factors, as 
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hypothesised in Chapter 3 following the review of the literature concerning the 
influences on risk preferences. The results suggest that the approach of Sitkin and Pablo 
(1992) and its focus on risk preferences and risk perception, combined with the 
emphasis of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) on the domains of loss and 
gain, and the emotions associated with risk (e. g. Hockey and colleagues, 2000) together 
influence a number of aspects of risk-related decision making. 
7.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter has discussed the results of analyses developed to test the hypotheses. The 
results showed that people can be categorised into two groups on the basis of their 
consistency of risk preferences across domains, and that there are significant differences 
between the groups in several personality factors and decision preference variables. The 
people with consistent cross-domain risk preferences were significantly more risk 
averse than people who were inconsistent. The degree of cross-domain consistency was 
shown to be influenced by several personality characteristics and decision making 
preferences. Analyses were also carried out to examine risk preferences within each of 
the work, health and finance domains. It was concluded that there are important 
differences between domain-specific risk preferences and cross-domain risk 
preferences. Whether people prefer to take or avoid risks in one domain is not, in 
general, likely to be completely generalisable to risk preferences in other domains. 
The results suggest that risk preferences are generalisable across domains only for 
people who have particular personality and decision making profiles that predispose 
them towards consistent risk preferences. It is possible that the decision making 
processes that lead to consistent risk preferences are different from the processes that 
are associated with particular risk preferences in each decision domain. 
Overall, the results indicate that cross-domain risk preferences, i. e. risk propensity, and 
domain-specific risk preferences can be understood and researched using different 
models and techniques. In addition, the results suggest that consistent risk aversion 
could be more prevalent than consistent risk seeking. It seems possible that risk seeking 
is targeted and could be domain-specific for many people. In practical terms, the results 
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imply that there is considerable individual variance in risk preference. The implications 
for managers are that risk management strategies need to take into account individual 
level risk propensity, whether people are consistent or inconsistent in their approaches 
to risk, and the nature of different risk situations. 
I -. 
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Chapter 8 
Qualitative data analysis 
8.1 Chapter abstract 
This chapter presents and discusses qualitative data concerning risk perception, risk 
preferences and risk behaviour. The quantitative data discussed in the previous chapter 
showed that while some people are relatively consistent across domains in terms of risk 
taking or risk aversion, many people make domain-specific choices about which risks to 
bear and which to avoid. This chapter discusses qualitative data that help to give further 
insights into why people's choices vary across domains. 
The data are gathered from open-ended items. This method does not allow for the 
examination of causal relationships between variables. Nor was it possible to relate the 
qualitative data systematically to the quantitative data. Nonetheless, the data illustrate 
well some of the factors that influence domain-specific risk-related choices. In 
particular, the data suggested that participants take risks for two key reasons. First, risks 
were considered in terms of the risk-return trade-off. People were willing to accept risks 
as part of a goal achievement process. Second, some people were more willing to bear 
risk than others because they believe, perhaps erroneously, that they can control the 
risks that they engage in. 
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8.2 Data gathering 
Participants were invited to make comments in response to several open ended items in 
the questionnaire. The comments made provided both a perspective on risk that was 
complementary to the quantitative data, and interesting insights into the ways that 
people choose to seek or avoid risk in different areas of their lives. 
There were five qualitative open-ended items in the questionnaire that asked 
participants to describe each of the following: 
" Recent risk and work experiences 
" Recent risk and health experiences 
" Recent risk and finance experiences 
" Risks taken at work 
" Risks taken outside of work 
For the first three areas, participants were asked to report both positive and negative 
outcomes of the risk event. All the items in the questionnaire were intended to be 
sufficiently open-ended to evoke a range of responses. 
Due to the restrictions upon the firefighter and trader data gathering discussed in the 
method section the last two items, those concerning risks taken at work and outside of 
work, were excluded from the questionnaire. In the questionnaire for the fire fighter 
sample group, participants were asked what they thought the risks involved in being a 
fire fighter were. There were no substitute items in the questionnaire for the trader 
sample group because these participants had also undergone an interview as part of the 
wider research project. 
The frequencies for comments in each category are shown in Table 8.1 on the next 
page. 
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Table 8.1 Number of qualitative data points 
Number of Number of 
people with people who 
risk experience commented 
Recent risk and work 113 113 
experiences 
Recent risk and health 74 70 
experiences 
Recent risk and finance 67 58 
experiences 
Risks taken at work N/A 140 
Risks taken outside of N/A 122 
work 
8.3 The qualitative method of data analysis 
The aims of this component of the data analysis were to examine the meaning of risk 
and the ways that participants structured their risk-related perceptions and choices. It 
seemed possible that the qualitative data could provide interesting information 
concerning motivations for risk taking, and why risk taking might be domain-specific 
rather than consistent across domains. The qualitative quotations are considered 
separately from quantitative data. 
The paradigm is loosely contructivist. The framework used is that based upon the work 
of Guba and Lincoln (1994). These authors proposed that the paradigm is concerned 
with local and specific constructed realities and findings interpreted using a hermeneutic 
method. That is, the approach is phenomenological and is concerned with the ways that 
participants' comments reflect their understanding of risk rather than objective 
assessments of what constitutes risk. The results were interpreted through a 
consideration of language in the traditional sense of hermeneutics, but not via a 
dialectical process as the authors suggested, given that the data in this analysis are 
written records and did not involve interview-based interactions between the 
participants and the researcher. The third element of the Guba and Lincoln framework 
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concerns subjectivist data, that is, the authors suggested that the researcher and the 
object of research could interact to create results. It is possible that this is an issue 
relevant to the data considered in this section. Some participants might not have actively 
or consciously considered the nature of the risks they face prior to being asked the 
question for the purposes of this research. Overall, the interpretation of data is focused 
on individual differences and the nature of domain-specific risks and returns, the 
properties of which are likely to be significant influences on risk-related decision 
making. 
The method described above was adopted because the data are derived from 
questionnaire comments and while these comments provide much data of interest, there 
are several reasons why more systematic qualitative analysis is inappropriate. Many of 
the participants were under considerable time pressure, notably the traders and fire 
fighters who completed the questionnaire as part of a series of other measures. It is 
likely that the other participants also had numerous other demands on their time. 
Participants might have made longer comments had they been in an interview situation. 
The data do not reflect the full range of data potentially available and it is likely that 
they do not reflect the full range of possible responses. Hence, coding of data and 
quantitative analysis of codes did not seem to be appropriate. The data do, however, 
provide a valuable addition to the quantitative data, an illuminating picture of risk and 
an illustration of some of the issues analysed using the quantitative method. In 
particular, these data reveal decision choices that could be important factors in shaping 
domain-specific risk-related decision making and explaining why many people are not 
consistently risk seeking or risk averse across decision domains. 
8.4 Qualitative data themes 
Two key themes were revealed in the data. First were comments concerned with the 
nature of risk. Second were data related to the nature of risk taking and choices between 
which risks to take, or accept, and which risks to avoid. 
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The categorising of data into themes was considered to be an integral part of the 
analysis, enabling understanding of the data, rather than simply being the precursor of 
analysis (Huberman & Miles, 1983). 
In general, the aim was to examine themes across the whole sample rather than 
categorising data according to sample group derivation. However, in some instances, 
differences between sample groups were evident and, where relevant, these differences 
are noted. Frequencies of each type of comment were not analysed, but some references 
are made to approximate frequency of different types of comments. 
Quotations are presented as they were written in the questionnaire. Small grammatical 
alterations have been made in some cases to clarify the quotation and to assist the 
reader, for example the addition of `I' or `and'. 
8.5 The nature of risk 
This section presents data that illustrate perceptions of what constitutes risk. The data 
showed that risk perception varied across the sample. The data were divided into two 
sections: risks associated with work and risks outside of work. The diverse nature of the 
ways that risk is perceived is evident. 
8.5.1 Risks associated with work 
Participants were asked to list risks that are involved in their work. Comments in this 
section reflect a range of opinions concerning what is considered to be a risk. Some 
participants considered physical risks to be the most important aspects of work-related 
risk. 
For example, one participant noted that the most risky aspect of their job was: 
"Glacial fieldwork in the Alps. " 
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The fire fighter participants were aware of the potential physical dangers of the job that 
they hoped to be accepted into. However the risks noted varied across participants in 
this group. 
"Smoke inhalation. " 
"Heat, smoke, humidity, collapsing buildings. " 
"Risk of fatal injury or disablement from burns or falls. " 
Many participants considered that the combination of physical and psychological risks 
were what made their work hazardous. Numerous participants mentioned stress as a 
major risk factor. It was noted that stress could be an equal, or a more significant risk 
factor than any physical risks that might be associated with their work. 
"Whilst working with the Army I have come "under fire", but I also have 
worked at a desk for 18 hours per day and with very -short deadlines - stress 
related illness prevalent. " 
"Military tasks - weapons, flying, hostile environments, Stress! Professional - 
assessing suicidal patients, aggressive patients and being accountable. " 
"High risks mentally and emotionally, not physical. World wide movement for 
job is necessary; competition with elite intellectuals; must get funding in order 
to keep job. " 
"Risk of being burnt, injury from falling debris in a fire, mental trauma from 
direct contact with victims. " 
"Taking on substantial academic work in addition to the university work. 
General positive outcome - to enhance standing in the profession. Negative 
outcome - high stress level, disruptive of home life. " 
There were also a number of job-specific risks. These quotations reflected the multi- 
faceted nature of risk. Comments relating to job-specific risks focused largely on 
negative aspects of risk. 
"High risk in failing to detect serious illness in patients when overwhelmed with 
trivial illnesses and unrealistic demands and expectations of a selfish public. " 
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"Risk of falling from political grace and losing my job with no compensation 
and no employment protection. " 
"Low volumes of ad hoc work (financial risk). Driving high mileage so 
injury/death risk. " 
"I am paid to take risk - shooting seismic data worth millions of dollars at our 
risk and then selling it to oil companies. " 
The negative impact for organisations as well as individuals was also noted. 
"Taking risk whilst proceeding through this merger phase, knowing that if we 
made money there was no particular upside for us, however if we lost money the 
spotlight would be upon us. Risk is a `free' resource and so a rational trader 
would take as much risk as possible in order to maximise his/her potential 
personal gain. For this organisation as a whole this can have a negative effect, 
i. e. many traders all taking large risk. Some `gaming' goes on. " 
The complex nature of risk was also highlighted by several participants from the fire 
fighter sample group. These people seemed to be clearly aware that they might be 
involved in an objectively physically demanding and dangerous environment. Yet a 
number of people included both job characteristics and the role of other people in their 
list of work-related risks. The comments reflected a sophisticated understanding of risk 
and risk bearing. 
"Risks include serious injury, falling from ladders or buildings, endangering 
lives of colleagues and/or members of the public due to recklessness, letting 
others down in situations where the consequences are very serious. " 
"Risks are no group interaction and not paying attention. " 
"Poor listening skills, poor team work, poor fitness level and poor 
communication skills. " 
In addition to specific risks discussed above, uncertainty was also a potential problem 
for some participants. 
"Dealing with the unknown" 
"I may be made redundant at any time, regardless of performance, due to lack of 
funding. " 
"The risks are that you do not know what is going to happen. " 
197 
"Unfortunately have been on an organised enquiry last 8 months and not on 
patrol, whereupon it would be inevitable that I would be expected to deal with 
the unpredictable and the unknown, as have done in the last 12 years. " 
In sum, the qualitative data reflected a range of perceptions concerning the nature of 
risk. The results also indicate that the sampling strategy was successful in capturing 
individuals representing a range of different orientations to risk, and the data illustrate 
well the multifarious nature of risk., The data also suggested that many people do not 
make the distinction between risk and uncertainty that is made by some theorists, for 
example Knight (1921,1965). Rather, for many people, it seems likely that risk and 
uncertainty are essentially linked. 
8.5.2 Risks outside work 
Participants' lists of risks outside of work provided further insights into perceptions of 
risk. In addition, these data illustrated the range of risky activities that respondents 
participated in. It was evident that while some respondents were involved in numerous 
risky activities across several domains, other participants noted that they took no risks 
in any domains. A third group of participants noted that they took risks in one or two 
domains only. 
An interesting finding was that when asked to list risks taken outside of work, many 
participants from the climbing sample seemed to be acutely aware not only of the risks 
of their sport and other sports they participate in, but also of the risks all around them in 
everyday life, such as driving cars. This could be an example of the positive relationship 
between perceived risk and risk preferences that was demonstrated in the quantitative 
data, and was contrary to the Sitkin and Pablo (1992) hypothesis that there is a negative 
relationship between perception and preference. That is, mountain climbers noted that 
they chose to take risks, and were aware of the risks that they were taking. As in the 
section relating to work-specific risks, both psychological and physical risks were 
mentioned. Some example lists of risks from the mountain climbing participants are 
shown below. 
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"Rock climbing, mountaineering, motor cycling, skiing (off piste), driving a 
car. " 
"Cycling into town; walking through rush hour traffic. " 
"Cycling to work at rush hour, motorcycling, snowboarding. " 
"Driving! Trekking in Himalayas for holidays. " 
"Taken risks. Negative outcomes. Got jeep stuck, lost a day. Ignored the map, 
lost a day and 210km of fuel in a remote area. Positive: Went back to make a 
second attempt on a mountain and got up it. Carried on during a route, dumped 
food and completed the route with no margin left. " 
In general, the risk lists showed a smaller number of risks for the other four sample 
groups. People who were not climbers were more likely to note that they did not take 
risks outside of work, however a number of people did note the risks to their health as 
their key nonwork risks. 
"Driving too fast, drinking too much (not at the same time! )" 
"Lack of sleep, abuse of parties (i. e. alcohol)" 
"Moderate smoking, drinking etc. Self-inflicted health risks. " 
"Smoking (less than 20 per day, but I know this is still a risk). " 
"Eating and drinking too much" 
"Not drinking enough water" 
However for some participants, physical risk taking and risk of other types were part of 
their nonwork activity. A diverse range of risks was noted. 
"Rock climbing, winter mountain walking, extramarital relationships, bike 
riding in city traffic, eating red meat. " 
"Cycling in central London; eat too much chocolate; play chess (postal) at 
international level. " 
"I take personal risks e. g. creative writing, singing in public. None are 
physically risky but are psychologically risky. " 
"Every poker hand I play is risky. " 
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"No, but it depends what you call risky. I drive a car which is obviously slightly 
risky, but I do not consider it as a risk each time I drive. " 
"Flying Aeroflot from Latvia to Moscow is probably the only real risk. " 
"Too intense work, too much pressure, fatigue, weakness, anxiety. " 
"Risk bike without helmet. Used to do surfing (big waves) and drugs. " 
"Cycling, running, boozing" 
"Investment in volatile shares. " 
In sum, the data illustrate well the diverse nature of risk and the range of individual risk 
portfolios. Participants' comments reflected a general high level of awareness of the 
range of risks involved in everyday life. There were some differences in the risks noted 
according to the participants' job and the activities they are involved in, for example the 
mountain climbing sample noted clearly many risks relating to their sport. Interestingly, 
the climbers were very aware of the risks involved in their everyday environment as 
well as the mountain environment. However, in general, the main themes of diversity 
and the importance of both physical and psychological risks were common to 
participants across the entire sample. 
8.6 Consistent approaches to risk 
The quantitative data analysis discussed in the previous chapters showed that some 
participants were consistent in their risk-related decision making. The qualitative data 
did show similar consistency in some cases. Some participants noted that they do not 
take any risks in each of the open-ended questions. These data were likely to fit in with 
the quantitative data that showed that was a number of consistently risk averse 
participants. Others mentioned risks in responses to each item. However, the number of 
people who noted risk taking in each domain was considerably smaller than the number 
who, wrote that they took no risks, reflecting the pattern of the quantitative data. For 
example one participant from the trading sample group wrote the following comments: 
Work risk: "The title of my job risk `risk arbitrage', so each minute of the day is risk 
taking. " 
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Health risk: "Finding time to alleviate stress. " 
Financial risk: "Yes, my job. " 
A different example, from the climbing sample group, is shown below. 
Work risk: "In June/July this summer I ran Alpine Mountaineering with a group of 
students - it had very positive outcomes in terms of group dynamics, 
success etc. I was involved in running a rock-climbing day for junior 
school class - again very positive outcomes for the children in terms of 
self-esteem. For me the success of seeing children achieve was a very 
positive outcome. " 
Health risk: "I ran an Alpine Mountaineering course which clearly involved possible 
risk to my health. All the outcomes were positive (similar to earlier 
statement). " 
Financial risk: "One of our two cars had come to the end of its life and we had to outlay 
an amount of money that wasn't planned in order to buy a replacement. 
However, it has so far had a positive outcome in terms of less servicing 
of the car and greater driving comfort. " 
A third example is an academic who noted risks in all three areas. 
Work risk: "I was given some consultancy work which interfered with existing work 
plans. I risk asking the head of school if I could not do it. Outcome -I 
had to do it. " 
Health risk: "Took up homeopathy for a neck problem. No positive outcome i. e. 
significant pain remains. " 
Financial risk: "Booked a holiday using an extended Visa allowance causing the need 
for more overdraft. " 
The above sets of comments reflect both a diverse range of risks within and across 
participants, and the notion of consistency. The people who made these comments were 
aware that they took risks, and chose to do so, in several areas of their life. Although the 
method of data collection did not enable matching of qualitative and quantitative data, 
the results of the qualitative data analysis do fit in with the results of the quantitative 
analysis. The data also gave some interesting insights into why risk choices might be 
inconsistent and domain-specific. These data are discussed below. 
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8.7 Domain-specific risk taking 
An important issue throughout the research described in this thesis has been why some 
people take more risks than others. Quantitative analysis identified personality traits that 
are associated significantly with individual differences in risk seeking and risk aversion. 
Personality was found to be one key factor in explaining why there are individual 
differences in risk preferences. However, there are many other important factors that 
explain variance in risk taking, and could be associated with domain-specific choices 
about risk. The quotations in this section are from participants who were inconsistent in 
their cross-domain risk preferences. 
Perception of risk is one factor that could influence domain-specific choices. As noted 
in the above section, perceptions of risk in this sample were shown to vary widely. The 
data presented in this section indicate that some people take risks because they perceive 
the level of risk to be acceptable. An issue described by a number of respondents in this 
research was the difference between what they term as risk taking and what they believe 
to be gambling. For some participants, the management of risk and some level of skill 
or ability differentiate risk from gambling. These data illustrate again the relationship 
between risk preferences and risk perception. Some participants indicated that they did 
not want to take risk, and that they did not perceive themselves to be risk takers because 
they considered themselves to be sufficiently knowledgeable and skilful to control the 
risk situation. There are several quotations to illustrate this point, several of which were 
from traders for whom risk management is a daily activity. 
"The nature of this business implies that risk have to be taken, along with the 
chance of being wrong. My focus is to be sure that we are aware of the risks 
involved (e. g. currency risk), to neutralise the risks we do not want and that the 
risk-return profiles are work it. " 
"I do not gamble because: 
i) I used to gamble a lot when I started in this industry 
ii) My job is essentially a form of gambling, so gambling as a pastime holds 
little allure 
iii) My risk priorities have changed since I married and had children 
iv) Most gambling involves a negative risk-return profile i. e. casinos, horse 
racing. It is therefore imprudent. I prefer calculated risk. " 
202 
"I do not gamble because I have enough of weighing up risk/return at work. I 
may have sporting bets with friends only. " 
Traders were not the only participants to think they were in some way controlling the 
risks that they were taking. The perception that risks could be controlled through the 
application of learned skills and abilities featured in several quotations. A number of the 
fire fighting sample participants believed that, although there were numerous risks 
associated with their chosen profession, risks could be controlled. 
"We have a lot of training on the camp, for example a hot fire once a week, 
which improves our skills at fighting fires. " 
"The risks shouldn't be that great because of the amount of training given. " 
"The risks are fairly high, but they can be minimised through good training. " 
The importance of procedures was also mentioned as an element of risk control. 
"The risks of fire fighting are the same as any other job so long as the rules 
aren't broken. " 
However some participants had a different approach to risk management which 
reflected less concern with trying to control risks, or perceptions that risks cannot or 
need not be actively controlled. 
[The risks involved in fire fighting are] "Serious injury or death caused by 
negligence, or just being unlucky. " 
"Unfortunately I gamble, and sometimes the losses can be almost as big as the 
wins. " 
Another example was the comment of one participant noted that they rode horses, "but 
not riskily! " It seems that this too could be an example of an unrealistic appraisal of 
risk. However skilful a rider the participant may be, there are many factors outside of 
their control. 
The comments in this section represent an interesting aspect of risk taking, namely the 
issue of whether risk taking is controlled or whether it is more akin to gambling and 
subject to luck, or to the whims of others. The quotations could indicate that there are 
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two types of people who have different risk preferences and risk behaviour. It could be 
that some people want to, and try to, exert control over their choices and in doing so 
reduce risk. Others, perhaps those with a more risk seeking profile, will accept and bear 
greater levels of risk. An alternative explanation is to consider the range of beliefs 
concerning the controllability of risk. The data showed that some participants indicated 
that they believed they were reducing the risks involved in their activities, such as 
mountain climbing and fire fighting, through learning and skill development. It could be 
that some people succeed in reducing their risk exposure, for example by ensuring that 
climbing or fire fighting equipment are in good order and that their use is understood. It 
might also be the case that many people have erroneous beliefs about the degree of 
control that they can exert over risk. 
Previous research has shown that a common source of cognitive bias is the illusion of 
control (Langer, 1975). This bias is the tendency to believe or act as if one can control 
events that are influenced by factors outside of the individual's control. Langer has 
demonstrated that the illusion of control is both pervasive and powerful. Research into 
the illusion of control has been carried out by the author of this thesis with colleagues. 
The research is described in Fenton-O'Creevy, Nicholson, Soane and Willman (1999). 
The traders in the ESRC study were administered a series of computer-based tasks. 
Participants were asked to control a moving index. Participants made a number of bets 
and predictions concerning how successful they would be and were asked how 
confident they were that they had controlled the moving index. The index was in fact 
random and participants had no control over its movements. Yet, the data showed that 
many participants believed that they had successfully moved the index. The illusion of 
control was found to be pervasive, despite traders' widespread beliefs in their ability to 
make rational decisions. Illusion of control was significantly and negatively associated 
with managers' ratings of performance in terms of ability to manage risk and individual 
contribution to desk profits. Other research has demonstrated that illusion of control and 
unrealistic beliefs of control lead to reduced risk perception and greater risk taking 
(Gollwittzer & Kinney, 1989). It seems possible that a number of the participants' 
comments illustrated above represented unrealistic control beliefs. 
In sum, it is clear that perceptions of risk and involvement in risky activities vary 
widely. However, the reasons why some people take risks are not uniform. While for 
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many people risk might be a worthwhile burden in order to achieve goals, for others 
unrealistic beliefs about their ability to control risks could be a factor. Such beliefs have 
been shown to lead to reduced perceptions of risk and increased risk taking. The 
combination of variance concerning perceived risk associated with domain-specific 
choices and unrealistic control beliefs could be an important explanation of inconsistent 
risk behaviour and domain-specific choices. 
8.8 The risk-return trade-off 
In addition to the issue of control beliefs and risk taking discussed above, two further 
reasons why people might choose to take risks were discussed in Chapter 1. It was 
noted that some people might take risks because they are seeking sensations, such as the 
excitement associated with bungy jumping, while others take risks because they believe 
there is an associated between risk and rewards. The trade-off between risks and their 
associated returns is an important factor that can explain why some people take more 
risks than others, and why some people might take one type of risk but not other types. 
The qualitative data showed that many participants make deliberate and considered 
choices about the risks that they will engage in and are willing to bear in order to attain 
the returns, or meet goals. These data also illustrate the domain-specific nature of some 
people's risk taking. In many cases, the data concerning risk taking featured the notion 
of balance between risks of difference types. Descriptions of the relationship between 
risks and returns illustrated the ways that participants weigh up alternatives and choose 
which risks to take, and which to avoid. 
A number of comments reflected the diverse nature of risks within each domain that 
need to be balanced. For example, career, financial, social and reputation risks were 
issues of concern to respondents. The following quotations illustrate some of the trade- 
offs participants have made. 
Some participants considered risk and return within a relatively confined area of their 
life, for example work. 
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"One `quite' large risk after my first week working in London with my new 
team... financially not so huge but `needed' to be correct in front of my new 
team. Credibility risk! " 
"Given up a permanent job to be employed on a fixed term contract. Positive 
outcomes so far - work closer to home. Job should open up wider career 
possibilities. " 
"Large back book position in a security. Trade still on, currently having a 
positive outcome on my career as the trade is very large giving me plenty of 
exposure to senior management. " 
A different approach to risk and return was reflected in comments that acknowledged 
the impact of individual risk choices on other people. 
"Risk assessment in mental health practice is far from being a science. Assessing 
the suicidal or homicidal may involve determining clinical/ demographic/ 
predisposing factors but the final judgement is heuristic, a gut feeling. Every 
time a patient `at risk' leaves my office there is still that chance. This risk may 
lead me to overestimate the risk and err on the side of caution, or underestimate 
the risk and `take the chance'. " 
"Try to minimise the risk as others' health depends on my decisions. However 
been so exhausted recently that I've taken greater risks in giving telephone 
advice to try to manage workload effectively and (hopefully) appropriately. The 
difficulty of telephone advice is that you can never completely be sure that the 
information you've given is correct and so any judgement you make could be on 
a shaky promise. " 
"I have to keep a balance of preparing classes that are demanding enough to 
achieve the expected learning of the students in a way that is attractive. The 
main risks are making it too demanding that they can't reach me or to make it 
too much fun that they don't concentrate and miss the points. " 
The potential benefits of helping other people through taking risk were a significant part 
of the trade-off for some participants. Particularly striking were comments made by the 
fire service recruits who noted the trade-off between negative consequences, including 
death for themselves, and the positive consequences for other people. 
"I am prepared to risk my life by applying skills that I have been taught to help 
people who cannot [help themselves] either by injury, fear or because they are 
simply unable. " 
"All you know is that when you're putting out a fire you may have to save 
someone's life which may put your life in danger as well. " 
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"A train had broken down on the Liverpool Street - Southend lined. I had to go 
across all the lines and mend the train while trains carried on moving past me at 
75 mph +. The positive outcome was that the downtime of the train was reduced 
and people got to work quickly. " 
"I had to remove valuable property from a burning house with an unstable 
ceiling. Positive outcomes - although the homeowner lost the house, he was able 
to keep hold of valuable personal and sentimental possessions. " 
"I take risks everyday in my work, however I feel this is justified by my interest 
in the work, knowing I am doing something for somebody else, love of the job 
and financial reward. " 
The majority of participants were more concerned with individual-level costs and 
benefits. The work-nonwork issue and the balance between the costs and benefits 
associated with work were an important trade-offs for some participants. 
"I decided to resign a permanent position so to seek a better paid temporary or 
permanent position. The negative aspect of this is no job security. Positive is 
better paid and more job satisfaction. So far the outcome has been fairly 
balanced. A long term positive outcome will depend on getting longer (than 2 
week) work assignments. " 
"Worked long hours - 11-12 hours per day and 3-4 hours' travel. Live 62 miles 
from office. Leave home at 5.30am. Arrive office 7.00am. Leave office between 
6-7pm. Arrive home 8-8.30pm. Positive outcome - gets things done at work. 
Negative outcome - insufficient time with wife of 28 years. Children have left 
home. Have needed a tooth filling for last year - still unfilled. " 
These comments concerning important issues such as job satisfaction could be one 
reason why the data gathered by the quantitative measure of work and nonwork 
discussed in Chapter 7, which did not assess job satisfaction, did not capture much of 
the variance on the scale. 
For some people, career and financial gains were a worthwhile outcome of risky 
activities. These people could be examples of the targeted, focused conscientious risk 
taking that was discussed in Chapter 7. 
"I went to Minsk, Belarus, pretending to be a representative of a soft drinks 
company, when actually I was a market research analyst, quite risky as it's a 
repressive regime. Then I went to Kalmykia, Russia, risking dodgy Russian 
planes, cars and buses and interviewing a local dictator, also encouraging people 
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to tell me what they don't like about him. Both trips had significant positive 
outcomes - money and career advancement. However, my article about 
Kalmykia had some very hostile reactions. " 
Stress was a major risk factor for many of the participants, and methods of dealing with 
stress could involve tradeoffs that might have both positive and negative consequences. 
"I don't really view rock climbing as being too risky. Sometimes worry that I 
occasionally over use alcohol to relax from work/stress. " 
The trade-off that generated the largest volume of data within this theme, however, was 
that between mental health and either physical, financial or career wealth. Priorities 
differed among participants. 
"Quitting my job and making a formal complaint about my boss 
- loss of income 
- loss of opportunities 
- increased hostility 
but, better mental health" 
"Everyday working 12 hours +, not enough sleep, worrying over career 
progression Job pressures cause too much drinking and smoking plus stress 
related disorders - insomnia, psoriasis, feel trapped within job environment. " 
"I suffer occasionally from chronic fatigue and I had to decide whether or not to 
cancel a trip abroad. I felt quite tired already and knew that making the trip 
might cause a relapse. But, I did not want to disappoint others, so I went. I'm 
glad I did -I was indeed quite unwell when I returned, but no lasting damage - 
which was all that I could have reasonably hoped for. " 
"Last year I asked for 14 months unpaid leave so that I could travel (and go on a 
mountaineering expedition to Greenland). This risk paid off -I came back to a 
pay rise and promotion! " 
"Quitting my job (and therefore a certain career path) to launch something from 
scratch with no relevant qualifications or previous experience. The effects of this 
decision will not be fully felt until next year, as I will have been living off 
savings plus freelance work. The short term effect has been positive -I love 
working from home, the change of routine and the challenge of completely new 
problems. " 
"Taking a picture of a convicted murderer at court. I was threatened but got the 
picture. Positive aspects were climbing onto a very narrow windowsill to get a 
better view - again, got the picture. Photos of a real killer! Very negative - 
threatening behaviour. Photos of public order/fight -I was kicked and assaulted 
and my camera was stolen, I lost the film. " 
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Trade-offs between different risks and returns seemed to be particularly important to the 
participants who valued highly sport and its potential associated outcomes. 
"Went climbing in Wales. Have had a serious back injury which if I'd fallen or 
done `too much' would have been aggravated. I didn't injure myself or worsen 
my back condition as I stayed within my limits. It was a very positive 
experience. Also, did a 10 mile sponsored walk and soft abseil. Both could have 
been risky to my back, but I took precautions of wearing my back brace and 
pacing myself. I therefore gained confidence. " 
"(1) Working through cold/flu attack. Risk - give up work vs. make myself ill. 
Outcome -2 weeks illness and lots of dosh. (2) Continuing to do physical work 
when I have serious back trouble. Risk - make back worse vs. find a boring job. 
Outcome - enjoy work but fairly constant back pain and osteopathy bills to pay. " 
"I regularly rock climb - significant improvements in mental well being. 
Climbed to 21,500 ft in the Himalayas - much more relaxed and less stressed 
afterwards. " 
"Every time I climb I am taking a risk, but so far, the outcome has always been 
positive, as I am still alive. The rewards always outweigh the risks. " 
"Going climbing always improves my mental health although I risk physical 
injury. " 
"Resigned from a stressful job, therefore was unemployed with financial 
commitments. Spent 3 months looking for a more suitable job and it paid off. I 
valued my health more than work. " 
"Rock climbing, ice climbing, mountaineering, cycling to work - would be 
considered risky by others - but are essential to me and being happy. " 
The relationship between physical and mental health was viewed differently by one 
participant, who was prepared to let their mental health decline in order to improve their 
physical health and appearance. 
"I have embarked on a slimming course in the last few months. This involves 
taking slimming tablets. I have lost 221bs and intend to lose another 13lbs. I feel 
better physically but it seems to affect me mentally i. e. temporary depression, 
absent-minded etc. But overall, generally better. " 
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A different aspect of the risk-return trade-off noted by respondents was the relationship 
between having money and consuming money. These comments came from both lower 
income participants and high earning financial traders. 
"I have taken a job with less hours and less pressure (i. e. university research), 
less job security and less money in order to preserve my physical and mental 
health. " 
"Nine months ago I borrowed a lot of money to buy a car. The pleasure I 
received from the car outweighed the risk involved and was a positive outcome. " 
"Wasting far too much money on exotic cars which I feel is positive for me. As 
long as my personal finances are in order I feel happy indulging in my vices - 
feeling good is positive for developing my career. " 
"Purchased some land and am in the process of building my `dream home' thus 
tying up all of my personal finances. The positive aspect is that I feel `hungry' to 
earn more money. The negative side is that initially I felt more insecure. " 
"I worked on roofs which is a risk but I had bills to pay and I needed the 
money. " 
"Giving all my savings (£3000) to a friend desperately in need of it. No outcome 
except I have no money. Feel sometimes upset that it's gone (negative) and 
sometimes happy that it has been spent in a good cause (positive). " 
In sum, the data presented in this section provided information concerning the ways that 
participants make risky choices and prioritise outcomes. For example, some respondents 
placed psychological well being above financial wealth and physical health. Although 
the qualitative data were limited by the method, that is the use of open-ended 
questionnaire items rather than interviews, they revealed important information about 
risk-related decision making. The differences between risks and their associated returns 
seem to be key influences on the decision making process. It is likely that these factors 
are significant in-explaining the domain-specific nature of much risk taking, and in 
illustrating how people can be inconsistent in their risk preferences across domains yet 
make clear domain-specific choices. 
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8.9 Discussion of qualitative data 
The qualitative data provide an interesting insight into the way that risk is perceived and 
the choices that people make regarding which risks to take and which to avoid. The data 
suggest that there is considerable variance across individuals in the ways that risk is 
conceptualised, understood and engaged with. An example of this point concerns the 
lists of work and nonwork risks that participants noted. Some participants reported that 
they like to avoid risks both at work and outside of work. They did not note day-to-day 
activities as risky. Other participants, notably the mountain climbers, took a different 
approach. These people often included everyday events such as driving in their list of 
risks. It seemed that people who actively and willingly engaged in risk activities had 
greater awareness of. the ambient risk environment than people who did not consider 
themselves to be risk takers. 
The quantitative data analysis discussed in the previous chapters showed that some 
people were consistently risk seeking or risk averse. A number of people reported 
consistent cross-domain approaches to risk. Comments from some respondents 
indicated that they took risks in each of the work, health and finance domains assessed. 
A number of other participants responded similarly, but with the reverse approach to 
risk. These people reported taking no risks in any of the three domains. The majority of 
the sample was, however, inconsistent. The qualitative data added to the picture of 
domain-specific risk preferences discussed in Chapter 7. That is, it seems likely that 
while many people are not consistent in their cross-domain preferences, they make 
choices about which domains they will take risks in. 
The qualitative data also provided information concerning people's motivation for 
taking risks. In particular, the relationship between risk and return was discussed. The 
data showed that people make conscious choices about the risks they are willing to take, 
or bear, in order to achieve valued outcomes. The data illustrated well the way that 
tradeoffs are made within and across risk domains to enable the realisation of particular 
goals. A commonly cited example was changing jobs. It was acknowledged that a new 
job could bring financial loss, particularly in the case of people setting up their own 
business, social risk such as moving to a new city, and a disruption to career 
progression. However, respondents felt that these risks were worthwhile if the hoped-for 
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benefits materialised. In particular, comments focused on reduced stress and 
improvements in psychological well being. A similar pattern of decision making was 
observed in the comments of people who engaged in risky sports. These people reported 
participating in sports that could lead in injury and possibly death in order to gain 
psychological benefits such as excitement, exhilaration and the feeling of meeting a 
challenge. The data implied that a theory of risk could benefit from including an 
understanding of the positive aspects of risk rather than just the negative aspects, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, and the notion of tradeoffs between risk and return that motivate 
risk taking. 
The combination of the nature of risk, subjective perceptions of risks, and individual 
difference factors, including personality, that influence risk preferences is likely to 
explain the frequency of domain-specific risk taking compared with the relatively low 
frequency of consistent cross-domain approaches to risk. The data are cross-sectional 
and cannot provide causal explanations, however some inferences can be drawn. For 
some people, it seems possible that their risk-related decision making focuses on 
domain-specific risk issues. It could be that risks, and their associated costs and 
benefits, are arranged hierarchically, although this proposition is not tested in this 
research. For example, psychological well being might be considered the most 
important aspect of life and activities that involve risks will be taken to achieve the 
ultimate goal state. Risk in itself might not be an element of the decision process 
involved in choosing whether to participate in such activities. Rather, risk is the part of 
the process necessary to attain the outcome. These people might have consistent 
approaches to risk-related decision making such that they will take risks in some 
domains where they desire the returns, but not others where the outcomes are not 
valued. Alternatively, it could be that people do not have a consistent approach to 
domain-specific risk. These people will take risk when they believe it to be worthwhile. 
Their motivations and goals could be susceptible to the influence of situational factors. 
Thus their risk behaviour could appear to be inconsistent. 
In addition, the data reveal an influence on risk taking that is different from goal- 
directed behaviour. This influence is the illusion of control (Langer, 1975). The data 
showed that a number of respondents make what they believe to be a choice between 
risk taking and gambling. While they might be comfortable with taking risks, they do 
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not perceive themselves to be gamblers. These data raise an issue about the perceived 
controllability of risks and its subsequent influence on risk perception and risk taking. 
Risks thought to be uncontrollable can be perceived to be being greater than those that 
might be controlled (Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1980). However, the illusion of 
control has been shown to lead to reduced perceptions of risk and increased risk taking. 
It could be that some people are successful in their attempts to control risk, and reduce 
the overall level of risk in their decision making and behaviour. However it might be 
that people believe that they have more control that they in fact do have. Thus an 
alternative motivation for risk taking behaviour is an unrealistic belief in the amount of 
control over the risk situation, and a belief that the risk being taken is not as great as 
objective data could indicate. 
8.10 Chapter summary 
The qualitative data support the findings of the quantitative analysis and provided some 
additional information about risk-related decision making and behaviour. It can be seen 
from the qualitative data that there are several factors influencing respondents' 
perceptions of what constitutes risk and their risk-related choices. Several of 
participants reported having relatively consistent approaches to risk across each of the 
three domains measured (work, health and finance). Both risk seeking and risk averse 
preferences were represented, as in the quantitative data results. However, many 
respondents reported taking risks in one or two decision domains but not in all three. 
The data indicated that domain-specific risk taking is often motivated by goal-directed 
behaviour. Participants noted that they were willing to take, or accept, some risks in 
order to achieve certain goals. It is possible that, for some people, the types of risk and 
goals they focus on is consistent in the sense that their risk taking is targeted towards 
the attainment of goals in particular domains, but their risk preferences might not be 
consistent across domains. Alternatively, other people might take risks in some domains 
but not others because of the influence of variable, situational factors. These people's 
risk taking is domain-specific and inconsistent. 
In sum, the qualitative data provide a useful insight into the nature of domain-specific 
decisions about risk and the tradeoffs people make between risk and return. 
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Chapter 9 
Summary, implications and conclusions 
9.1 Chapter abstract 
This chapter presents the implications of the research and the overall conclusions. Three 
implications are discussed. First, the implications for the understanding of the concept 
of risk propensity are reviewed. It is suggested that the cross-domain approach is a 
useful framework for understanding risk preferences and propensity to take or avoid 
risks. Second, the implications for the ways that risk preferences and behaviour are 
understood in terms of the factors that motivate risk taking are reviewed. Third, the 
inferences for the management of risk in organisations are discussed. 
In the next section of this chapter, the results of this research were summarised to 
illustrate the main relationships between personality, decision preferences and risk 
propensity. The summary of the results and its derivation are discussed. 
The final section discusses the limitations of the study. It is suggested that the 
conceptualisation of risk propensity, the factors within and across domains that are 
associated with risk propensity, the measurement of each of these variables, and the 
sampling strategy could all have had an impact upon the results of the study. Future 
research directions are proposed. 
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9.2 Summary of the research 
The research presented in this thesis had three aims. 
" To examine whether risk preferences are consistent across different decision 
domains. 
" To assess the influence of biographical variables, personality factors, and cognitive 
and emotional decision preference variables on both the consistency of cross- 
domain risk preferences, and on domain-specific risk preferences. 
" To consider the implications for the relationship between cross-domain and within- 
domain risk preferences. 
The research aims shaped the development of the research in terms of both the 
conceptualisation and the measurement of risk propensity. The analyses presented and 
discussed in Chapter 7 showed that the aims of the research had been fulfilled. The 
results showed that people can be categorised as consistent or inconsistent across the 
domains of work, health and finance, and that there are significant differences between 
the groups in terms of personality characteristics and decision preferences. It was 
concluded that some people have consistent cross-domain risk preferences that are 
based in personality and characteristic decision preferences. The data showed that 
participants with consistent cross-domain risk preferences were risk averse when 
compared with the people who had inconsistent preferences across domains. It was 
suggested that consistent risk seeking is observed relatively infrequently. It seems 
possible that many people will choose to take, or accept, risks in the domains that offer 
the returns that the individual values rather than indiscriminately taking risks in all 
domains. 
The following section of this chapter discusses the implications of the research. A 
summary of the key factors that are associated with risk propensity is then presented. 
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9.3 Implications of the research 
The findings of the research have implications for the conceptualisation and 
measurement of risk preferences. First, the results suggest that the operationalisation of 
risk propensity could have an impact on the understanding of the concept. If risk 
preferences are to be measured in line with the Sitkin and Pablo definition of risk 
propensity, as a general tendency to take or avoid risks, then it seems that the degree of 
consistency of preferences across domains is the critical factor to measure rather than 
risk preferences in only one or two domains. There has been little empirical work 
published that has considered individual-level consistency of risk preferences in more 
than one decision domain. One exception is the work of Weber and Milliman (1997), 
which was discussed in Chapter 2. The research presented in this thesis fits in with the 
conclusion of Weber and Milliman that there is likely to be a personality-based 
construct of risk preference which is consistent across situations and decision domains, 
although the construct might not apply equally well to all individuals. Second, the 
results suggest that risk preferences in one domain could have some shared causes and 
some different causes from risk preferences in other domains. Risk preferences 
measured in one domain are not likely to give an accurate picture of risk preferences in 
all situations, unless the individual being measured has a personality-based approach to 
risk decisions, i. e. a consistent propensity towards risk. The majority of people, 
however, are inconsistent in their domain-specific risk preferences. These people will 
take risks in situations where they consider it worthwhile to accept a risk in order to 
attain a goal. Research that has operationalised risk propensity in terms of responses to 
decisions of one type only, such as hypothetical gambles, is likely to have captured 
some people with consistent risk preferences in their sample, however the risk 
preferences of many participants will not be generalisable to other domains. A summary 
representation of the main influences on risk preferences is discussed in the next 
section. 
The research has implications concerning the understanding of risk behaviour. In 
Chapter 1, two factors that can motivate risk taking were mentioned. The first 
motivation was the personality characteristic of sensation seeking, a facet of 
extroversion, that has been shown in numerous works by Zuckerman to be a significant 
predictor of risk taking in a number of decision domains. It seems that, for people with 
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strong needs for sensation, a choice might be made to take a risk because of the positive 
feelings and emotions, such as excitement, that risk taking entails. A second motivation 
for risk taking, also discussed in Chapter 1, was the relationship between risk and 
return. An important factor in decision making concerning whether to take, or accept, a 
risk, can be the expectations concerning the outcomes of risky behaviour. Frequently, 
people might take a chance because they believe or hope that a positive outcome will 
ensue. The data discussed in this study suggested that both of these motivations are 
likely to be important factors in understanding risk preferences and risk behaviour. 
Although sensation seeking was not measured directly, extroversion was found to be a 
significant predictor of domain-specific preferences for taking risks. The qualitative 
data reviewed in Chapter 8 demonstrated that people made choices about the risks that 
they would take in order to yield the returns they desired. For example, a number of the 
participants from the mountain climbing sample wrote about how they were aware of 
the dangers of climbing, yet the psychological benefits of their achievements were the 
reward for their risk. These data gave an interesting insight into the domain-specific 
nature of risk taking. 
A third motivation for risk taking was revealed by the analyses discussed in Chapter 7. 
This motivation is concerned with particular ways of approaching decision making. It 
was shown that whether people consistently think through the payoffs and costs of 
decision alternatives when making choices about risk was a significant factor associated 
with the degree of consistency of cross-domain risk preferences. The data showed that 
people who showed greater variability across domains tended to have greater variability 
in their approaches to thinking through the payoffs and costs of decisions than the 
consistent group. It could be that differing degrees of attention to situational 
information, and other types of situational influence, lead to greater inconsistency of 
risk preferences across domains. In addition, since the inconsistent participants were 
more risk taking than the people who had consistent cross-domain preferences and 
reported less attention to the payoffs and costs of choice alternatives, it might also be 
that the use of inconsistent, and at times heuristic, approaches to decision making could 
imply that there is a third factor that motivates risk taking which uses a different 
mechanism from either sensation seeking or the calculation of risk and return. It seems 
that some risk taking could be the result of using heuristics. That is, people could take 
risks because they are in effect blinkered by a lack of sensitivity to the differing 
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characteristics of risk: situations, and they might not be aware of the risks they are 
taking. The relationship between cognitive biases, which are inappropriately applied 
heuristics (Bazerman, 1994), and risk taking was discussed in Chapter 8 in relation to 
the data that suggested illusion of control could be a factor influencing decision making. 
The research of Gollwittzer and Kinney (1989) demonstrated that people who believe 
they are more in control of events than objective data would suggest were more likely to 
take risks than people who had a more realistic appraisal of risk. This relationship 
between the use of heuristics and risk taking could have important implications for the 
understanding of risk propensity and for the management of risk taking. It could be that 
people who use heuristics might sometimes take risks that they are not aware of 
engaging in because they have not considered the pertinent situational information. 
The consistency of risk preferences and the degree of consideration of payoffs and costs 
of choice alternatives raises an interesting issue about the understanding of risk 
preferences and risk behaviour with respect to the expected utility theory approach 
discussed in Chapter 1. In one respect, the data supported the proposition of the theory 
that there is a general tendency towards risk aversion. The data do not suggest that 
people are entirely rational in their decisions about risk. It does not seem likely that 
people are seeking to maximise the utility of each risk decision if they take heuristic 
approaches to their choices, particularly if decisions are influenced by cognitive biases. 
The issue of cross-domain consistency also raises the question of whether it is rational 
to take the same approach to risk decisions in each situation. It could be that sensitivity 
to the differing demands of situations is more rational than taking the same type of 
decisions all the time. However, it would seem to be more rational to be continuously 
risk averse, as the data indicate might be the case, than to be continuously risk seeking. 
For example, it would be more sensible to drive at 30mph on all roads than at 70mph. In 
sum, the data illustrated the subjective and individual nature of risk preferences and 
risk-related decision making. 
In addition to the conceptual implications of the research, there are three implications 
for managers in risk sensitive and safety critical industries. First, the relationship 
between personality and risk preference suggests that there are stable individual 
differences for some people that influence whether those people have consistent 
tendencies to take or avoid risks. The application of appropriate placement tools could 
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be an important element in the risk management process to ensure an optimal fit 
between the risk profile of an individual and the risk profile of their job. Second, there 
is an issue concerning the communication of risks within organisations. Weber and 
Milliman (1997) noted that if behaviour is associated with perceptions then cognitive 
processes need to be targeted by risk management programmes. Conversely, if 
preferences are associated with behaviour, then emotions should be targeted. This 
research suggests that perceptions, preferences, cognitions and emotions are all 
important components of risk-related decision making. A successful risk management 
programme could aim to appeal to each of these factors, as well as providing support or 
appropriate incentives and control for people with strong dispositional risk orientations. 
Third, the finding that risk preferences differ across domains implies that risk 
management strategies are not likely to be effective if they are static and rigid. A 
flexible approach to risk management that takes into account both the differences 
between individuals and the differences between risks in different domains could have a 
greater chance of managing risk effectively than an approach that assumes little 
variance across individuals or situations. In addition, insight into whether people have 
domain-specific but consistent risk preferences or domain-specific, inconsistent risk 
preferences could provide managers with valuable information concerning individual- 
level potential for risk seeking and risk aversion. Interviews with the traders in the 
sample carried out as part of the wider data collection process illustrated that need for a 
greater understanding of individual-level tendencies to take or avoid risk. For example, 
one trader reported being risk averse. He was aware that he did not like to take risk and 
that he needed encouragement and support from his manager in order to be comfortable 
taking the types of risk necessary to generate financial returns. A second example is a 
trader who reported taking too much risk when he was in a situation where he felt 
confident and had experienced gains. He was aware that this was a habitual approach to 
risk that was sub-optimal for both his own profit and loss account, and for the 
organisation. This trader was a senior manager who had considerable autonomy and had 
the responsibility for training new traders. The inexperienced traders on this desk 
reported wanting to trade in the same style as their manager. Shortly after the research 
project was completed, this trader was fired for losing a huge amount of money. A risk 
management strategy that recognised his tendency to take sometimes inappropriate 
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volumes of risk and enabled peers to discuss his trading strategy could have proved 
useful. 
9.4 A summary of the relationships between personality, decision variables and 
risk preferences 
The results of this research led to the development of a summary representation of the 
factors that are associated with risk propensity, shown in figure 9.1, below. 
Figure 9.1: A representation of factors associated with risk preferences 
Attention to 
Personality 
payoffs and costs 
Consistency of 
risk preferences 
Reference points 
Perceived 
situational risk 
The summary of the data shown above is derived from the results of this research. The 
representation was developed from the data which suggested that the concept of risk 
propensity encompasses a range of risk preferences that vary from consistent across 
situations to domain-specific risk preferences that can be inconsistent and situationally 
variable. Although the stability of individual level cross-domain consistency and 
inconsistency was not measured, it is possible that, for some people, risk preferences are 
also consistent over time. People who have the profile that is associated with consistent 
preferences, for example low neuroticism and low openness, and who experience 
significant life events that lead to changes in a few key aspects of personality or 
significant risk-related events that lead to the development of enduring changes in risk- 
related decision processes, could be relatively consistent in their risk preferences across 
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situations, yet not have stable risk preferences over time. It is also likely that, for many 
people, risk seeking declines with age. It could be possible that a person might have a 
consistent propensity towards risk, but the direction of preferences could change from 
risk seeking to risk aversion over a lifetime. Where risk preferences are not consistent 
across domains, it is possible that people could have domain specific risk preferences 
that are relatively consistent. For example, a mountain climber might prefer consistently 
to take risks associated with climbing mountains and to avoid risks associated with their 
personal finances. For other people, however, risk preferences could be inconsistent 
both across domains and across time. 
It is proposed that there are four variables that influence risk propensity, as 
conceptualised in terms of the degree of consistency of risk preferences. The first 
variable is personality. The data showed that people who had low scores in the traits of 
neuroticism, extroversion, openness and a high score in agreeableness were associated 
with consistent approaches to risk. It was suggested in the discussion of these results 
that this pattern of traits could lead to emotional stability, low levels of sensitivity to the 
changing demands and characteristics of risk situations, and hence a relatively 
consistent set of risk preferences that can be considered to be an individual propensity 
towards risk. It needs to be acknowledged that the sample did not include many 
participants who were consistently risk seeking. The majority of people with consistent 
risk preferences were risk averse. It could be that the shape of the personality profile of 
the consistent risk seeker is different. However, it is suggested that the principle of a 
trait-based set of influences on risk propensity applies whether an individual has a 
propensity to seek risk or to avoid risk. 
In this summary representation, personality is proposed to influence risk preferences in 
three ways. First, evidence from the regression analyses indicated that both personality 
traits and decision preferences predict risk preferences. It could be that there is a direct 
relationship between personality and risk preferences. That is, personality traits shape 
whether people prefer to take or avoid risks by providing a foundation for basic 
characteristics that enable people to enjoy or tolerate risk and uncertainty, or the 
reverse, for example through the presence or absence of trait anxiety and sensation 
seeking. The work of Nicholson, Fenton-O'Creevy, Soane and Willman (2000) showed 
that the profile of a risk seeker was high scores in extroversion and openness combined 
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with low scores in neuroticism, agreeableness and conscientiousness. Where situations 
allow the enactment of personality-based preferences, it is possible that people will act 
in accordance with their preferences. The idea that a particular set of personality 
characteristics influences the consistency of risk preferences is similar to the work of 
Baumeister and Tice (1988) into metatraits. The authors describe a metatrait as "the trait 
of having versus not having a trait. It refers to whether a given trait dimension or 
construct can be used to describe a particular personality ... Untraited 
individuals may be 
susceptible to fluctuating states and situational manipulation" (p 571). 
The conceptualisation `is based upon the work of Allport (1937) and Bem and Allen 
(1974) who suggested that traits do not all describe people equally well. Baumeister and 
Tice suggested that people can be described as traited or untraited. For example, if a 
person is assessed using a personality questionnaire and their results show strong 
directional preferences for each trait, they can be described as having metatraits. 
Alternatively, if a person shows no strong tendencies for any trait they can be described 
as untraited. The former person can be hypothesised to behave strongly in accordance 
with their personality traits. The latter can be expected to show cross-situational 
variance. The corollary is that traited individuals are more likely to have consistent risk 
preferences and untraited individuals are more likely to have inconsistent risk-related 
decision processes. 
There has been little subsequent development of the work of Baumeister and Tice. The 
theory has not been applied to the research described in this thesis in its entirety. 
However, the theory of metatraits is one potentially useful way to approach issues 
concerning personality structure. The work of Baumeister and Tice was not developed 
in association with a particular model of personality, however the theory can be applied 
to highlight differences between people who are have strong sets of personality traits 
and people who do, for example by considering inter-item variance. The differences 
between people with respect to personality traits could be associated with consistent, 
trait-based approaches to risk or inconsistent, situation-based risk preferences. 
There are two other ways that personality could influence risk preferences, as 
represented in figure 9.1. Personality could influence risk preferences by leading 
individuals to self-select into environments and jobs that suit their risk dispositions. 
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Hence, a person who does not like risk might choose a job with little uncertainty in a 
structured, hierarchical organisation. In addition, it is possible that personality 
influences risk preferences via the decision making process. The three decision 
preferences variables in the study that were shown to be associated with risk propensity 
were attention to payoffs and costs, reference points and perceived risk. The 
relationships between personality, decision preferences and risk taking are discussed 
below. 
The data in this research showed that people with consistent risk preferences tended to 
think through the payoffs and costs associated with decision choices. These people were 
risk averse when compared with the participants with inconsistent cross-domain 
preferences. It could be that consistently risk averse people have a cautious approach to 
risk and wish to consider information carefully before making choices, even though 
their choices tend to be the same in different situations. This proposition is similar to the 
work of Zuckerman (1979a) who found that people who were low in sensation seeking 
and risk averse were more likely to consider risk information than people with high 
sensation seeking tendencies. The process of thinking through information led them to 
support their preferences for avoiding risk. People who were inconsistent in their cross- 
domain choices tended to be less consistent in their approach to situational information 
and, overall, to be less likely to think through the payoffs and costs of decision 
alternatives. It was proposed that in addition to having some trait-based dispositions 
towards risk, these people might also have heuristics that are associated with their 
preferences towards risk. These heuristics could take several forms. For example, the 
people with inconsistent preferences preferred to take risks significantly more than the 
consistent group. These people could have a different set of underlying dispositions, e. g. 
sensation seeking, that influence characteristic approaches to risk taking, but which only 
engage with some risk situations, e. g. sports, not work. It might also be that heuristics 
take the form of cognitive biases such as illusion of control (Langer, 1975). That is, 
people believe they are more in control of a situation than objective information would 
suggest, and take more risk than might be appropriate while perhaps not being aware 
that they are doing so. Another potentially relevant form of cognitive bias is optimistic 
bias (Weinstein, 1980), that is the tendency to believe that positive events are more 
likely to be encountered than average. Zuckerman (1979a) suggested that sensation 
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seeking people pay selective attention to information that relates to their optimistic, 
opportunity focused ideas about risk. 
The data from this study showed that cognitive and emotional aspects of the reference 
point between loss and gain are related to inconsistent risk preferences. It seems that 
whether people believe themselves to be in a situation of loss or gain, and the associated 
negative or positive affect, influences whether they will prefer to take a risk or avoid a 
risk. It is suggested that if people have consistent perceptions and emotions associated 
with whether they are in situations of loss or gain, their risk preferences are more likely 
to be consistent than people with varying reference points. It could be that personality 
shapes relatively consistent perceptions of loss and gain. For example, the Costa and 
McCrae (1991) NEO PI-R measure of personality assesses optimism and pessimism, 
which could affect reference point-related perceptions.. The precise relationship between 
the domains of loss, gain and whether people take or avoid risks is complex, and not 
represented in this model. However, it is proposed that inconsistent reference points are 
associated with inconsistent risk preferences. Reference points could influence 
preferences in the ways that prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) proposed. 
That is, loss can lead to risk seeking and gain can lead to risk aversion. Qualitative data 
from this research, and the research of other authors, indicated that a factor that could 
moderate the relationship between loss, gain and preferences is emotion. It could be that 
when people are in the domain of gain and are experiencing positive affect they take 
risks perhaps because they are more confident, or because they feel that they have some 
slack that can absorb some degree of loss. Mittal and Ross (1998) also found that 
positive affect could increase risk taking. The nature of these relationships could be a 
subject of future research. 
The third factor that is proposed to influence risk preferences is perceived risk. The 
results of the analyses showed that consistent risk preferences were associated with 
consistent risk perceptions. The results of the data analysis showed that people who 
preferred to take risk perceived there to be risk in their environment. In contrast, people 
who preferred to avoid risk perceived there to be little risk in their environment. This is 
contrary to the prediction of Sitkin and Pablo (1992) that risk perception and risk 
preferences are related inversely, i. e. people who take risks do so because they perceive 
low levels of risk and vice versa. The positive relationship between risk perception and 
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risk preference observed in this research could be due to selection into environments 
that fit in with personality-based risk preferences. People with preferences for low 
levels of risk might choose to be in environments where they perceive the risks to be 
low, and the reverse could be true for people who prefer high levels of risk. 
Further, the data showed that people who have inconsistent risk preferences were likely 
to have inconsistent risk perceptions. Variable risk perceptions could be associated with 
a number of variables. It might be that people without strong directional personality- 
based risk preferences are more influenced by situational factors than traits, and thus 
their perceptions vary according to the characteristics of each risk situation. It could be 
that risk perception might be dependent upon the cognitive and emotional appraisals of 
loss and gain, and upon the evaluation of the choice alternatives associated with each 
risk decision. Again, the precise nature of the relationships between the variables that 
influence risk perception and increase the inconsistency of perception could be an area 
for future research. It is clear, however, that there are several decision preference 
variables that are associated with consistent and inconsistent risk preferences, and that 
these factors are likely to moderate the relationship between personality- and risk 
preferences. In addition, although not tested in this research, it is possible that the 
strength of the relationship between personality and decision making preferences varies 
according to the nature of the individual's personality profile. That is, people without 
the trait pattern that is associated with consistent risk propensity could have weaker 
associations between personality and decision making preferences. 
9.5 Limitations and directions for future research 
The conclusions and implications of this research must be considered within the context 
of the limitations of the study. There are three key issues that could have influenced the 
results: the conceptualisation of risk propensity, the measure and the sample. 
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9.5.1 The conceptualisation of risk propensity 
In this research, risk propensity was conceptualised as the degree of consistency of 
cross-domain risk preferences. It was suggested that people with consistent preferences 
across different decision domains, whether their preferences were for taking risk or 
avoiding risk, have a general risk propensity. Conversely, people who have inconsistent 
preferences across domains have domain-specific risk preferences which might 
constitute consistent preferences within particular domains, but which are not consistent 
across domains. These people do not have a generalisable risk propensity. It has been 
suggested in the above section of this chapter that risk propensity, or lack thereof, is 
influenced by personality, attention to payoffs and costs of choice alternatives, cognitive 
and emotional aspects of loss and gain, and perceived risk. The conceptualisation of risk 
propensity used in this thesis was developed both from a review of the relevant 
theoretical and empirical works of other authors, and from the data gathered in this 
research. 
The approach to risk propensity taken in this work raises two issues. First, it could be 
that this conceptualisation of risk propensity has focused on the issue of cross-domain 
consistency rather than the issue of the direction of risk propensity, that is, whether 
people prefer to take or avoid risks, or are consistently moderate. It could also be that 
the focus on risk preferences, although suggested by Sitkin and Pablo (1992) to be an 
expression of risk propensity, rather than reported or actual risk behaviour has captured 
preferences for risk that might not be enacted. The data indicated that risk preferences, 
and the degree of consistency of risk preferences, are associated with biographical and 
personality factors that are known to be valid constructs. However, it seems that the use 
of the constructs of risk preferences and their degree of consistency has been a useful 
way to capture risk propensity and individual-level variation therein. It could be that the 
relative number of consistent risk seeking, risk averse and inconsistent people is 
relatively representative of the population. Moreover, since the relationship between 
risk propensity and personality was demonstrated, it seems likely that people will act in 
accordance with their propensity is at least some situations. This issue is discussed 
further in the next section. Second, it could be that the pattern of relationships between 
the variables and risk propensity shown in figure 9.1 is different from that represented. 
For example, it could be that the level of perceived risk influences the direction and 
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degree of consistency of risk preferences, rather than the other way round, particularly 
for those people who do not have strong trait bases for their risk propensity. The 
representation of the research results in figure 9.1 does have a conceptual basis in the 
work of other authors, notably Sitkin and Pablo (1992), however the direction of 
relationships could be an issue for future research. 
9.5.2 The measure 
The development of the measure has been discussed in detail in the method chapter. The 
measure was developed using standard procedures for questionnaire design. Measures 
that have been used previously formed the bases for items as far as possible. An 
established short measure of personality was incorporated in the questionnaire to 
measure personality effectively. 
A new measure was developed for use in this research for two reasons. First, although 
there are some measures that purport to measure risk propensity, the majority of 
measures have focused on risk preferences or reported risk taking in only one decision 
domain, as discussed in Chapter 2. The research that has considered risk preferences in 
more than one domain has tended to use different measures in different domains e. g. 
Weber and Milliman (1997). The aim of this research was to measure the same 
constructs across different domains to examine both cross-domain risk preferences and 
domain-specific risk preferences. The second reason for the development of a new 
measure was to enable the measurement of a particular set of constructs. The foundation 
for the measure was the work of Sitkin and Pablo. Operationalisation of their model of 
risk propensity in published works has varied with respect to the factors measured that 
have been suggested to predict risk propensity, as discussed in Chapter 5. This measure 
was developed to incorporate the key factors of risk preferences and risk perception that 
are in the Sitkin and Pablo (1992) model, emotional and cognitive aspects of reference 
points that relate to whether an individual is in the domain of loss or gain from the work 
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) which is also cited by Sitkin and Pablo (1992), 
emotional and cognitive approaches to decision making, domain-specific aspects of 
decision making, as well as biographical variables and personality factors. The 
combination of these variables was an attempt to develop an effective way to fulfil the 
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aims of the research. The relationships between the new variables, biographical and 
personality factors indicated that the measure had some degree of validity. The data 
gathered using the measure did support the hypotheses derived from previous 
theoretical and empirical work. 
Although there were reasons for the construction of the questionnaire that was used in 
this research, the development of a new measure can be problematic. First, the measure 
focuses on the concept of risk preference. The choice of risk preference as the key 
variable was driven by the work of Sitkin and Pablo. It is possible that, while risk 
preference is a valid concept that is subject to individual differences and associated with 
personality, the relationship between risk preference and risk behaviour is variable and 
at times weak. In some contexts it is likely that there are strong constraints upon 
individual behaviour. For example, many employees are expected to comply with 
stringent rules concerning acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. There might be little 
opportunity for the exercise of individual preferences within the context of managerial 
and organisational control systems. It could be argued that management systems can be 
strong enough to minimise any individual level variability in risk preferences. It is 
possible that in some departments of some organisations this might be true. However, 
there have been enough high profile risk management disasters, such as the collapse of 
Barings bank, to suggest that risk management systems fail and that for every headline 
disaster there could be many more, similar smaller-scale situations known only to 
insiders. In addition, the results of analyses showed that there was significant variability 
in the risk preference variables, and that a significant predictor of risk preference was 
personality. As mentioned in the above section, the relationships between risk 
preference and personality suggest that there are also likely to be relationships between 
risk preference and risk behaviour in some situations. 
A second issue is the relationship between the data gathered using the measure 
developed for this research and the data from other previously used measures of risk 
preference. As discussed above, the questionnaire was derived from several theoretical 
and empirical sources. A practical consideration when developing a survey instrument 
of this kind is that the questionnaire should not appear to participants to be too long. It 
was hoped that this aim was achieved. However, the addition of items that have been 
used in other authors' published work could have enabled additional analysis. It was 
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noted in Chapters 2 and 3 that many authors have not considered the consistency of 
individual-level risk preferences. Rather, there has been a tendency to consider sample 
data at the aggregate level to conclude that risk preferences are variable. It was 
suggested in the literature review that if individual level data had been analysed, it 
might have been possible to identify individuals with consistent risk preferences. Future 
research could use the key work, health and finance items developed for this research as 
well as items that have been used in published research, such as the well-cited Asian flu 
problem of Tversky and Kahneman (1986). This would enable the relationship between 
consistent and inconsistent risk preferences and framing effects to be examined and 
discussed in relation to published research. 
Third, the variables that were measured in this research were limited to several key 
concepts derived largely from the work of Sitkin and Pablo (1992) and Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). There was only one item to measure each of the key concepts in each 
domain. While the results showed that the measure was able to discriminate between 
people with different preferences, it is very likely that each construct comprises a 
number of sub-components. The development of scales to measure each key construct 
could be a way of achieving finer discrimination between individuals and more effective 
prediction of cross-domain and domain-specific risk preferences. 
Fourth, the measure focused on the three decision domains of work, health and personal 
finances. These domains were chosen both to reflect three important areas in 
participants' lives and to capture variability in risk preferences. Future research could 
take a similar approach, taking into the account the issues noted above, and assess risk 
preferences in more domains, for example social risk taking. 
9.5.3 The sample 
The distribution of risk preferences within the sample was skewed. The sample did not 
include as many people who had consistent preferences to take risk as people who had 
consistent preferences for avoiding risk. This pattern of results fits in with other 
research (e. g. MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986; Nicholson, Fenton-O'Creevy, Soane & 
Willman, 2000). However, it is not clear whether the sample in this research is 
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representative of the population, and there are more people with consistently risk averse 
preferences than with risk seeking preferences, or whether the sampling strategy did not 
capture enough people with consistent preferences for risk taking. It could be that the 
personality and decision preference profile of people with consistent risk preferences 
developed in this research does not apply equally well to people with consistent 
preferences for taking risk rather than those who are consistently risk averse. 
Future research could extend the sampling strategy to encompass participants from a 
wider range of industry and special interest groups. A larger number of participants 
from a more diverse population could better enable the assessment of the distribution of 
risk preferences than the current sample. 
9.6 Summary of the research conclusions 
The research that has been described in this thesis led to the development of the 
following eight concluding points. 
41 Both the degree of consistency of cross-domain risk preferences and the direction of 
domain-specific risk preferences are subject to individual level variation that is 
associated with personality traits and characteristic risk-related decision processes. 
" People with low trait neuroticism, extroversion and openness, and high trait 
agreeableness are more likely to have consistent cross-domain risk preferences than 
people without this personality profile. 
" Conscientiousness was associated with consistent cross-domain risk preferences, but 
is also likely to lead to targeted, focused risk taking in some situations, for example 
where the individual has chosen to accept a risk in order to attain a goal. 
" Variation in risk preferences in the work, health and finance domains is associated 
with differences in the factors that influence risk preferences in each domain. 
" Domain-specific risk preferences are not generalisable from one domain to another 
for people who do not have a consistent risk propensity. 
" Individual level variation in both consistency of cross-domain risk preferences and 
'domain-specific risk preferences suggests that risk management processes should 
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take account of both individual risk preferences and the variable nature of risk 
situations. 
"A summary for representing the factors associated with consistent and inconsistent 
decision preferences was developed. It was proposed that the influences on risk 
propensity are personality, the consistency degree of attention to situational 
information, the consistency of position in relation to cognitive and emotional 
reference points, and the consistency of perceived risk in each situation. 
9 Future research could expand upon this work through the development of a more 
comprehensive questionnaire measure and wider sampling. 
9.7 Chapter summary 
Chapter 9 has reviewed the implications of the research. It was suggested that there are 
implications for the conceptualisation and measurement of risk propensity, and that the 
concept of the degree of consistency of cross-domain risk preferences is a useful way to 
approach risk propensity. It was noted that for many people, risk preferences are not 
consistent across domains. Rather, these people have domain-specific risk preferences 
that are not generalisable from one domain to another, although the domains in which 
they choose to take risks might be relatively consistent. Awareness of individual-level 
risk propensity could be a useful part of the risk management process. 
A representation of the key the influences on risk propensity was presented. It was 
suggested that risk propensity is associated with personality, the consistency of the 
degree of attention to situational information, the consistency of cognitive and 
emotional aspects loss and gain, and the consistency of perceived risk. 
Several limitations of the study were acknowledged. Limitations included the three 
domains that were measured and the relatively small number of items used to measure 
each of the constructs in the questionnaire. However, it was noted that the questionnaire 
has enabled the aims of the research to be met. The addition of more items and more 
domains could be an avenue for further research into the nature of risk propensity. The 
chapter ends with a summary of the research conclusions. 
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Appendix 1 
Scales from which domain specific 
variables were developed 
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Error risk taking items 
These items were used to form the items in the work section of the questionnaire. 
The error risk taking scale from Rybowiak, Garst, Frese and Batinic (1996, 
unpublished; 1999 published) comprises the following items. 
1. If one wants to achieve at work, one has to risk making mistakes. 
2. It is better to take the risk of making mistakes than to "sit on one's behind". 
3. To get on with my work, I gladly put up with things that can go wrong. 
4. I'd prefer to err than to do nothing at all. 
Answers are in the form of a five-point Likert scale. Participants rated how applicable 
each statement was to them. The response range was from `totally' to `not at all'. 
Health protection items 
These items were used to form the items in the health section of the questionnaire. 
The Moorman scale (1990) measures health motivation, that is, motivation to perform 
health behaviours. Items are answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1, none of the 
time to 7, all of the time. 
1.1 try to prevent health problems before I feel any symptoms. 
2. I am concerned about health hazards and try to take action to prevent them. 
3.1 try to protect myself against health hazards I hear about. 
4. I don't worry about health hazards until they become a problem for me or someone 
close to me. 
5. There are so many things that can hurt you these days, I'm not going to worry about 
them. 
6. I often worry about the health hazards I hear about, but don't do anything about 
them. 
7.1 don't take any action against health hazards I hear about until I know I have a 
problem. 
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8. I'd rather enjoy life than try to make sure I'm not exposing myself to a health 
hazard. 
Lifebalance items 
These items were used to form items in the health section of the questionnaire. 
The Moorman and Matulich (1993) Lifebalance scale comprises three items. Items are 
answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1, none of the time to 7, all of the time. 
1. Get enough rest and sleep. 
2. Reduce stress and anxiety. 
3. Maintain a balance between "work" and "play". 
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Appendix 2a 
Questionnaire information for participants 
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Risk Questionnaire 
Aims of this research 
" To understand why people take some risks but not other risks. 
9 To study perceptions of risks and how these perceptions affect behaviour. 
About the questionnaire 
" This questionnaire asks you about risks related to your job, your health and your 
personal finances. The questionnaire will take about 10-20 minutes to complete. 
" In this questionnaire, "risk" means a choice where there are possible negative 
outcomes you prefer to avoid. 
9 There are no right or wrong answers and there are no trick questions. 
" Most of the questions ask you to show your opinion by circling a number. For 
example, if you think there is a lot of risk in your job, you would answer as follows: 
9. How much risk is involved in your Much risk Little risk 
job? ©2345 
What happens to the answers? 
" This questionnaire is completely confidential. Only the researchers will see your 
answers. 
" No individuals will be identified in any reported results of this questionnaire and no 
information will be passed on to anybody else in a way which would identify any 
individual participants. 
Thank you very much for your help. 
You can detach and keep this sheet. If you require further information, please contact: 
Emma Soane 
Research Officer, 
London Business School, 
Sussex Place, 
London. 
NW14SA 
0171 262 5050 
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Appendix 2b 
Biographical and demographic information items 
for the academic, chess player and mountain 
climber sample groups 
256 
General Information 
This section asks for some basic information about you. The information will not be 
used for any other purpose or passed on to anyone not involved in this research project. 
1. Are you (please circle): Male Female 
2. How old are you? 
3. Please circle the appropriate number showing your highest level of education. 
GCSE/O-Level 6 
A-level 5 
Diploma/HND 4 
Degree 3 
Masters 2 
PhD 1 
4. What is your job title? 
5. What is the business of the company you work for?, 
6. How long have you held this job, or this type of post, including with other companies 
if applicable? 
7. How many levels are there between you and the most senior person in your branch? 
For example, if you report to a supervisor who reports to the senior manager, there are 2 
levels. 
8. In your view, what are the risks involved in your job?, 
9. Are there any activities you participate in outside work that you think are risky? For 
example, rock climbing, smoking more than 20 cigarettes a day. 
10. What was your annual income over the last year, including any bonuses and 
overtime (in £ sterling)? Please circle one number. 
Less than 20,000 5 
20,000 - 29,999 4 
30,000 - 39,999 3 
40,000 - 49,000 2 
More than 50,000 1 
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Appendix 2c 
Biographical and demographic information 
items for the fire fighter sample group 
258 
General Information 
1. Your candidate number : 
2. Your age: 
3. Are you (please circle): Male Female 
4. Please circle the number which shows your highest level of education only. 
GCSEJO-Level 6 
A-level 5 
Diploma/HND 4 
Degree 3 
Masters 2 
PhD 1 
5. In your view, what are the risks involved in working as a fire fighter? 
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Appendix 2d 
Biographical and demographic information 
items for the trader sample group 
260 
General Information 
1. Are you (please circle): 
2. Your age, 
3. Please circle the appropriate number showing your highest level of education. 
GCSEJO-Level 6 
A-level 5 
Diploma/HND 4 
Degree 3 
Masters 2 
PhD 1 
4. Job title 
5. How long have you been working for your present employer? 
6. How long have you held this job, or this type of post, including with other 
employers if applicable? 
7. How many different employers/companies have you worked for in your career? 
(Please exclude casual jobs) 
8. How many times in your career have you made a radical shift between job 
functions/areas? (Write "0" if you have worked in the same area throughout your 
career, or the appropriate number) 
9. How likely are you to make a major career change in the next three years? 
Please circle one number 
Very likely 5 
Quite likely 4 
Not sure 3 
Quite unlikely 2 
Very unlikely 1 
10. How many levels are there between you and your CEO? (For example, if you 
report to the CEO, put 1, if your manager reports to the CEO put 2 etc. ) 
11. What is your annual income, including bonuses and overtime (in £ sterling)? 
Please circle one number 
<20,000 6 
20,000 - 49,999 5 
50,000 - 99,999 4 
100,000 - 299,000 3 
300,000 - 499,000 2 
>500,000 1 
Male Female 
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Risk questionnaire 
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Risk and Work 
This section asks you questions about your work and work-related attitudes and 
behaviours. A risk is carrying out a decision which could result in a negative outcome. 
1. Have you taken any risks in the last few weeks and months at work which had 
significant negative or positive outcomes? Please note the risks and their outcomes in 
the space below. Use the extra space at the end of this section if needed. 
If you had no risks to note, please go to question 4. 
2. Have the risks mentioned above Not at all Yes, signtficantly 
changed the way you manage risk at 12345 
work? 
3. Have these events made you more or More cautious Less cautious 
less cautious in your behaviour at work? 12345 
4. How do you feel about your job at the Very negative Very positive 
moment? 12345 
5. Compared with the last few months, is Much worse Much better 
your current general work situation: 12345 
6. When making important decisions Very rarely Very often 
about risks at work, how frequently do 12345 
you think through all the payoffs and 
costs of each alternative? 
7. When making important decisions Very rarely Very often 
about risks at work, how frequently are 12345 
you influenced by your feelings, or 
emotions? 
8. How much risk is involved in your Much risk Little risk 
job? 12345 
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9. Do you prefer to take risks or avoid Take risks Avoid risks 
risks when making decisions at work? 1 234 5 
10. This section asks you about your attitudes and behaviour concerning making 
mistakes at work. 
a) To achieve at work, I have to risk Strongly Strongly 
making mistakes. disagree agree 
1 234 5 
b) When making an important decision, I Strongly Strongly 
would rather wait and see than risk disagree agree 
making a mistake. 1 234 5 
c) I feel apprehensive that I might make a Strongly Strongly 
mistake at work. disagree agree 
1 234 5 
d) To get on with my work, I am happy to Strongly Strongly 
put up with things that can go wrong. disagree agree 
1 234 5 
e) I avoid the risk of making a mistake as Strongly Strongly 
often as possible. disagree agree 
1 234 5 
11. This section asks you about your attitudes and behaviours in relation to meeting 
your personal targets at work. 
a) I do whatever it takes, including taking Strongly Strongly 
risks, to achieve targets. disagree agree 
1 234 5 
b) I prefer not to reach targets than to take Strongly Strongly 
risks. disagree agree 
1 234 5 
c) I feel apprehensive when I take risks to Strongly Strongly 
achieve work-related goals. disagree agree 
1 234 5 
d) Risk is part of the excitement and Strongly Strongly 
interest of my work, disagree agree 
1 234 5 
e) I meet almost all my goals at work Strongly Strongly 
without significant risk to me or the disagree agree 
organisation I work for. 1 234 5 
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Risk and Health 
This section asks you questions about your health and health-related attitudes and 
behaviours. Here. a risk is a carrying out a decision which could have a negative 
outcome. 
1. Have you taken any risks in the last few weeks and months with your health which 
had significant negative or positive outcomes? Please note the risks and their outcomes 
in the space below. Use the extra space at the end of this section if needed. 
If you had no risks to note, please go to question 4. 
2. Have the risks mentioned above changed Not at all Yes, stgn ftcantly 
the way you manage health risks? 12345 
3. Have these events made you more or less More cautious Less cautious 
cautious about your health? 12345 
4. How do you feel about your health at the Very negative Very positive 
moment? 11 12345 
5. Compared with the last few months, is 
your current general state of health: 
6. When making important decisions about 
risks to your health, how frequently do you 
think through all the pros and cons of each 
alternative? 
Much worse Much better 
12345 
Very rarely Very often 
12345 
7. When making important decisions about 
risks to your health, how frequently are you 
influenced by your feelings, or emotions? 
8. How much risk to your health does your 
lifestyle involve? 
9. Do you prefer to take risks or avoid risks 
when making decisions about your health? 
Very rarely Very often 
12345 
Much risk Little risk 
12345 
Take risks Avoid risks 
12345 
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10. This section asks you about your health protection-related attitudes and behaviours. 
a) To do what I want to in life, I have to Strongly Strongly 
expose myself to things which can be health disagree agree 
hazards. 1 23 45 
b) My health is too important to me to put it Strongly Strongly 
at risk voluntarily. disagree agree 
1 23 45 
c) I am apprehensive about health hazards Strongly Strongly 
and take action to prevent them. disagree agree 1 23 45 
d) I'd rather enjoy life than spend time Strongly Strongly 
trying to avoid health hazards. disagree agree 
1 23 45 
e) I try to prevent health problems before I Strongly Strongly 
feel any symptoms. disagree agree 
1 23 45 
11. This section asks you about the time you spend at work and leisure. 
a) The best way to get my work done is for Strongly Strongly 
work to have top priority in my life. disagree agree 1 23 45 
b) I feel spending a lot of time at work is Strongly Strongly 
losing out on a full life. disagree agree 
1 23 45 
c) I am apprehensive if I know I need to spend Strongly Strongly 
a lot of time doing things unrelated to work in disagree agree 
the evenings or at weekends. 1 23 
45 
d) I get satisfaction from working long hours. Strongly Strongly disagree agree 
1 23 45 
e) I rarely take work home in the evenings or Strongly Strongly 
at weekends. disagree agree 
1 23 45 
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Risk and Personal Finances 
This section asks you questions about your personal finances and your personal finance- 
related attitudes and behaviours. Here. risk means carrying out a financial decision 
which could have a negative outcome. 
1. Have you taken any risks in the last few weeks and months with your personal 
finances which had significant negative or positive outcomes? Please note the risks and 
their outcomes in the space below. Use the extra space at the end of this section if 
needed. 
If you had no risks to note, please go to question 4. 
2. Have the risks mentioned above changed Not at all Yes, sign! cantly 
the way you manage your personal finances? 12345 
3. Have these events made you more or less More cautious Less cautious 
cautious about your financial management? 12345 
4. How do you feel about your current Very negative Very positive 
financial situation? 12345 
5. Compared with the last few months, is Much worse Much better 
your current general financial situation: 12345 
6. When making important decisions about Very rarely Very often 
personal finance risks, how frequently do 12345 
you think through all the payoffs and costs of 
each alternative? 
7. When making important decisions about Very rarely Very often 
risks to your personal finances how 12345 
frequently are you influenced by your 
feelings, or emotions? 
8. How much risk is involved in your Much risk Little risk 
personal finances? 12345 
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9. Do you prefer to take risks or avoid risks Take risks Avoid risks 
when making decisions about your personal 1234 5 
finances? 
10. This section asks you about your attitudes and behaviours with regard to use of your 
money. 
a) I take opportunities to enjoy my money Strongly Strongly 
now, rather than in the future. disagree agree 
1234 5 
b) I prefer to always leave a good proportion Strongly Strongly 
of my money in my account, or save it, than disagree agree 
risk or spend much of my money. 1234 5 
c) I feel apprehensive if I know I'm likely to Strongly Strongly 
overspend. disagree agree 
1234 5 
d) I enjoy spending most of my disposable Strongly Strongly 
income. disagree agree 
1234 5 
e) I systematically divide my income into Strongly Strongly 
spending and saving money. disagree agree 
1234 5 
11) This section asks you about gambling-related attitudes and behaviours. 
If you never gamble please tick the box [ 
Then continue to the next set of questions. 
If you do gamble with your own money, this question asks about gambling such as betting 
on racing, or making investments where there is uncertainty about the risk and reward ratio. 
a) Gambling is an opportunity for me to have Strongly Strongly 
fa n, disagree agree 
1234 5 
b) Gambling is just a waste of money. Strongly Strongly 
disagree agree 
1234 5 
c) I feel apprehensive when I gamble. Strongly Strongly 
disagree agree 
1234 5 
d) I enjoy the excitement of gambling. Strongly Strongly 
disagree agree 
1234 5 
e) Whenever possible, I avoid gambling Strongly Strongly 
with my money. disagree agree 
1234 5 
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I see myself as someone who.... 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do 
you agree that you are someone who likes to spend time with others? Please circle a 
number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with 
that statement. 
Strongly Strongly 
aim am a names 
1. Is talkative. 
2. Tends to find fault with others. 
3. Does a thorough job. 
4. Is depressed, blue. 
5. Is original, comes up with new ideas. 
6. Is reserved. 
7. Is helpful and unselfish with others. 
8. Can be somewhat careless. 
9. Is relaxed, handles stress well. 
10. Is curious about many different things. 
11. Is full of energy. 
12. Starts quarrels with others. 
13. Is a reliable worker. 
14. Can be tense. 
15. Is ingenious, a deep thinker. 
16. Generates a lot of enthusiasm. 
17. Has a forgiving nature. 
18. Tends to be disorganised. 
19. Worries a lot. 
20. Has an active imagination. 
21. Tends to be quiet. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
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22. Is generally trusting. 
23. Tends to be lazy. '' 
24. Is emotionally stable, not easily upset. 
25. Is inventive. 
26. Has an assertive personality. 
27. Can be cold and aloof. 
28. Perseveres until the task is finished. 
29. Can be moody. 
30. Values artistic, aesthetic experiences. 
31. Is sometimes shy, inhibited. 
32. Is considerate and kind to almost 
everyone. 
33. Does things efficiently. 
34. Remains calm in tense situations. 
35. Prefers work that is routine. 
36. Is outgoing, sociable. 
37. Is sometimes rude to others. 
38. Makes plans and follows through with 
them. 
39. Gets nervous easily. 
40. Likes to reflect, play with ideas. 
41. Has few artistic interests. 
42. Likes to co-operate with others. 
43. Is easily distracted. 
44. Is sophisticated in art, music or 
literature. 
Thank you very much for your help. 
Strongly Strongly 
disagree agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Advertisements for the research 
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Mountain climbers advert 
Risk taking research participants wanted 
Would you like to take part in a study of risk taking? Emma Soane, from London 
Business School and the University of Sheffield, is looking into why some people 
take more risks than others. The study considers what factors in peoples' 
psychological make-up and experience go into risk seeking or risk avoidance. Your 
participation would be greatly appreciated. 
Would you like to be involved? All you have to do is fill in a questionnaire which 
takes about 15 minutes. The questionnaire will be sent to you, along with a reply paid 
envelope for you to return it. Contact Emma Soane on 0171 262 5050 ext 3707, or 
email esoane@lbs. ac. uk leaving your name, address and mentioning `mountain 
climbing research' in your message. Watch this space for the results. 
Chess players advert 
Why do you take some risks but not others? 
I'm doing research into why some people take a lot of risks, some people avoid risks 
and some people are in between. I'm looking for chess players to take part to see 
whether you take risks in some areas of your life but not others. 
What does it involve? 
Completing a questionnaire that is anonymous and voluntary. 
How do I take part? 
Contact Emma Soane on 0171 262 5050 ext. 3707, or email esoane , 
lbs. ac. uk saying 
that you want to take part in the chess research 
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Descriptive statistics 
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Appendix 6 
Descriptive statistics for the newly 
created variables used in the analysis 
discussed in Chapter 7 
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Appendix 7 
The development of the domain-specific 
risk preference scales discussed in Chapter 7 
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Principal components analysis was used to examine each set of ten domain-specific 
items. The tables below show the Varimax rotated component matrix for each set of 
items. 
Table A7.1: Varimax rotated component matrix, for work domain-specific items 
Component 
1 2 3 
1. I meet almost all my goals at work without . 759 . 005 -. 
183 
significant risk to me or the organisation. 
2. When making an important decision, I would 
. 631 -. 003 . 
198 
rather wait and see than risk making a mistake. 
3. Risk is part of the excitement and interest of -, 593 . 
240 -. 005 
my work. 
4. I prefer not to reach targets than to take risks. . 534 -. 
321 . 141 
5. I avoid the risk of making a mistake as often as . 446 -. 
242 . 217 possible. 
6. To get on with my work, I am happy to put up . 
005 
. 
812 -. 003 
with things that can go wrong. 
7. I do whatever it takes, including taking risks, -. 302 . 
581 -. 008 
to achieve targets. 
8. To achieve at work, I have to risk making -. 437 . 
517 . 
367 
mistakes. 
9. I feel apprehensive that I might make a mistake -. 003 -. 141 . 
853 
at work. 
10. I feel apprehensive when I take risks to . 
457 
. 
145 . 
672 
achieve work-related goals. 
Factor 1 comprised items 1,2,3 (recoded), 4 and 5. 
Cronbach's alpha for Factor 1= . 633 
Factor 1 formed the work goals scale. 
Factor 2 comprised items 6,7 and 8. 
Cronbach's alpha for Factor 2 =. 483 
Factor 2 was not used in subsequent analysis. 
Factor 3 comprised items 9 and 10. 
Cronbach's alpha for Factor 3 =. 544 
Factor 3 was not used in subsequent analysis. 
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Table A7.2: Varimax rotated component matrix for health domain-specific items 
Com ponent 
1 2 3 4 
1. I feel spending a lot of time at work is losing -. 720 . 
117 -. 005 . 
411 
out on a full life. 
2. I get satisfaction from working long hours. , 706 . 175 . 221 . 
003 
3. I rarely take work home in the evenings or at -. 701 . 003 . 180 -. 
146 
weekends. 
4. The best way to get my work done is for work . 681 -. 
004 . 
007 . 
315 
to have top priority in my life. 
5. To do what I want to in life, I have to expose -. 003 . 847 . 
102 . 101 myself to things which can be health hazards. 
6. My health is too important to me to put it at -. 009 -. 756 . 
277 . 
008 
risk voluntarily. 
7. I'd rather enjoy life than spend time trying to -. 005 . 486 -. 
452 -. 009 
avoid health hazards. 
8. I try to prevent health problems before I feel -. 001 . 
007 
. 
837 -. 006 
any symptoms. 
9. I am apprehensive about health hazards and 
. 009 -. 284 . 705 -. 
003 
take action to prevent them. 
10. I am apprehensive if I know I need to spend a . 161 -. 
002 -. 005 . 
895 
lot of time doing things unrelated to work in the 
evenings or at weekends. 
Factor 1 comprised items 1 (recoded), 2,3 (recoded) and 4. 
Cronbach's alpha for Factor 1= . 658 
Factor 1 formed the life balance scale. 
Factor 2 comprised items 5,6 (recoded) and 7. 
Cronbach's alpha for Factor 2 =. 603 
Factor 2 formed the health protection scale. 
Factor 3 comprised items 8 and 9. 
Cronbach's alpha for Factor 3 =. 210 
Factor 3 was not used in subsequent analysis. 
Factor 4 comprised item 10. 
Factor 4 was not used in subsequent analysis. 
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Table A7.3: Varimax rotated component matrix for finance domain-specific items 
C omponent 
1 2 3 
1. I enjoy the excitement of gambling. -. 843 . 125 -. 
003 
2. Gambling is an opportunity for me to have fun. -. 824 . 
007 -. 005 
3. Whenever possible, I avoid gambling with my 
money. . 
732 -. 137 . 330 
4. Gambling is just a waste of money. . 
656 -. 006 . 
009 
5. I enjoy spending most of my disposable income. -. 001 . 
836 . 
007 
6. I prefer to always leave a good proportion of my 
money in my account, or save it, than risk or spend 
much of my money. 
. 
002 -. 792 . 
205 
7. I take opportunities to enjoy my money now, 
rather than in the future. 
-. 129 . 747 . 
008 
8. I systematically divide my income into spending 
and saving money. . 
104 -. 509 . 
107 
9. I feel apprehensive when I gamble. . 
263 
. 146 . 
830 
10. I feel apprehensive if I know I'm likely to 
overspend. . 
005 -. 469 . 684 
Factor 1 comprised items 1 (recoded), 2 (recoded), 3 and 4. 
Cronbach's alpha for Factor 1= . 791 
Factor 1 formed the gambling scale. 
Factor 2 comprised items 5 (recoded), 6,7 (recoded) and S. 
Cronbach's alpha for Factor 2 =. 721 
Factor 2 formed the use of money scale. 
Factor 3 comprised items 9 and 10. 
Cronbach's alpha for Factor 3 =. 477 
Factor 3 was not used in subsequent analysis. 
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Appendix 8 
Correlations between domain-specific 
risk preference scales discussed in Chapter 7 
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Table A8.1: Correlations between domain-specific risk preference scales 
Work goals Life balance Health Gambling 
scale scale protection scale 
scale 
Life balance scale . 
001 
358 
Health protection -. 136 ** -. 031 
scale 358 358 
Gambling scale 
. 305 *** . 130 
t -. 186 ** 
220 220 220 
Use of money . 130 
* 
. 
099 t -. 278 *** . 
199 ** 
358 358 358 220 
tp<. 1, *p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001 
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